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INTRODUCTION

It is generally recognized that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA, or the Act)1 was patterned after Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 Indeed, enacted in 1967, the ADEA's substantive prohibitions were lifted verbatim from Title VI1 and, in comparing the two statutes, one can easily substitute "age" for Title VII's
protected categories of race, gender, religion, and national origin.4
Due to this similarity, the judiciary and the agencies responsible for
enforcing the ADEA historically have looked to Title VII for guidance.

1. Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), Pub. L. No. 90-202, ch. 14, 81 Stat.
602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988)).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), Pub. L. No. 88-352, ch. 21, 78 Stat. 253 (1964)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982 & Supp. 1986)).
3. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 & n.12 (1978) (substantive provisions of the
ADEA "were derived in haec verba from Title VII") (emphasis in original); see also Hodgson
v. First Fed. Say., 455 F.2d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1972).
4. Compare ADEA § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988) with Title VII § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a) (1982).
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Thus, ADEA courts generally apply Title VII-created methods of

proof,5 Title VII-created interpretations of key defenses, 6 and Title
VII-created interpretations of certain procedures.7 While this "cross-

breeding" has been accepted largely without question, two critically
interrelated areas of borrowed doctrine continue to stir controversy
and hover uneasily over the Act: the role of costs as a legitimate basis
for terminating or refusing to hire employees, and the availability of
disparate impact as a theory of liability under the ADEA.
The cost problem exists because older workers may in fact create
costs for enmployers in ways not encountered under Title VII. The
issue is provocative because it highlights one of the greatest tensions
in our employment discrimination laws. From Title VII, we are famil-

iar with the maxim that mere cost savings may not be used to justify
discrimination. 8 There is, in other words, a price

-

a cost -

for

5. See, e.g., Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1015 (1st Cir. 1979) (given the similarities
between Title VII and the ADEA, "one naturally might expect to use the same methods and
burdens of proof").
6. See, e.g., Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 411-17 & n.23 (1985) (applying
Title VII case law to interpret the ADEA's bona fide occupational qualification exception).
7. See, e.g., Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 754-59 (1979) (relying on Title
VII to interpret parallel ADEA provisions governing the relationship between federal and state
enforcement procedures); Quinn v. Bowmar Publishing Co., 445 F. Supp. 780, 784 (D. Md. 1978)
(interpretation of Title VII procedures may be used to interpret ADEA procedures).
However, while the ADEA's substantive provisions are derived from Title VII, its procedural
and enforcement scheme is derived both from Title VII and the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 201-219 (1988)). See
ADEA § 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988) (incorporating by reference FLSA §§ 11(b), 15, 16, 29
U.S.C. 88 211(b), 216, 217 (1988)). Because of this hybrid enforcement scheme, ADEA procedure
differs from Title VII in two noted aspects: the availability of jury trials and the nature of class
actions. Jury trials are available under the FLSA, and thus the ADEA, but not under Title
VII. See Lorillard,474 U.S. at 582-83. Class actions, available under Title VII pursuant to the
general procedures of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, are restricted under the
ADEA only to individuals who affirmatively "opt in" and consent to be included, in a representative suit. See ADEA § 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (incorporating by reference FLSA § 16(b),
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988)); Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 118 F\R.D. 351, 358-59 (D.N.J. 1987).
Administration of the ADEA initially was assigned to the Department of Labor, the agency
that administered the FLSA. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No.
90-202, §§ 6-7, 81 Stat. 602, 604-05 (1967). In 1979, however, Congress transferred ADEA
responsibility to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which already administered Title VII, in an effort to consolidate enforcement responsibility in a single agency.
Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1978), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. § 1155 (1982), and
in 92 Stat. 3781 (1978).
8. See City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-17
(1978) (rejecting a general cost justification defense under Title VII).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

securing more important remedial and social objectives. To cite but a
few examples: employers may not justify discrimination on grounds
of customer preference regardless of its profitability; 9 they may not
rely on race or gender as crude proxies for performance simply because
such proxies may be easy to apply and inexpensive to administer; 1°
they may not rely solely on the cheapness of neutral proxies if they
operate to target protected groups and are not sufficiently job related;"
and they must provide women equal pay for equal work even if the
market would place a lower value on female labor.12 These examples
illustrate the costs of compliance - employers must forfeit the profits
derived from discrimination. But assuming compliance and merit-based
selection, blacks and women are not, by their race or gender, uniquely
costlier to compensate.
The same cannot be said as easily of workers covered under the
ADEA. Seniority and longevity often influence salary and fringe benefit levels. Because these factors correlate with age, older workers
can become more costly to compensate than their younger counterparts. 13 This disparity creates significant tension during times of
economic stress when employers look to maximize savings by laying
off or replacing their costliest workers.' 4 The tension exists because
the use of salary costs as a criterion for layoffs appears to be both
economically rational yet peculiarly burdensome to the older segment
of the work force. To the extent the ADEA prohibits discriminatory
discharges out of concern that displaced older workers face unique
obstacles in finding employment late in their careers, 15 seniority-related cost comparisons can frustrate that objective. On the other hand,
to require employers to ignore such costs as part of an economic

9. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir.) (customer
preference for female flight attendants cannot justify a gender-based hiring policy), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 950 (1971).
10. See, e.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1969) (insisting
on a very strong correlation between gender and an essential job requirement before an employer
may utilize a gender-based policy).
11. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-32 (1977) (rejecting employer's use
of a height and weight requirement that disproportionately excluded women and was only
crudely symptomatic of the physical demands of the job).
12. See, e.g., Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 205 (1974) (pay differential
found unlawful under Equal Pay Act).
13. Studies reveal that a correlation often exists between seniority-related pay practices
and age. See sources cited infra note 131.
14. See, e.g., Metz v. Transit Mix Co., 828 F.2d 1202, 1211 (7th Cir. 1987) (high-salaried
senior employee replaced by junior employee to save on salary differential).
15. See infra notes 194-98 and accompanying text.
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cutback may equally frustrate the need for sensible cost-cutting
policies.
The courts have approached this problem uncritically. Most have
summarily rejected the use of salary comparisons as a basis for decisionmaking under the ADEA, irrespective of the employer's

economic difficulty.' 6 They have reached this result primarily by treating the seniority-salary criterion as the equivalent of an overt age
classification, even though it is at least facially neutral. 17 By this
characterization, age discrimination is established per se, and the
courts are able to draw on the settled principle that costs can never,

or hardly ever, serve as a justification for discriminatory treatment.'
This analysis appears to ignore the employer's attempt to offer the

facially neutral cost policy not as a justification for admitted discrimination, but to deny the charge of discrimination altogether. As a
result, the courts do not seriously examine the employer's economic
needs.

Several commentators, and some jurists, have rightly criticized
this approach but have advanced an equally extreme position. They

suggest treating the salary cost factor as an inherently reasonable,
non-age criterion that remains immune from challenge unless it can
be exposed as a pretext to target older workers. 19 Their argument

16. See Metz, 828 F.2d at 1211; Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 691
(8th Cir. 1983); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1034 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
945 (1981); Gelof v. Papineau, 648 F. Supp. 912, 921 (D. Del. 1986), modified on other grounds,
829 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1987); Franci v. Avco Corp., 538 F. Supp. 250, 259 (D. Conn. 1982);
Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, 454 F. Supp. 715, 730 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), affd in part, and rev'd
in part without opinion, 608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979).
17. See, e.g., Metz, 828 F.2d at 1206-08; Marshall, 454 F. Supp. at 728.
18. See Metz, 828 F.2d at 1206-08; Marshall, 454 F. Supp. at 728; see also Smallwood v.
United Airlines, 661 F.2d 303 (4th Cir.) (economic considerations cannot justify age-based treatment), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1007 (1981); 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(f) (employers generally may not
rely on age-related cost factors to justify action against older workers).
19. See C. BOLICK, THE AGE DISCRIMINATION AND EMPLOYMENT ACT: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY OR REVERSE DISCRIMINATION? 5-8 (Cato Institute Feb. 10, 1987); Blumrosen, Interpreting the ADEA: Intent or Impact, in AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT: A
COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION MANUAL FOR LAWYERS AND PERSONNEL PRACTITIONERS
68, 106-07, 111-15 (M. Lake ed. 1982); Calille, Three Developing Issues of the Federal Age
Discriminationin Employment Act of 1967, 54 DET. J. URB. L. 431, 435-46 (1977); Note, Age
Discriminationand the DisparateImpact Doctrine, 4 STAN. L. REv. 837, 851-52 (1982). For
jurists opposing the prevailing view, see Geller v. Markham, 451 U.S. 945, 948 (1981) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting from Court's order denying certiorari) (suggesting that salary cost justification is
a legitimate neutral factor regardless of its age-based impact); Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828
F.2d 1202, 1211 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., ,dissenting) (same); Mastie v. Great Lakes
Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299, 1318 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (employer need not ignore costs associated
with individual's higher salary).
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ignores the potential for liability under the disparate impact theory
- a Title VII creation in which liability is based on a showing of
unjustified discriminatory effect rather than intent. More precisely,
their argument is based on the broader claim that the disparate impact
theory does not belong in the ADEA. 2°
This article examines this controversy and attempts to justify a
more balanced approach between these two extremes. The thesis is
that courts are incorrect doctrinally in treating a reliance on salary
cost factors as overt age discrimination and in uncritically applying
an anti-cost principle derived from that setting. Commentators and
jurists in opposition are equally in error in refusing to scrutinize facially
neutral cost criteria beyond a vain search for intent. Their approach
risks insulating criteria that are age-based in effect even if scrutiny
under an objective standard might reveal the criteria as merely convenient or unnecessary in light of less restrictive alternatives. A balanced approach would recognize disparate impact as a theory of liability in age discrimination cases. It would do so in a manner consistent
with the Supreme Court's most recent decisions clarifying (some might
say "adjusting") the application of disparate impact theory under Title
VII.21

After an overview of the statute, the first half of this article will
focus on cost problems. It will assess the Title VII-created anti-cost
principle in light of the different ways cost issues can arise in the age
setting. Specifically, it will contrast cost arguments that are truly
offered as a justification for overt age policies from those (like salary
cost comparisons) that are offered as neutral criteria to deny age
discrimination altogether. Focusing on the latter, the article will then
critique the two approaches cited above and demonstrate the advantages of an approach based on disparate impact. This solution is irrelevant, of course, if the critics are right and disparate impact in general
does not belong in the ADEA. The second half of the article will
address this broader question in detail. It will critique the commentary
in opposition and offer a competing justification for applying disparate
impact in age cases.

20. See, e.g., Geller, 451 U.S. at 948-49; Metz, 828 F.2d at 1220; Blumrosen, supra note
19, at 70-106; Note, supra note 19, at 854-55. For other commentators opposing disparate impact
under the ADEA, see infra note 273.
21. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989); Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988); see also infra notes 143-47 and accompanying text (discussing
Wards Cove Packing and Watson).
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II.

2a5

ADEA OVERVIEW: PURPOSE, PROHIBITIONS,
AND EXCEPTIONS

The ADEA grew out of the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.2 While some support existed during the 1964 debates to
add "age" to Title VII's list of protected classifications,2 Congress
chose to defer the age issue for further examination, directing the
Secretary of Labor to make a "full and complete study of the factors
which may tend to result in discrimination in employment because of
age .... "" Within one year, Secretary Wirtz submitted a report that
documented the existence of widespread age discrimination in the
work place and its damaging effects on both unemployed older workers
and on the national economy.2 This report provided the catalyst for
swift passage of the ADEA in 1967.
The stated purposes of the Act are 'to promote employment of
older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and
workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of
age on employment."2 Collectively, these goals reflect the central
theme of the Act - to shift focus away from chronological age and
age-related barriers and to insist on individual assessments of ability
and merit in making employment decisions. This theme is further
clarified by the provision that defines the class of protected employeesY Consistent with congressional concern with the employment
problems faced by "older" workers, and not with age discrimination
in the abstract, the Act applies only to workers who are forty and
olderas
22. Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), Pub. L. No. 88-352, ch. 21, 78 Stat. 253 (1964)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982 & Supp. 1986)); see also supra notes 1-4 and
accompanying text.
23. See 110 CONG. REc. 2596-99; 9911-13; 13,490-92 (1964); Freed & Dowell, The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 196, 196 (1972).
24.
25.

Civil Rights Act of of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 241, 265.
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, AGE DISCRIMINATION

IN

EMPLOYMENT, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER SECTION

715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1965) [hereinafter SECRETARY'S REPORT]. The report

also included a separate volume of supporting data and research materials. U.S. DEP'T

OF

LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT, REPORT

715 OF THE CIVIL
ACT OF 1964 RESEARCH MATERIALS (1965) [hereinafter RESEARCH MATERIALS].
26. Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), Pub. L. No. 90-202, ch. 14, 81 Stat.
602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 6214-34 (1988)).
27. ADEA § 12, 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1988).
28. Id. Age 40 was selected because 'testimony indicated this to be the age at which age
discrimination in employment becomes evident" and because "it was felt a further lowering of
OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER SECTION

RIGHTS
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The substantive prohibitions of the Act, tracked from Title VII,
broadly outlaw age distinctions in hiring, firing, promotion, and in all
other terms and conditions of employment.- But Congress did not
condemn every use of age in employment; its principle focus was on
limiting arbitrary age discrimination.3 0 To define this limit, the Act's
prohibitions are circumscribed by four statutory exceptions. An employer can avoid liability if: (1) age is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
business;31 (2) the age differential is based on the terms of a bona fide
seniority or employee benefit plan;32 (3) discharge or discipline is based
on good cause;M or (4) the employment action is based on a "reasonable
factor other than age" (RFOA).3 The last three exceptions are found
only in the ADEA and were not drawn from Title VII.35

the age limit . . . would lessen the primary objective; that is, the promotion of employment
opportunities for older workers." HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OP 1967, H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted
in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2213, 2219 [hereinafter 1967 HOUSE REPORT].
However, the 1967 Act did not protect all employees age 40 and over, but applied only to
employees between age 40 and 65. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, P.L. No.
90-202, § 12, 81 Stat. 607, § 12 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1988)). In addition,
the original Act was interpreted to permit forced retirement before age 65 if it was in accordance
with the terms of a bona fide pension plan. United Air Lines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 198-203
(1977). Amendments in 1978 prohibited pension-sponsored mandatory retirement. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 189, 189
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1988)). The 1978 Amendments also raised the
outer age limit of the Act from 65 to 70. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256 § 12, 92 Stat. 189, 189 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 631
(1988)). Amendments in 1986 eliminated the outer age limit altogether, and thus abolished
involuntary retirement for nearly all covered employees. Age Discrimination in Employment
Amendment of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, 100 Stat. 3342 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §
631(a) (1988)).
29. ADEA § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988).
30. See generally id. § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. 621(b) (1988).
31. Id. § 4(f)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1988).
32. Id. § 4(f)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1988).
33. Id. § 4(f)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(3) (1988).
34. Id. § 4(f)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1988).
35. Administrative regulations also create an exception for bona fide apprenticeship programs. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.13 (1989). The regulation exempts such programs from ADEA coverage
and permits employers and unions to limit entry to younger workers based on the view that
such programs serve more of an educational than an employment function. Id. One court
has rejected this argument and found the regulation invalid. See Quinn v. New York State Elec.
& Gas Corp., 569 F. Supp. 655, 664 (N.D.N.Y. 1983). The EEOC, which inherited the regulation
from the Department of Labor when it assumed enforcement responsibility for the ADEA, twice
has proposed rescinding the exemption. See 45 Fed. Reg. 64,212 (1980); 50 Fed. Reg. 17,857
(1985). Each time, however, the EEOC decided to reaffirm it. See 46 Fed. Reg. 47,724 (1981);
52 Fed. Reg. 33,809 (1987).
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Not all of these "exceptions" are equal in character. The BFOQ
and benefit plan provisions are exceptions in the truest sense of permitting decisionmaking that is concededly age based and otherwise
unlawful. The BFOQ exception allows an employer to rely on age to
deny employment if age is a sufficient predictor of the necessary
requirements of the job.36 The benefit plan exception sanctions agebased adjustments in benefit levels in recognition of the age-related
costs commonly associated with certain pension and group insurance
37
programs.
The good cause and RFOA provisions are not exceptions in the
same sense of privileging conduct that is concededly discriminatory.
Under these provisions, employees typically attempt to deny age discrimination altogether by advancing a legitimate non-age factor as the
basis for the employment action.38 In this sense, these "exceptions"
appear to underscore that which is inherent in the Act - it condemns
only discrimination based on age. This would suggest that the scope

36. See Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 412-19 (1985); see also infra notes
51-94 and accompanying text (discussing the BFOQ exception).
37. See Note, InterpretingSection 4(f)(2) of the ADEA: Does Anyone Have a "Plan"?, 135
U. PA. L. REV. 1055, 1061-65 (1987) (recounting the legislative history behind the exception
and Congress's concern over the age-related costs associated with certain employee benefit
programs); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10 (1989) (interpretive regulations requiring employers to
show cost justification for age-based benefit reductions). But see Public Employees Retirement
Sys. v. Betts, 109 S. Ct. 2854, 2866-67 (1989) (interpreting the exception significantly more
broadly). For more detailed discussion, see infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
38. These defenses sometimes overlap in that "good cause" can be viewed as one particular
type of reasonable factor other than age. See Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974,
985 (9th Cir. 1981); Marshall v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 576 F.2d 588, 591 (5th Cir. 1978).
Courts have disagreed over whether the RFOA exception constitutes an affirmative defense
and shifts the entire burden of proof, or whether it merely shifts to the employer the obligation
to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for its employment decision. The latter
approach is more consistent with the burden-shifting paradigm used in Title VII disparate
treatment cases. See Eglit, The Age Discriminationin Employment Acts ForgottenAffirmative
Defense: The Reasonable Factors Other Than Age Exception, 66 B.U.L. REV. 155, 159-60

(1986); see also infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text. In disparate impact cases, by contrast,
the RFOA provision can be read to operate more in the nature of an affirmative defense since
disparate impact theory contemplates liability based on discriminatory effect, absent an overriding justification. An employer forced to 'Justify" a neutral rule that is age related would, in
effect, use the RFOA exception to advance its justification. See Eglit, supra, at 219-20, 223.
However, in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2126 (1989), the Supreme
Court modified the burden-shifting paradigm in Title VII disparate impact cases and held that
the burden of production, not proof, shifts to the employer to establish an overriding justification.
See infra notes 142-47 and accompanying text. This adjustment in burdens, as announced for
Title VII, would logically affect disparate impact cases under the ADEA as well. See Loeb v.
Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1015 (1st Cir. 1979).
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of the RFOA exception depends on the statutory meaning of "age
discrimination," a concept not expressly defined in the Act.3 If "age
discrimination" is meant to refer only to an employer's intentional
reliance on overt age criteria (disparate treatment), then the RFOA
exception would protect as a "factor other than age" any believable,
facially neutral explanation. If age discrimination is meant to refer
also to an employer's use of facially neutral criteria that create unjustified or unnecessary age-based effects (disparate impact), then a believable, non-age criterion might be vulnerable to challenge.40 These
options as to the meaning of age discrimination foreshadow the debate
on whether disparate impact theory belongs in the ADEA.
Because the Act does not provide a generic cost defense, an employer wishing to deny employment based on cost must do so through
one of the statutory exceptions. The exception applicable will vary
depending upon the nature of the cost argument and whether it is
invoked to justify or to deny age-based treatment. This distinction is
critical in assessing the validity of salary comparisons. The discussion
below reflects this division, focusing first on cost as a justification for
age-based treatment, and then on cost as a reasonable factor other
than age.
III.

COST AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR AGE-BASED TREATMENT

A.

Basic Anti-Cost Principles

Employment discrimination laws, such as Title VII and the ADEA,
prohibit employers from denying employment based on certain forbidden criteria. One of the underlying assumptions of these laws is that
decisionmaking based on such criteria is unfair because the criteria
are unrelated, or insufficiently related, to job performance and productivity. 41 If this assumption were always true, it would mean that dis-

39. While the ADEA contains a definition section, it does not include a definition of "discrimination." See ADEA § 11 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 630 (1988)). The same is true of
Title VII. See Title VII § 701 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982)).
40. See infra text accompanying notes 357-60.
41. See Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 237 (1971)
(fair employment laws "prohibit businessmen from making employment decisions on the basis
of race or color - a criterion whose use would in any event impair rather than advance
productivity and wealth maximization"); see also G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971) (forbidden criteria in employment discrimination laws are
not related to productivity); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 27.1 (3d ed. 1986)
(in a competitive market, economic forces tend to minimize discrimination and penalize employers
who engage in discriminatory behavior); Donohue, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV.
1411 (1986) (Title VII promotes long-term efficiency by burdening employers who rely on non-productivity-based factors).
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crimination is economically irrational and the profit-minded employer
would abandon discriminatory policies.42 In practice, however, discrimination, at least in the short term, is not always economically
irrational. According to economists, an employer might find forbidden

criteria attractive, even if only crudely predictive of productivity
needs, because they are relatively convenient and cheap to administer.43 Forbidden criteria also might be attractive if the employer's
customers opposed the employment of a protected group and would

withdraw their business if the discriminating employer substituted a
nondiscriminatory policy. 44 Similarly, the employer might cater to the
discriminatory preferences of its employees to avoid the productivity
problems and personnel conflicts that might erupt within a disgruntled
45
work force.

Since the enactment of employment discrimination laws, courts

have had to face the question of whether such laws would prohibit
only the irrational use of forbidden criteria or whether they would
prohibit these examples of "rational" discrimination as well. The quick
(but imprecise) answer is the latter: Title VII and the ADEA generally

46
prohibit the use of illicit criteria irrespective of economic rationality.

In this sense, the law serves to blunt market incentives to discriminate.
In the race setting, this answer is apparent from the structure of

42. See L. REYNOLDS, LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 159, 159 (7th ed.
1978) (maintaining that, in a purely competitive market, only least discriminatory employers
could survive); see also Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination,in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR
MARKETS 3, 20-23 (0. Ashenfelter & A. Rees eds. 1973) (discriminatory practices are destructive
in the long run).
43. See Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659,
659-61 (1972). This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as "statistical" discrimination. Id. The
premise is that when an employer perceives a general or statistical correlation between a
protected trait (such as race, gender, or age) and productivity, the employer may also assume
that any error costs that result from relying on the protected trait may be smaller than the
cost of developing and implementing a more accurate method of selection. On this assumption,
the employer would have an incentive to use the protected trait as a crude, but easy-to-use
predictor. Id. See Arrow, supranote 42, at 23-25; Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of PreferentialTreatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 9-11; see also
Fiss, supra note 41, at 257 (referring to the use of race as a crude symptom of merit).
44. See Fiss, supra note 41, at 257.
45. Id. at 258.
46. See City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978)
(rejecting general cost defense for overt discrimination under Title VII); Smallwood v. United
Air Lines, 661 F.2d 303, 307 (4th Cir. 1981) ("Economic considerations. .,.cannot be the basis
for a BFOQ [under the ADEA, since] precisely those considerations were among the targets
of the Act."), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1007 (1982); see also Fiss, supra note 41, at 258-63 (fair
employment laws have been understood to prohibit discriminatory practices even when they
are instituted for rational economic reasons).
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Title VII itself. Title VII prohibits race-based treatment absolutely
and provides no exception for rational or economically motivated discrimination. 47 This absolute approach is consistent with the broad consensus that race criteria are morally and socially condemnable 4 8 and,
in the aggregate, harmful to the national economy. 49 Further, this
absolute approach reflects the reality that there is nothing inherent
in race that correlates with performance.
Aside from race, however, Title VII is not absolute. It contains a
BFOQ exception for gender,- and a similar exception is incorporated
into the ADEA. 51 Thus, while cost justifications often are rejected in
gender and age cases, the reasons for doing so are not as apparent
from the structure of the two statutes. One must look to judicial
interpretations affecting the scope of the BFOQ exception.
B.

The BFOQ and the Anti-Cost Rule Under Title VII

The BFOQ exception to Title VII reflects the view that, in certain
circumstances, gender may be used to determine one's suitability for
employment.52 But the exception naturally competes with the broader

47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). Race is noticeably excluded from Title VII's BFOQ
exception. See Title VII § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1982).
48. Nickel, Discriminationand Morally Relevant Characteristics,32 ANALYSIS 113, 113-14
(1972) (stating that race is morally irrelevant); Fiss, supra note 41, at 259-62 (absolute ban
would avoid risk of abuse, would avoid "legitimating" race discrimination through exceptions,
would avoid psychological and economic harm to the victim, would encourage "responsible behavior" in business, and would advance values other than wealth maximization).
49. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 149, 151 (1963), and H.R. REP. No.
1370, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1962), reprintedin EEOC, Legislative History of Titles VII and
XI of Civil Rights Act of 1964, at 2149, 2151, 2156-57 (1964) (reflecting Congress's strong concern
about the national economic consequences of race discrimination). For a full discussion of the
influence of economic factors on the passage of Title VII, see Caldwell, Reaffirming the Disproportionate Effects Standard of Liability in Title VII Litigation, 46 U. PIrrr. L. REV. 555,
579-83 (1985).
50. Title VII § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1982). This exception also applies to
criteria based on religion and national origin. Id.
51. ADEA § 4(f)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1988).
52. The legislative history to the BFOQ exception is sparse. This is because "sex" was
inserted as a protected category under Title VII near the end of debate, without hearings, as
a gambit to derail the legislation. See 110 CONG. REC. 2584 (1964); see also Holloway v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977) (citations omitted); Sirota, Sex Discrimination:
Title VII and the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification, 55 TEx. L. REV. 1025, 1027 (1977).
While isolated remarks about the BFOQ exception are scattered in the legislative record, the
most direct indication of congressional intent regarding the exception appears in the Interpretative Memorandum of Title VII, submitted by the Senate floor managers of the bill. 110 CONG.
REc. 7212 (1964); see also Sirota, supra, at 1028. The memorandum explained, inter alia, that
the BFOQ provision would provide a "limited right to discriminate." 110 CONG. REC. at 7213.
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proposition that gender, as a forbidden criterion, is usually a poor
predictor of an employer's job needs, and that gender-based policies
frequently rest on stereotypes and unfounded assumptions rather than
on fact. 53 As a result, the courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity Council (EEOC) have interpreted the BFOQ exception narrowly
and have imposed on employers a demanding standard of justification.5

The employer must show: (1) that the trait or requirement at issue
relates to an essential, not merely a tangential, aspect of the business; 55

and (2) that gender constitutes an accurate proxy for the desired
trait . 5 To meet this second obligation, the employer must show either
that gender is almost perfectly, correlative with the trait in question,
or that gender is needed as an imperfect barometer because it is
highly impractical to screen for the desired trait on an individual
basis. 57 Gender-based BFOQs are rarely upheld under this standard.
Absent jobs in which individuals must possess certain sexual and

biological characteristics,5 gender is generally regarded as a poor

53. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1790-91 (1989) (evidence of
sex stereotyping can raise a strong presumption of unlawful discrimination); City of Los Angeles
Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) (in banning discrimination
based on sex "Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men
and women resulting from sex stereotypes") (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d
1194, 1198 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971)); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400
U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (per curiam) (rejecting employer policy against employing women with
pre-school-age children despite the generalization that mothers, more than fathers, assume
primary parenting responsibilities). See generally Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion
of Women to Positionsof Power, 41 HAST. L.J. 471 (1990).
54. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977) (BFOQ was '"meant to be an
extremely narrow exception"); see also Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.2 (1989) [hereinafter Sex Discrimination Guidelines) (BFOQ "exception as to sex should
be interpreted narrowly."). The applicable test combines the holdings of two leading circuit
court opinions: Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388-89 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 950 (1971), and Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 236 (5th Cir.
1969). In Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985), the Supreme Court endorsed this
test under Title VII and applied it to the ADEA. Id. at 412-15.
55. See Criswell, 472 U.S. at 413. This requirement is derived from Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388.
In the airline industry, for example, a restriction designed to ensure safe air transport would
relate to the "essence of the business," see, e.g., Hoefelman v. Conservation Comm'n, 541 F.
"Supp. 272 (W.D. Mo. 1982), affd, 718 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1983), whereas the employment of
only female flight attendants based on their allegedly superior capacity to provide a pleasant
environment for passengers would not. See, e.g., Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388.
56. See Criswell,472 U.S. at 414. This requirement is derived from Weeks, 408 F.2d at 235.
57. Criswell, 472 U.S. at 414 & n.19 (paraphrasing Weeks, 408 F.2d at 235 n.5).
58. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 1971) (distinguishing between the innate sexual characteristics required of a wet nurse and more neutral
traits, such as strength, that merely may correlate more strongly with one gender).
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proxy for performance and productivity. Physical strength or dexterity
ordinarily can be assessed individually rather than by relying on as59
sumptions about women in general.
Both the stringent requirements of the BFOQ test and its particular
focus on gender as a proxy for ability make it difficult to justify a
BFOQ on cost alone. As one commentator has observed, "[t]he thrust
of the BFOQ defense is on the inability of an employee to perform.
Additional costs cannot be a defense because they do not affect an
employee's performance." This statement is essentially correct, even
if too absolute. Thus, an employer may not justify a male-only policy
61
based on the cost of constructing added facilities for female workers,
or on the loss of business or on inefficiencies that may result from
either lowered employee morale or customer dissatisfaction with the
employment of a particular gender group. 62 To illustrate, the fact that
airline passengers may prefer slim, young, female flight attendants,6
or that customers of a beauty salon may prefer male hairdressers,6
will not support a BFOQ even if catering to such preferences enhances
profitability. In this sense, the BFOQ exception incorporates a general
anti-cost bias similar to that discussed above in the race setting.
The bias here is less absolute, however, as it is subject to limited
exceptions. The "authenticity" exception recognizes that in certain
situations sex or ethnicity is such a part of the product being sold
that the employer must be allowed to cater to customer expectation

59. See Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 234 (5th Cir. 1969) ("strenuous" tasks of switchmen on a railroad insufficient to support a gender BFOQ); see also Sex
Discrimination Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. 1604.2(a)(1)(ii) (1988) ("principle of nondiscrimination requires that individuals be considered on the basis of individual capacities and not on the basis
of any characteristics generally attributed to the group"); Sirota, supra note 52, at 1048. But
see Levin v. Delta Air Lines, 730 F.2d 994, 998-99, 1002 (5th Cir. 1984); Harris v. Pan Am.
World Airways, 649 F.2d 670, 676-77 (9th Cir. 1980) (upholding policies requiring female flight
attendants to begin involuntary pregnancy leave during the first trimester of pregnancy). Given
the slim correlation between early pregnancy and one's capacity to perform, it is difficult to
reconcile the latter cases with the BFOQ test. The cases arguably reflect the greater tendency
of courts to uphold BFOQs when safety is at stake. See infra note 93.
60. M. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIINATION LAW § 5.29, at 288 (1988).
61. See Sex Discrimination Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (b)(4)(i) (1989). See also EEOC
Decision No. 72-1292, 1973 EEOC Dec. 464 (1972) (restrooms); EEOC Decision No. 70-558, 1973
EEOC Dec. 4236 (1970) (housing).
62. Sex Discrimination Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(iii) (1989).
63. See, e.g., Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, 692 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
dismissed, 460 U.S. 1074 (1983); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 387 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
64. See, e.g., Witt v. Secretary of Labor, 397 F. Supp. 673, 678 (D. Me. 1975).
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in order to operate successfully. 65 Thus, a French restaurant might
legitimately employ only French chefs and waiters in an effort to

market "authentic" French cuisine;6 the Playboy Club might claim
the right to employ only women as waitresses on the ground that
sexual atmosphere, not just food and drink, is part of the primary
service. 67 The point here is not to debate the wisdom of these licenses

but to suggest that they represent a slight relaxation of the anti-cost
rule. An employer need not ignore customer expectations and suffer

a loss in business when sex or ethnicity is part of the business itself.
At the same time, this authenticity exception has been construed
so narrowly as to underscore rather than detract from the anti-cost
principle. Best known perhaps is Wilson v. Southwest Airlines,68 a

case in which a district court rejected a gender BFOQ for flight attendants despite evidence that the gender requirement was vital to the

employer's program to market its struggling airline as a sex club in
the sky. 69 Although the airline's profits surged as a result of the marketing campaign, the court ruled that safe air transport, not sexual
atmosphere, remained the airline's primary function, and that the

struggling employer could not prevail merely by citing profitmaking
as the "essence of [its] business." 70 In practical terms, the court drew

a line, fearing that any business could otherwise claim a BFOQ simply
by "tacking on sex or sex appeal as a qualification for any public
contact position where customers preferred employees of a particular
sex.",71

65. See Sex Discrimination Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2) (1989).
66. This example is cited with approval in the legislative history to Title VII. See 110
CONG. REC. 7213 (1964) (Interpretative Memorandum of Title VII submitted by the Senate
Floor Managers of the Civil Rights Bill); 110 CONG. REC. 2849 (1964) (Congressman Dent); see
also Local 246, Utility Workers Union v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 320 F. Supp. 1262, 1265
(C.D. Cal. 1970) (authenticity BFOQ in Chinese restaurant). But cf. EEOC Decision No. YSF-9058, 1973 EEOC Ree. 4128 (1969) (employer's desire to add "class" to restaurant cannot support
a gender BFOQ limiting employment to male waiters).
67. See St. Cross v. Playboy Club, App. 773, Case No. CFS 22618-70 State Human Rights
Appeal Bd. (N.Y. 1971) (dicta); Weber v. Playboy Club, App. 774, Case No. CFS 22619-70,
State Human Rights Appeal Bd. (N.Y. 1971) (dicta); see also Sirota, supra note 52, at 1066-68
(surveying employer claims based on sex appeal).
68. 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
69. Id. at 304.
70. Id. at 302; see also Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1981)
(foreign bias against women in business cannot justify a gender BFOQ); Guardian Capital Corp.
v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 46 A.D.2d 832, 360 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1974) (unlawful
for employer to fire male waiter and substitute sexually attractive waitress to change the appeal
of its business), appeal dismissed, 36 N.Y.2d 806, 330 N.E.2d 658, 369 N.Y.S.2d 1027, appeal
denied, 37 N.Y.2d 705, 337 N.E.2d 145, 374 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1975).
71. Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 304.
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The second prong of the BFOQ test - requiring evidence of a
strong correlation between gender and job performance - also embodies anti-cost principles and an exception. It furthers anti-cost
principles by insisting that an employer's reliance on a forbidden criterion must be based on its predictive power and not simply on its attractiveness as an inexpensive selection device.72 As for the exception,
recall that, as an alternative to showing a near perfect correlation
between gender and an essential job trait, the employer may point to
the impracticality of individualized screening.m Under this standard,
an employer certainly may not shun individual assessments merely
because they will result in some added expense or because a group
generalization would be cheaper and easier to administer.74 But the
"impracticality" standard suggests that, at some point, an employer
may consider the cost of alternative selection devices. Logically, it is
not enough that technology is available to provide highly accurate
individual screening if the employer can show that the cost of the
technology is prohibitive.- 5
As explained thus far-, the anti-cost rule, with its limited exceptions,
obligates an employer to absorb the cost of abandoning discriminatory
policies, whether it be the cost of added facilities, the economic consequences of a disappointed clientele, or the cost of switching from a
cheap and convenient proxy to more accurate measures of job performance. These are, in effect, the transitional costs of compliance. They
are transitional in the sense that they can be offset in the long term.
The cost of added facilities simply represents a start-up expense.76
The cost consequences of ignoring customer preference should exist
only if customers can shop elsewhere to satisfy a taste for discrimination. Assuming compliance with the law, i.e., assuming all competitors
abandon discriminatory practices, no employer should suffer a competi-

72. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
74. See Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 235 n.26 (5th Cir. 1976) (insufficient for employer to allege that individualized screening would require added expense); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 428 F. Supp. 1118, 1120 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (BFOQ rejected when accurate,
inexpensive test could have been devised), vacated in part, 569 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978).
75. See Freed & Polsby, Privacy, Efficiency, and the Equality of Men and Women: A
Revisionist View of Sex Discriminationin Employment, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 583,
607 n.75 (arguing that administrative cost is relevant to an employer's choice of selection criteria);
see also Note, The Age Discriminationin Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARV. L. REV. 380,
408-09 (1976) (advocating a flexible approach where courts would balance several factors, including the cost of alternative selective devices).
76. See cases cited supra note 61.
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tive disadvantage. 7 Finally, the added administrative cost of abandoning crude but inexpensive proxies is potentially offset by the productivity gains of switching to more accurate measures of merit78

But what of costs that are not transitional but reflect that a gender
group is simply more costly to employ and compensate? For example,
may employers draw gender distinctions because women as a group
cost more to cover under pension and insurance programs, either
because of their greater longevity or their capacity to become pregnant? May employers rely on statistical studies showing that women
as a group have a higher rate of turnover in certain areas of employment? 79 The Supreme Court effectively foreclosed these cost justifications in City of Los Angeles Department of Water Power v. Manhart,0
a case involving a challenge to a discriminatory pension policy. The
practice at issue required female employees to make greater pension
contributions than their male counterparts to account for the fact that
women as a group outlive men and are thus more costly to cover.81
While the Court did not dispute the accuracy of the actuarial data, it
rejected the gender policy on two related grounds. First, the Court
emphasized that the statute requires employers to treat employees as
individuals and not simply as "components of a racial, religious, sexual,
or national class."'82 The Court thus complained that the class-based

77. Cf. Fiss, supra note 41, at 257-58, 261 (noting that in a competitive market there is
an incentive for employers to inform on competitors who cater to customers' discriminatory
preferences).
78. See Caldwell, Reaffirming the DisproportionateEffects Standard of Liability in Title
VII Litigation,46 U. PITT.L. REV. 555 (1985). Professor Caldwell argues that fair employment
laws promote productive efficiency because they outlaw the use of non-productivity-related
criteria and because eliminating such criteria (and substituting ones that correlate more strongly
with productivity) will have the effect of expanding the pool of individuals who are allowed to
compete for jobs. Id. at 576-78; see also 1 C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 4.1, at 143-45 (2d ed. 1988) (reviewing Professor Caldwell's thesis).
79. Some commentators point to these statistical studies (of higher turnover and more
intermittent employment patterns) to explain the earnings gap between men and women. See,
e.g., Polachek, Women in the Economy: Perspective on Gender Inequality, in COMPARABLE
WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80's, A CONSULATION OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS

18, 34, 40-49 (1984). Others reject this explanation. See, e.g., CHAFETZ, MASCULINE, FEMININE
OR HUMAN? AN OVERVIEW OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER ROLES 68, 132-33 (2d ed. 1978)
(arguing that men and women quit at similar rates when their jobs are held constant); Blumrosen,
Wage Discrimination,Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 397, 415-28, 447 (1979) (attributing the wage gap to job segregation and to
employer misconceptions about the reliability of female employees).
80. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
81. Id. at 705.
82. Id. at 708.
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comparison regarding longevity, though true as a generalization, was
not true per individual. Second, the court observed that Title VII
does not contain a cost justification defense allowing for class-based
cost comparisons. 4
Manhart did not speak directly to the BFOQ defense since the
case involved a denial of benefits rather than employment. However,
by broadly condemning group classifications as a means for assessing
costs, the Manhart Court implicitly prohibited BFOQs based on cost
alone. Gender, in other words, may be used as a necessary proxy for
merit but not as a mere predictor of expense. The following section
examines how much of this anti-cost rule should apply in the ADEA
setting.
C.

The BFOQ and the Anti-Cost Rule Under the ADEA

The BFOQ provision of the ADEA is nearly identical to its Title
VII counterpart." When invoked under the ADEA, the employer typically concedes reliance on an age-based classification - such as an
age ceiling for hiring or a mandatory retirement age - but seeks to
justify the classification as a valid measure of a trait deemed essential
to the business.
The need for this exception reflects a duality about age discrimination that is not as apparent in the gender setting. The Act is built on
the premise that age alone is a poor predictor of individual performance

83. Id.
84. Id. at 716-17. The Court relied not only on the absence of a general cost defense in
Title VII but also on Congress's rejection of a proposed amendment to the Equal Pay Act that
would have allowed gender-related costs to constitute a specific defense. Id. at 717 n.32. The
Court reaffirmed Manhart in a slightly different pension context in Arizona Governing Comm'n
v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983) (per curiam). There, although men and women contributed
equally toward the purchase of lifetime annuities, the annuities for women yielded lower monthly
payments than those for men. Id. at 1077. The Court held that this discriiniatory treatment
could not be overcome by the fact that women as a group would receive their benefits over a
longer lifetime. See id. at 1085 & n.15 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part). For
application of this anti-cost principle to pregnancy disability insurance, see Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 685 n.26 (1983) (employer may not rely
on "costs" to justify the exclusion of pregnancy-related insurance coverage from an otherwise
comprehensive benefit program).
85. Compare ADEA § 4(f)(]), 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1988) with Title VII § 703(e)(1), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e 2(e)(1) (1982).
86. See, e.g., Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985) (unsuccessful attempt to
justify age 60 as a mandatory retirement age for flight engineers); EEOC v. University of Tex.
Health Science Center, 710 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1983) (successful attempt to justify age 45 as
the maximum hiring age for campus police officers).
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and that employees should be judged on individual merit, not on so-called group generalities. 7 The BFOQ exception, on the other hand,
recognizes that age can at some point affect performance, and that
the Act was not intended to insulate employees from the performancerelated consequences of aging.8 Still, as in gender cases, broad use
of this privilege could undermine the goals of the statute. Imprecise
use of age as a predictor of performance could foster the very
stereotypes about older workers that the Act is designed to prevent 9 Moreover, even age limits that are based on accurate generalizations brand as unqualified those within the excluded age group who
are able to perform. This latter risk is acute if one agrees that the
effects of the aging process vary among individuals. 90 It is also acute
because of the economic incentive for employers to use forbidden
criteria not so much because of their predictive power but because of
their relative convenience and cheapness to administer. 91 Presumably,
for these reasons, the Supreme Court held in Western Air Lines v.
Criswe192 that the stringent standards of the Title VII BFOQ test
apply with equal force under the ADEA. 93
87.

ADEA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988); SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 25, at

6-8, 21-22; 110 CONG. REC. 31,254 (1967) (Sen. Javits). Congress reaffirmed these views in 1978
and 1986 by raising and then repealing altogether the outer age limit on statutory coverage.
See supra note 28; see also Age Discriminationin Employment Act Amendments of 1978, S.
REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
504, 506 [hereinafter 1978 SENATE REPORT].

88. See Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, H.R. REP. No. 756,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5628, 5632
[hereinafter 1986 HOUSE REPORT] (BFOQ "provision recognizes that certain mental or physical
capabilities may decline with age, so that in some jobs with unusually high demands, age can
be a factor considered in hiring and retaining employees."); see also SECRETARY'S REPORT,
supra note 25, at 8 (making similar observations with respect to jobs that involve unusual
physical demands).
89. See Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 748 (7th Cir.) ('[0]veruse
of the [BFOQI exception involves the risk of reintroducing on a broad scale the very age
stereotyping the ADEA was designed to prevent."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983).
90. Several studies have confirmed that the rate of physiological change associated with
aging varies with the individual, and that older workers usually perform as effectively as their
younger counterparts. See studies collected in: M. LEVINE, AGE DISCRIMINATION AND THE
MANDATORY RETIREMENT CONTROVERSY 108-09 (1988); HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING,
95th Cong., 1st Sess., MANDATORY RETIREMENT: REPORT ON THE SOCIAL AND HuMAN
COST OF ENFORCED IDLENESS 34 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter MANDATORY RETIREMENT]; SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 25, at 8-9, 14-15. See also Western Air Lines v.
Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 409 n.11 (1985) (acknowledging Congress's reliance on such data and
studies).

91.
92.
93.
BFOQs

See sources cited supra note 43 and accompanying text.
472 U.S. 400 (1985).
Id. at 412. Though the tests are the same, courts have been more willing to uphold
based on age than on gender. This appears to reflect that many age BFOQ cases have
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Consistent with this Title VII gloss, transitional costs cannot sup-

port an age-based BFOQ. Thus, the courts have held that the ADEA
condemns justifications based on customer preference- and does not
allow cheaply administered, age-based proxies to supplant individual
assessments of ability unless the cost of nondiscriminatory screening
is truly unaffordable.9 5 :But what of direct cost claims that able-bodied
older workers are, by virtue of their age, more costly to employ than
their younger counterparts? For example, an employer might impose
an age forty-five hiring cap, claiming that its employee benefit programs (pension and insurance) are significantly more costly for employees over that age. Or an employer might claim that the projected

arisen in the context of public safety occupations, and courts tend to act more cautiously when
public safety is at issue. See EEOC v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d 447 (8th Cir.
1984) (age 32 hiring limit and age 60 mandatory retirement age are BFOQs for highway patrol
officers), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828 (1985); Maki v. Commissioner of Educ., 568 F. Supp. 252
(N.D.N.Y. 1983) (age 65 BFOQ for bus drivers), affd, 742 F.2d 1437 (2d Cir.), appeal dismissed,
742 F.2d 1437 (2d Cir. 1984); Hoefelman v. Conservation Comm'n, 541 F. Supp. 272 (W. D.
Mo. 1982) (age 60 BFOQ for noncommercial pilots), affd, 718 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1983). Still,
other courts have reached opposite results in similar cases. See EEOC v. Boeing Co., 843 F.2d
1213 (9th Cir.) (age 60 is not a BFOQ for noncommercial pilots), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 222
(1988); EEOC v. Mississippi, 837 F.2d 1398 (5th Cir. 1988) (age 60 is not a BFOQ for state
conservation officers); Hahn v. City of Buffalo, 596 F. Supp. 939 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (age 40 is
not a BFOQ for police officers), affd, 770 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1985).
The outcome in these cases appears to turn on the ability of the employer to gather convincing
medical evidence showing a correlation between aging and declining health and the inability of
medical science to screen employees individually in a reliable manner. While the courts will not
defer blindly and uphold an age BFOQ on the mere invocation of safety, the Supreme Court
acknowledged in Criswell that in close cases it is legitimate for the fact finder to defer to the
safety-employer's judgment. Criswell, 472 U.S. at 419 n.29. At the same time, an employer
will find greater difficulty in justifying an age proxy if the employer already utilizes a successful
medical program to screen for health risks during the employees' worklives. This is what plagued
the airline in Criswell. While citing health and safety to justify an age 60 retirement rule for
flight engineers, the airline could not overcome the fact that its preexisting screening program
showed the feasibility of individualized testing. Id. at 419-20. In such a situation, an employer
essentially must show that its individualized procedure is significantly riskier when applied to
higher risk older workers.
94. See Gathercole v. Global Assocs., 545 F. Supp. 1280, 1282 (N.D. Cal. 1982), later
proceeding, 560 F. Supp. 642 (N.D. Cal. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 727 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir.),
amended, 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 563 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1087 (1984). Original
Department of Labor Guidelines permitted an authenticity exception for "actors required for
youthful or elderly characterizations or roles, and persons used to advertise or promote the sale
of products designed for, and directed to appeal exclusively to either youthful or elderly customers." 29 C.F.R. § 860.102(e) (1988). The EEOC, however, omitted this language from its regulations upon assuming enforcement of the Act, leaving uncertain whether an authenticity exception is available in age cases. See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6 (1989).
95. See cases cited supra note 74.
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work-lives of older workers are too short to justify a costly investment
in their training. Although Title VII, as interpreted by Manhart,
rejects this cost justification completely, the ADEA can be read to
permit it in limited cases. This represents a point of departure between
the two statutes.
The Act specifically addresses the cost problems associated with
employee benefit plans, but not within the BFOQ provision. Section
4(f)(2) of the Act permits employers to make overt age distinctions

within bona fide employee benefit plans.9 While the statutory language
is vague, the legislative history clearly indicates that the primary

purpose of this section is to allow employers to account for age-related
benefit costs by reducing benefit levels for older employees.9 In con-

junction with this privilege, Congress provided that employers may
not rely on these costs to deny employment.98 This compromise reflects
Congress's awareness of two competing problems unique to the age
setting. Pension and insurance programs depend so extensively on
actuarial age factors to determine structure and funding that to man-

96.

29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1988) provides in relevant part:
"It shall not be unlawful for an employer...
(2) [to observe the terms of... any bona fide employee benefit plan such as a
retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the
purposes of [the Act]..., except that no such employee benefit plan shall excuse
the failure to hire any individual, and no such . . . employee benefit plan shall
require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual... because of the
age of such individual.

Id.
97. See 1967 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 28, at 29. For a detailed examination of the
legislative history, see Note, InterpretingSection 4Qf(2) of the ADEA: Does Anyone Have a
"Plan"?, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1055 (1987).
Notwithstanding the legislative history and its focus on benefit costs, the Supreme Court
recently interpreted the exception more broadly to allow for age-based benefit reductions, even
in the absence of a cost justification, if the employer lacked the subjective intent to evade the
Act. Public Employee's Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 109 S. Ct. 2854 (1989). The Court reasoned
that a subjective gloss was consistent with the "subterfuge" language of the exception. Id. at
2868. Legislation is pending before Congress that would overrule Betts, and would protect
age-based benefit reductions only when justified on grounds of cost. See S. 1293, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S7687-88 (daily ed. July 11, 1989); S. 1511, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.,
135 CONG. REC. S9948-51 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989); H.R. 3200, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135
CONG. REC. E2906-07 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989).
98. The last clause of the exception provides that 'no such employee benefit plan shall
excuse the failure to hire any individual [or] . . . shall require or permit the involuntary
retirement of [such] individual." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1988). As originally enacted, this clause
only banned refusals to hire and did not expressly prohibit involuntary retirement. Congress
rectified this omission in 1978. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 189.
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date equal coverage regardless of age would impose a significant cost
burden on employers.- This in turn would undermine the pro-employment objective of the Act by making older workers unattractive to
hire or retain.-°° Congress's solution relieved the cost problem without
affecting employability. Although even this limited solution is contrary
to the teachings of Ma'nhart,10' it reflects the reality that age, more
so than gender, can be a legitimate predictor of mortality (life insurance), health (medical and disability insurance), and retirement (pension plan).
The question remains whether employers can justify an age limit
in employment based on age-related costs not covered under section
4(f)(2). Certainly an employer may not justify an age cap on the assumption that older workers will be less productive, and thus more
costly, because of their age. This would advance the very stereotype
the Act seeks to prevent. 10 2 But the second example above refers to
a more direct cost claim - the claim that workers hired or reassigned
after middle age, e.g., forty, will, by virtue of their shorter remaining
work-life, retire before the employer can recoup the investment in
their training and development.- ° Viewed positively, the employer

99. Representatives of the insurance industry raised these concerns during committee deliberations on the original age bill. They urged that a benefit plan exception was needed to
stabilize costs and preserve traditional underwriting and funding practices. Age Discrimination
in Employment, 1967: Hearings on S. 830 and S. 788 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 279-80, 295-97 (1967)
[hereinafter 1967 Senate Hearings];Age Discrimination in Employment, 1967: Hearings on
H.R. 3651, H.R. 3768, and H.R. 4221 Before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 496-500 [hereinafter 1967 House Hear-

ings].
100. As Senator Javits explained in urging the adoption of section 4(f)(2):
[The administration's bill] does not provide any flexibility in the amount of pension
benefits payable to older workers depending on their age when hired, and thus
may actually encourage employers, faced with the necessity of paying greatly
increased premiums, to look for excuses not to hire older workers when they might
have been hired under a law granting them a degree of flexibility with respect to
such matters.
1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 99, at 24. Senator Smathers, a co-sponsor of the bill, expressed
similar concerns. Id. at 30.
101. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
103. This cost argument has been examined from an economic perspective. See Smith,
Background Notes for a Labor Economist's Prospective on Age Discrimination,AGE DISCRIMINATION 126, 133 (1982) (noting that "the existence of hiring costs or training investments is
one reason why firms will care about a worker's age"); Cohn, Quantitative Evidence of Age
Discrimination: Some Theoretical Issues and Their Consequences, 3 AGING & WORK 149
(1980) (arguing that the need to capture investment costs is a potentially rational reason to
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legitimately fears that the newly hired or reassigned older worker
will reach retirement before reaching peak productivity. Viewed negatively, the employer is able to cater to a preference for youth by

hiring only those with "long-range potential."'1 4
Courts have rejected this cost argument even when raised in its
most persuasive setting - the employment of commercial airline
pilots.1°5 Here, the training period is long, the costs are high, and
federal regulations require retirement at age sixty.1° The age sixty
cap arguably reduces some of the speculation about the duration of a
pilot's work-life and renders more accurate an airline's claim that it

cannot justify the investment in a pilot first hired at age forty or
forty-five. These facts notwithstanding, the justification rests solely
on economic grounds and thus runs afoul of the anti-cost rule. The
one-line explanation offered by the court in Smallwood v. United Air-

lines'° is typical of courts' responses: "Economic considerations cannot

be the basis for a BFOQ [since] precisely those considerations were
among the targets of the Act."'°8

treat older workers less favorably than younger ones). But see STAFF OF SENATE SPECIAL
COMM. ON AGING, 98TH, CONG, 2D SESS., REPORT ON THE COSTS OF EMPLOYING OLDER
WORKERS 58-61 (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter CosTS OF EMPLOYING OLDER WORKERS]

(prepared by Morrison and Rappaport, arguing that reluctance of employers to afford training
opportunities to older workers is counter-productive).
104. See Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1640, 1648 (N.D.
Ala. 1974) (justification couched in terms of "ong-range potential" and 'Tuture benefit" to the
company found to constitute unlawful age discrimination), affd in part and rev'd in part on
other grounds, 531 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976); see also Coates v. National Cash Register Co.,
433 F. Supp. 655, 661 (W.D. Va. 1977) (unlawful to terminate older worker because of lack of
training when that training had been afforded only to younger employees).
105. See Smallwood v. United Air Lines, 661 F.2d 303, 307 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 1007 (1982); cf. Murnane v. American Airlines, 667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (the court
upheld the airline's maximum hiring age but did not rely on a cost argument), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 915 (1982). See infra note 109.
106. 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1989) (Federal Aviation Admin. Regulations). While this regulation is persuasive evidence of a BFOQ, it is not conclusive. See EEOC v. Boeing, Co., 843
F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1988); Williams v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 806 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1986).
107. 661 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1981).
108. Id. at 307. This absolute statement appears in the decision without any specific reference to the legislative history of the ADEA or to where Congress 'precisely" rejected all
economic considerations. Nevertheless, the Smallwood statement has acquired an authority of
its own and courts repeatedly cite it. See, e.g., Monroe v. United Air Lines, 736 F.2d 394, 407
(7th Cir. 1984); Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 755 (7th Cir. 1983); Hahn
v. City of Buffalo, 596 F. Supp. 939, 953 (W.D.N.Y. 1984), affid, 770 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1984);
EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 526 F. Supp. 1135, 1140-41 (C.D. Cal. 1981), affd 706 F.2d
1039) (9th Cir. 1983).
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The possibility exists that the courts truly do not intend such an
absolute approach. If taken literally, an airline would face difficulty
sustaining a cost argument even in the case of a fifty-eight-year-old
candidate two years away from mandatory retirement.' The limited
legislative history on point seems to allow for greater flexibility. During committee hearings on the age bill, Secretary of Labor Willard
Wirtz"0 referred approvingly to section 4(f)(1) - which contains the
BFOQ defense - when asked specifically whether airlines would have
to invest substantial sums in the hiring and training of forty-five year
old candidates.", Although Wirtz was careful in his answer to emphasize the unique level and duration of training involved in the airline
industry, the colloquy indicates some awareness by Congress of the
legitimacy of certain kinds of cost problems that can arise in the age
setting. Arguably, the ability of an employee to work a sufficient
number of years to justify an investment in his training can, in certain
112
settings, be deemed a qualification of the job.
In most employment settings, however, this investment-cost argument - dependent upon projections of work longevity - would be
suspect. First, in contrast to the training of airline pilots, few training
programs are so long and costly that an employer cannot recoup these
costs more quickly.11 3 Second, surveys indicate that older workers are

109. This is not to say that airlines can never prevail in these cases. They have succeeded,
however, only by recharacterizing the justification in terms of safety. See Johnson v. American
Airlines, 745 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1984); Murnane v. American Airlines, 667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir.
1981). This argument is based on the crew complement arrangement and the "up-or-out policy"
used by many airlines. Murnane, 667 F.2d at 99. Under this in-house training and progression
system, pilots are assigned first as flight officers, and are required to advance over their careers
to co-pilot and captain. The hiring cap ostensibly promotes safety by ensuring that pilots become
captains well in advance of retirement and by guaranteeing a maximum number of years of
experienced and seasoned flying. Id.
110. Secretary Wirtz was the Johnson administration's chief spokesperson for the ADEA
at the committee hearings.
111. See 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 99, at 49.
112. This might explain one of the underlying bases of the administrative regulation permitting employer and labor to impose age limits for entry into bona fide apprenticeship programs.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1625 (1989). The EEOC, of course, does not defend the regulation on this
ground, but relies on the theory that apprenticeship training traditionally operates more as an
extension of the educational process than as an employment program for a particular job or
promotion. Id.; see also 46 Fed. Reg. 47,724 (1980) and 52 Fed. Reg. 33,809 (1987) (reaffirming
the exemption after considering whether to rescind it). One court has rejected the EEOC's
rationale and has declared the exemption invalid. See Quinn v. New York State Elec. & Gas
Corp., 569 F. Supp. 655 (N.D.N.Y. 1983).
113. See New York State Comm'n Against Age Discrimination Report cited in Calille,
Three Developing Issues of the Federal Age Discriminationin Employment Act of 1967, 54
DET. J. URB. L. 431, 436 n.28 (1977); Note, Age Discriminationin Employment: The Problem
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often more stable than younger workers and less likely to leave for
another job. 114 Third, absent a lawful mandatory retirement age as a
yardstick (such as the one for commercial pilots), assumptions about
work longevity are necessarily speculative and vary with the individual. ADEA amendments in 1978 and 1986,115 which raised and then
eliminated altogether an outer age limit on statutory protection rein116
force the fact that the time of retirement is an individual decision.
Thus, whatever yardsticks were once available under earlier versions
of the Act no longer exist. For these reasons, using age to predict
work patterns, and in turn to deny employment, is incompatible with
the rationale of Manhart:group assessments based on protected status
17
ordinarily cannot overcome the preference for individual treatment.

This latter point best explains the force of the anti-cost rule under
the ADEA's BFOQ exception. The courts' inflexibility rests not just
on the view that employers should not rely on costs, but that employers
should not be permitted to make cost projections merely on the basis
of overinclusive generalizations about older workers as a group. Such
generalizations strike at one of the core concerns of the fair employment laws because they disqualify individuals on their immutable

status alone without regard to inevitable individual differences."18 Inof the Older Worker, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 399 (1966); see also Smith, supra note 103, at
135 (arguing that to rely on an investment cost argument, employer must establish that investment costs are significant and investment period is lengthy).
114. See COSTS OF EMPLOYING OLDER WORKERS, supra note 103, at 6; RESEARCH
MATERIALS, supra note 25, at 88; M. LEVINE, supra note 90, at 109, 113; Knowles, Dispelling
Myths About Older Workers, in EMPLOYING OLDER AMERICANS: OPPORTUNITIES AND CON-

STRAINTS 16 (Conference Board, Research Report No. 916, 1988).
115. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256 §
12, 92 Stat. 189, 189 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1988); Age Discrimination in
Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, 100 Stat. 3342 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 631(a) (1988)).
116. See 1978 SENATE REPORT, supra note 87, at 3 (retirement decision should be an
"individual option"; capable older workers should be given "[m]aximum freedom of choice in
deciding when to retire").
117. See Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707-11. For an extreme example of a court's hostility to an
employer's reliance on projected work longevity, see EEOC v. Community Unit School Dist.
1986). There, a school district, faced with the task of
No. 9, 642 F. Supp. 902 (S.D. Ill.
transferring certain principals to other schools or reclassifying them as teachers, selected the
plaintiff for reclassification based on his announced intention to retire the following year. Id.
at 903. The court found the reclassification unlawful because an act based on an intent to retire
is Inexorably linked with age." Id. at 905.
118. See Friedman, Redefining Equality, Discriminationand Affirmative Action Under
Title VII: The Access Principle,65 TEx. L. REV. 41, 47 (1986) ("At its core,... [the statutory
command of equal treatment] requires that each person be judged and treated according to his
or her own abilities and that an individual not be saddled with attributes or characteristics
ascribed to the group to which he or she belongs.").
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sofar as the Act permits employers to rely on generalizations about
age to assess the cost of employee benefit programs, it does so because
the generalizations in that setting are strongly accurate and because
employers may rely on them only to affect benefit levels and not to
disqualify older workers for employment.
IV.

A.

COST AS A REASONABLE FACTOR OTHER THAN AGE

Salary and Compensation as a Comparative Measure of Cost

The preceding discussion concerned the use of cost as a justification
for age-based treatment. A more difficult question is presented when
employers assert cost as a "reasonable factor other than age"
(RFOA).119 This kind of cost claim appears more benign because employers utilize it to deny the charge of age-based treatment rather
than to privilege admitted discrimination.
On its face, the RFOA provision states the obvious. Since the Act
outlaws all discrimination, an employer may defeat a discrimination
claim if the adverse action truly is based on a neutral factor other
than age. The precise scope and operation of the defense is not defined,
however, and the relevant legislative history is meager. In the only
specific discussion on point, Senator Yarborough, manager of the legislation in the Senate, cited the example of a bona fide test used to
measure the requirements of a job.1 20 Beyond this, the legislation is
silent, suggesting perhaps purposely that the legitimacy of an asserted
non-age factor must de-pend on the facts of each case. EEOC regula-

119. ADEA § 4(f)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1982).
120. 113 CONG. REC. 31,253 (1967). Senator Yarborough explained:
For example, if a test shows that a man cannot do certain things. He might fail
to pass the test at 35; he might fail to pass the test at 55. Some men slow up
sooner than others. If the job requires a certain speed and the differentiation is
based on factors other than age, the law would not apply.
Other passages in the legislative history, though not tied specifically to the RFOA provision,
similarly emphasize the right of employers to deny employment to older workers who lack the
ability to do the job. See 1967 House Hearings, supra note 99, at 8 ("If someone cannot perform
his or her job, the bill provides no relief simply because the individual is between the ages of
45 and 65.") (statement of Secretary Willard Wirtz); 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 99, at
37 ('When a person's age catches up with him and diminishes his capacity and competence, he
must accept the fair-minded economic judgment of those he works for, or seeks to, if his value
has fallen below the break-even point.") (statement of Secretary Wirtz); see also 1978 SENATE
REPORT, supra note 87, at 10 (specifying disability or poor performance as a legitimate reason
to compel retirement). Consistent with these views, the RFOA provision has been interpreted
to permit employment decisions "based on factors that sometimes accompany advancing age,
such as declining health or diminished vigor and competence." Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d
1003, 1016 (1st Cir. 1979).
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tions support this view, declaring: "No precise and unequivocal determination can be made as to the scope of the phrase 'differentiation
based on reasonable factors other than age.' Whether such differentiations exist must be decided on the basis of all the particular facts
1
and circumstances surrounding each individual situation. 21

Cost as a reasonable factor other than age is raised most typically
during times of economic austerity when employers wish to initiate
reductions in force.1 2 To the extent older workers are victimized by

this process, they often will challenge the employer's method of selection as discriminatory. Given the specific focus of the complaint, it is

generally insufficient for the employer to respond merely by citing its
economic difficulties as a non-age explanation for the terminations;

the employer must go further and address the claim that its selection
process was age-based.m It is in response to this claim that the employer will rely on the RFOA defense, pointing either to a selection
process based on an assessment of performancen 4 or one based on

comparative costs.lm
Under the former, the employer often will point to some comparative review process designed ostensibly to target the poorest perfor-

121. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(b) (1989). Earlier guidelines adopted by the Department of Labor
enumerated certain factors that might support a RFOA. Included were: job-related physical
requirements, educational levels, and measures based on quantity and quality of production,
and also validated tests. 29 C.F.R. §§ 860.103, .104(b) (1986). For further analysis of the original
guidelines, see infra notes 363-69 and accompanying text.
122. See generally Powers, Reductions in Force Under the Age Discriminationin Employment Act, 2 THE LAB. LAW. 197 (1986).
123. See EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 733 F.2d 1183, 1186 (6th Cir. 1984). For this reason,
the courts have held that economic hardship, while sufficient to justify a general layoff, does
not justify a layoff process targeted at employees who are eligible for a pension. Since a pension
eligibility formula typically depends directly on age, it cannot be credited as a factor other than
age. See id.; see also EEOC v. City of Altoona, 723 F.2d 4, 6 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1264 (1984); Popko v. City of Clairton, 570 F. Supp. 446, 451-52 (W.D. Pa. 1983); EEOC
v. City of New Castle, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1409, 1413 (W.D. Pa. 1983) affd, 740
F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1984) (mem.); accord EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 1394 (9th Cir.
1984).
124. See, e.g., Moore v. McGraw Edison Co., 804 F.2d 1026, 1030 (8th Cir. 1986); Smith
v. Farah Mfg., 650 F.2d 64, 68-70 (5th Cir. Unit A Jul. 1981); Schwager v. Sun Oil Co., 591
F.2d 58, 61 (10th Cir. 1979); Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 118 F.R.D. 351, 355-56 (D.N.J. 1987).
Similarly, the employer may assert as an RFOA that the plaintiffs selection for layoff was the
result of a nondiscriminatory decision to abolish or consolidate the plaintiffs position. See Mizrany
v. Texas Rehabilitation Comm'n, 522 F. Supp. 611, 616-17 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
125. See, e.g., Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1206 (7th Cir. 1987); Holt v.
Gamewell Corp., 797 F.2d 36, 37 (1st Cir. 1986); Gelof v. Papineau, 648 F. Supp. 912, 920-21
(D. DeL 1986), modified on other grounds, 829 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1987).
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mers. 126 While a performance criterion constitutes a classic non-age
explanation, the process still must be sufficiently credible to withstand
the charge, before a jury, that it allowed for impermissible considerations of age, i.e., that the process did not turn on a preference for
youth, vitality, new blood, or long-term potential. 12 The employer's
task is complicated by the fact that it must justify comparative differences among a pool of workers, all of whom presumably were performing satisfactorily and would have remained employed were it not for
the economic downturn. In short, depending on the job, it may be
difficult to find meaningful performance-based distinctions. ss
Instead, a rational employer struggling economically might target
the workers who appear most costly, i.e., those receiving the highest
salaries.129 This method can prove particularly efficient if the jobs at
issue require minimal experience or have a short experience curve so
that the employer can sustain the loss of high-salaried workers without
suffering a major loss in quantity or quality of production.130 Here,
since the cost criterion -

comparative compensation levels -

is fa-

cially neutral and appears to be economically rational (and is indeed
more objective and ascertainable than a performance rating) the employer may offer this criterion as a classic "reasonable factor other
than age." Yet, since higher compensation costs are often a function
of accumulated seniority, the cost comparison predictably, even if unintentionally, operates against older workers. 131 This latter factor com-

126. See cases cited supra note 124.
127. Compare Moore v. McGraw Edison Co., 804 F.2d 1026 (8th Cir. 1986) (evaluation
process valid); EEOC v. Western Elec. Co., 713 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1983) (evaluation process
valid); and Stringfellow v. Monsanto Co., 320 F. Supp. 475 (W.D. Ark. 1970) (extensive evaluation process valid) with EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 614 (10th Cir. 1980) (subjective,
unvalidated process found discriminatory); Harrison v. Lewis, 559 F. Supp. 943, 950 (D.D.C.
1983) (standardless evaluations "[u]nless made in the context of specific and concrete guidelines,
are especially prone to... abuse"); and Schulz v. Hickok Mfg. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D.
Ga. 1973) (employer evaluations undercut by independent evidence of plaintiffs superior performance). See generally Ashe & McRae, Performance Evaluations Go to Court in the 1980's, 36
MERCER

L. REV. 887 (1985).

128. An assessment of each worker's productivity can be particularly difficult if the employer
organizes production on a group basis and the individual worker cannot control output. M.
LEVINE, supra note 90, at 118 n.1 (citing Suzuki, Age, Seniority and Wages, 113 INT. LAB.
REV. 67, 73-74 (1976)). Meaningful differences are also difficult to identify in low-skill jobs. M.
LEVINE, supra, at 118 n.2 (citing Henly, The Ability Factor in Labor Relations, 10 ARB. J.
10 (1955)).
129. See cases cited supra note 125.
130. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
131. For studies noting this correlation between age, seniority, and higher compensation,
see Suzuki, Age, Seniority and Wages, 113 INT'L LAB. REV. 67 (1976); 3 MANPOWER ADMIN-
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plicates the issue and raises the possibility of three approaches to the
problem.
Under the first approach, the age-based impact would not be determinative of liability. Since the Act expressly endorses the use of
reasonable non-age factors, reliance on a neutral cost criterion would
be deemed legitimate absent evidence of a pretext to target older
workers. In terms of policy, the employer might argue that the Act
cannot be read to demand that a struggling business retain senior
workers regardless of their cost. 13
Under the second view, one would focus on the inevitable correlation between seniority, salary, and age and would condemn the "neutral' cost comparison as the functional equivalent of overt age-based
treatment. Proponents of this protective view would point to the general anti-cost principle that dominates employment discrimination law,
as well as to indications that the Act was passed, in part, out of
concern that unemployed older workers face unique obstacles in finding
employment late in their careers. 1H
A third view would resist both extremes. It would regard the cost
comparison as facially neutral, and thus a potential RFOA, but undesirable because of its predictable age-based effect. Under this view,
the cost criterion would not be condemned per se as an overt age
rule, but the employer would have to justify a need for this criterion
beyond that which would negate outright pretext.'3
One's choice among these approaches depends in large measure on
what theories of discrimination (disparate treatment and disparate

ISTRATION, DEPT. OF LABOR, THE PRE-RETIREMENT YEARS: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF

THE LABOR MARKET EXPERIENCE OF MEN 67-68 (1973); see also Lapp, An Economic Model
of EarlyRetirement, in OUTLAWING AGE DISCRIMINATION: ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL
RESPONSE TO THE ELIMINATION OF MANDATORY RETIREMENT 39 (1980) (salary progression

reflects implicit contract between worker and firm that culminates in mandatory retirement);
Lazear, infra note 201, at 1264-65 (identifying link between higher salary levels and age and
citing that link as a reason for mandatory retirement); Medoff & Abraham, Experience, Performance, and Earnings, 95 Q.J. ECON. 703, 730-31 (1980) (data showing that in most large U.S.
corporations older workers are generally paid more than younger ones). But cf. COSTS OF
EMPLOYING OLDER WORKERS, supra note 103, at 9-23 (correlation between high salary and

age does not exist across the board and depends on specific employment situation).
132. See Mets v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1211 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting); see also Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299, 1318 (E.D. Mich.
1976) ("The Act does not contemplate that an employer must ignore employment costs or face

possible ADEA violation charges.").
133. See Metz, 828 F.2d at 1205-06; Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715,
728 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), affd in part, rev'd in part, 608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979).
134. See infra text accompanying notes 242-68.
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impact) are available under the ADEA. Since these theories help to
define discrimination based on age, they necessarily affect what is
acceptable as a reasonable factor other than age. It is necessary,
therefore, to review these theories before canvassing the specific cases.
B.

Theories of Liability: DisparateTreatment and DisparateImpact

Borrowing from Title VII jurisprudence, most courts have adopted
both the disparate treatment and the disparate impact models of liability in ADEA cases, 1 5 although adoption of the latter is less settled
and remains controversial.136 Disparate treatment is "the most easily
understood concept of discrimination";137 the employer intentionally
treats employees differently based on age. An aggrieved employee
can show this intent by way of direct or circumstantial evidence showing that age was a determinative factor behind the adverse employment decision. 13 In direct evidence cases, the employee typically points
to an overt age policy that conclusively establishes age-based treatment. This showing ordinarily would establish per se liability irrespective of the employer's justification, absent the rare case of a BFOQ. 3 9

135. See, e.g., Holt v. Gamewell Corp., 797 F.2d 36, 37 (1st Cir. 1986); Holley v. Sanyo
Mfg., 771 F.2d 1161, 1164 (8th Cir. 1985); EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 1392-95 (9th
Cir. 1984); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1015-16 (1st Cir. 1979); Lusardi v. Xerox
Corp., 118 F.R.D. 351, 361-62 (D.N.J.1987).
136. See, e.g., Arnold v. United States Postal Serv., 863 F.2d 994, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
While most courts have held or assumed that disparate impact theory applies under the ADEA,
some courts have carefully avoided the issue, and several commentators have argued strongly
against incorporating this Title VII doctrine. See cases cited infra note 272 and commentary
cited infra note 273. For a full examination of this disparate impact controversy, see infra notes
270-463 and accompanying text.
137. International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
138. See Young v. General Foods Corp., 840 F.2d 825, 828 (11th Cir. 1988). The courts
have held that age need only be a determinative, not the sole, factor underlying the adverse
action. See, e.g., Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 827 F.2d 13, 17 (7th Cir. 1987); Wilhelm
v. Blue Bell, Inc., 773 F.2d 1429, 1432 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
139. See Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121, 124-25 (1985) (discriminatory
airline policy denying transfer rights to pilot over age 60); EEOC v. City of Altoona, 723 F.2d
4 (3d Cir. 1983) (layoff selections based on pension eligibility formula that incorporated age).
EEOC regulations essentially adopt the same absolute position. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(c) (1989)
("When an employment practice uses age as a limiting criterion, the defense that the practice
is justified by a reasonable factor other than age is unavailable.").
However, unlike evidence of an admitted, facially discriminatory policy, some forms of direct
evidence are disputed and must compete with employer claims that the adverse action was
motivated by nondiscriminatory factors. An employer, for example, may attempt to deny discrimination in the face of direct testimony that a supervisor made derogatory ageist statements;
see Lindsey v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 772 F.2d 799, 801 (11th Cir. 1985), or that a scrap
of paper stated that the plaintiff was 'too old." Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d
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More commonly, the employee must depend on circumstantial evidence that the employer was, in fact, motivated by age. Upon establishing a prima facie inference, the employer must respond by offering
evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation for the adverse
action.10 The..plaintiff in turn is afforded a rebuttal opportunity to
show that the proffered neutral explanation was merely a pretext for
.covert age discrimination.141 While this disparate treatment paradigm
arose out of Title VII, which lacks an express RFOA provision, it

translates well to ADEA cases. When an ADEA employer offers a
nondiscriminatory explanation, it attempts, in effect, to offer a reasonable factor other than age.

Disparate impact theory, by contrast, is concerned with employment practices which are neither overtly nor covertly based on age
but which have an unjustified age-based effect. As developed under

120, 129 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982). If the direct evidence
is credited, as in Lindsey, it may conclusively establish the existence of an impermissible motive.
At the same time, because a court may only find a violation if age is a determinative factor,
the employer is afforded the opportunity to prove that age was not determinative and that the
employer would have reached the same decision absent any discriminatory intent. See Carter
v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 582 (11th Cir. 1989). This "same decision" test essentially
constitutes an affirmative defense in which the burden bf proof rests with the employer. See
generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (1989) (direct evidence of sex stereotyping establishes the presence of an impermissible gender factor, and the employer can avoid
liability under Title VII only by proving that it would have made the same decision had it not
taken gender into account).
140. See, e.g., Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 827 F.2d 13, 17-18 (7th Cir. 1987). The
elements of a prima facie case in ADEA cases are drawn from the Title VII test announced in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Thus, in an ordinary termination
case, an ADEA plaintiff can establish a prima fade case by showing he or she was within the
protected class (age 40 and over), was terminated while performing satisfactorily, and was
replaced by someone younger. See, e.g., Verbraeken v. Westinghouse Elec., 881 F.2d 1041 (11th
Cir. 1989); Holley v. Sanyo Mfg., 771 F.2d 1161, 1164-66 (8th Cir. 1985). The courts ignore this
last element in reduction in force cases since laid-off employees generally are not replaced when
an employer shrinks its workforce. In lieu of the "replacement requirement," some courts
demand that plaintiffs provide significant additional evidence suggestive of an intent to discriminate. See, e.g., Branson v. Price River Coal Co., 853 F.2d 768, 771 (10th Cir. 1988); Williams
v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 129 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
943 (1982). Other courts are less demanding, but require at least a showing that similarly
situated younger employees were retained or treated more favorably during the reduction in
force. See Oxman v. WLS-TV, 846 F.2d 448, 454-55 (7th Cir. 1988); Massarsky v. General
Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 118 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983).
Whatever the precise variation of elements, the prima facie case is meant to establish a
rebuttable inference of discrimination sufficient to shift the burden of explanation (not proof)
to the employer. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-60 (1981).
141. See, e.g., Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 827 F.2d 13, 18 (7th Cir. 1987).
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Title VII, neutral selection devices that correlate with race or some
other protected status may be found unlawful, regardless of good faith,
if they lack the requisite justification or necessity.142 This means that
once a plaintiff demonstrates a discriminatory effect, the employer
must do more than negate hostile intent; the employer must show,
under an objective standard, that the effect was justified. To meet
this burden, the employer must present evidence indicating that the
challenged practice was sufficiently "job related."'' While the precise
meaning of this standard has proven somewhat elusive, '- the Supreme
Court's most recent pronouncements suggest that there should be a
"manifest" or "significant" relationship between the challenged criterion and a legitimate business interest.14 The plaintiff may attack the
adequacy of this relationship or the necessity of the criterion by demonstrating the feasibility of less restrictive alternatives.16 Since a violation is not predicated on discriminatory effect alone but on an unjustified discriminatory effect, the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden
on the justification issue.147

142. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see also New York City Transit
Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-47 (1976).
143. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431; Beazer, 440 U.S. at 587; Washington, 426 U.S. at 247.
144. In Griggs, the Court articulated what could be viewed as three different standards of
justification: "business necessity," "job-relatedness," and that the challenged practice must "bear
a manifest relationship to the employment." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32. These three phases
have generated considerable confusion as to the precise showing needed to justify a disparate
impact. See Note, Business Necessity: JudicialDualism and the Searchfor Adequate Standards,
15 GA. L. REv. 376, 386 (1981); see also infra note 147.
145. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2125-26 (1989); Watson v.
Forth Worth Bank & Trust Co., 487 U.S. 977 (1988); New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer,
440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979).
146. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1986) (quoting
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)). The opportunity for a plaintiff to
show a feasible, less restrictive alternative can serve two functions. First, it can undercut the
claimed business justification for the challenged practice. Id. Second, evidence of a feasible
alternative may, but need not, suggest that the challenged practice was adopted as a mere
pretext for discrimination. Id.; see also infranote 241 (discussing less restrictive alternatives).
147. This paradigm effectively incorporates recent adjustments in the disparate impact
model as announced by the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct.
2115, 2126 (1989). The adjustments primarily affect the nature of the burdens of proof. Earlier
Supreme Court decisions had suggested that, upon a showing of impact, the entire burden of
persuasion shifted to the employer to prove job-relatedness and necessity. See Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
These same cases also held, perhaps inconsistently, that it was the plaintiffs (not the employer's)
obligation to address the issue of feasible alternatives and thus show the absence of necessity.
See, e.g., Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425. Similarly, while some Court decisions insisted on a strong
necessity standard and evidence of an extremely close correlation between the challenged criterion and the employer's job needs, others permitted a more flexible standard. Compare Dothard,
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If this theory is applied to the ADEA,'48 it naturally would affect
the scope of the RFOA exception: a neutral practice that is prima
facie vulnerable because of a discriminatory effect would not be protected as a reasonable factor other than age if it lacked the requisite

justification or was undercut by a showing of a feasible, less restrictive
alternative. Correct application of these models of discrimination lies

at the heart of the controversy surrounding employer attempts to
justify terminations based on the cost of compensation.
433 U.S. at 331-32 & n.14 ("discriminatory employment practice must be shown to be necessary
for safe and efficient job performance.") and Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 431 (endorsing EEOC's
rigid validation requirement for written tests) with Beazer, 440 U.S. at 587 n.31 (emphasizing
Griggs's " anifest relationship" language and finding it sufficient that employer's goals were
"significantly served" by the challenged practice) and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-47
(1976) (ignoring the EEOC's strict validation requirement and upholding the use of a written
test that may have predicted success in police officer training program but was not shown to
predict success on the job).
The Court in Wards Cove Packing endorsed those views that would lighten the employer's
burden. It held that, at the justification stage, the burden of production, not persuasion, shifts
to the employer to make a showing of job-relatedness. Wards Cove Packing, 109 S. Ct. at 2126.
The court defined this standard as somewhere between mere rationality and absolute necessity:
"the dispositive issue is whether a challenged practice serves, in a significantway, the legitimate
employment goals of the employer." Id. at 2125-26 (emphasis added). This standard draws on
the Court's earlier language in Beazer, 487 U.S. at 587 n.31. Assuming the employer produces
evidence capable of supporting this justification, the ultimate burden remains with the plaintiff
to convince the court that the justification is lacking or that less restrictive alternatives could
equally serve the employer's objectives. Wards Cove Packing, 109 S. Ct. at 2126.
While some commentators have expressed alarm about these adjustments in burdens, see
Coyle, How FarWill the Court Go?, Natl L.J., June 26, 1989, at 1, col. 1, and the adjustments
undoubtedly can affect the chance of success in close cases, the essential premise of disparate
impact liability is preserved. The essence is that a facially neutral rule that unintentionally
selects by race, gender, (or age) can impair equal employment opportunity as effectively as an
overt classification. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 987 (The premise of disparate impact is that neutral
practices may, in operation, be "functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination."). Hence,
while impact alone does not establish liability, it establishes the need to scrutinize the practice
beyond intent under an objective standard.
Parenthetically, the 101st Congress attempted unsuccessfully to amend Title VII and overrule
the controversial aspect of the Wards Cove Packing decision. § 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.,
136 Cong. Rec. H8045-48 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1990). The legislation in this regard would have
restored to the employer the full burden of proof on the "business necessity" issue. At the same
time, the legislation contained language that would have continued to recognize a flexible definition of the business necessity standard. Similar to the Wards Cove Packing "significantly
serve" language, the legislation would have required an employer to show that the challenged
practice bore a "significant relationship" either to successful job performance or to a significant
business objective. President Bush vetoed the legislation on October 22, 1990. Congress subsequently failed to override President Bush's veto. Daily Labor Reporter #207, p.A-6, Oct. 25,
1990.
148. See infra notes 257-453 and accompanying text (evaluating the applicability of disparate
impact theory under the ADEA).
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The Regulations and the Cases

In its regulations interpreting the RFOA provision, the EEOC
rejects the use of cost differentials, as follows: "A differentiation based
on the average cost of employing older employees as a group is unlawful except with respect, to employee benefit plans which qualify for
the section 4(f(2) exception to the Act. 1 4 9 By its terms, however,
this provision does not expressly prohibit reliance on direct compensation costs. The regulation simply restates the Manhart principle that
the Act requires fairness to individuals, and individuals should not be
disqualified as more costly merely because of group-based generalizations. 150 By contrast, when an employer makes direct compensation
comparisons, the employer relies not on a group assumption but on
each individual's ascertainable salary level. In such instances, "the
employer is not operating on a stereotyped assumption about the
higher salary costs of longer service employees, but upon a reality
which is applicable to the particular employee in question." 51
Notwithstanding this difference, most courts have summarily condemned the use of salary comparisons that predictably result in the
failure to hire or the termination of older workers. 5 2 Most of these

149. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(f) (1989). The Department of Labor's original guidelines were nearly
identical:
A general assertion that the average cost of employing older workers as a group
is higher than the average cost of employing younger workers as a group will not
be recognized as a differentiation under the terms of the Act, unless one of the
other statutory exceptions applies ....
29 C.F.R. § 860.103(b) (1986).
150. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
151. Blumrosen, supra note 19, at 111.
152. See Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1205-08 (7th Cir. 1987); Dace v. ACF
Indus., 722 F.2d 374, 378 (8th Cir. 1984); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d
686, 691 92 (8th Cir. 1983); Geller v. Markham, 685 F.2d 1027, 1034 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 945 (1981); Kaczor v. City of Buffalo, 657 F. Supp. 441, 443 (W.D.N.Y. 1987); Gelof
v. Papineau, 648 F. Supp. 912, 921 (D. Del. 1986), modified on other grounds, 829 F.2d 452
(3d Cir. 1987); Franci v. Avco Corp., 538 F. Supp. 250, 256 (D. Conn. 1982); Marshall v. Arlene
Knitwear, 454 F. Supp. 715, 724, 727-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), affd in part, rev'd in part, 608 F.2d
1369 (2d Cir. 1979). For the few cases questioning the prevailing view, see EEOC v. Atlantic
School Dist., 879 F.2d 434, 436 (8th Cir. 1989) (accepting the prevailing view in termination
cases but rejecting it in hiring cases) and Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp.
1299, 1316-19 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (distinguishing between individual and group-based cost comparisons).
Of course, the courts agree that no liability exists if the higher salary was not a function of
seniority and age or if the higher salary was not a determining factor in the adverse action.
See Holt v. Gamewell Corp., 797 F.2d 36, 38 (1st Cir. 1986) (salary not linked to seniority);
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cases have arisen in a disparate treatment setting, requiring the plaintiff to show either that the employer relied on an overt age classification or that the employer's neutral explanation was in fact a pretext
for age-based discrimination. 153 Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear'15 is typical of the courts' approach. In Marshall, a court found unlawful an

employer's termination of its most senior employee (age sixty-two)
pursuant to its plan to shrink its staff from three to two workers.ca
Finding that the senior employee was selected in part because of her
higher salary, "a factor intimately related to [her] age,"'1 the court

declared: "Where economic savings and expectation of longer future
service are directly related to an employee's age, it is a violation of
the ADEA to discharge the employee for those reasons."157 Another
court drew a similar conclusion in Franci v. Avco Corp.,1ca where it

condemned an employer's layoff plan that allowed managers to focus
on salaries and fringe benefits because those factors would "encourage

the layoff of highly paid, experienced, and thus older, employees."'

59

EngineeringCo.,160 the

In Donnelly v. Exxon Research &
District
Court of New Jersey was somewhat more flexible in allowing indirect

reliance on salary when this factor was used as part of an overall
productivity assessment designed to measure an employee's effectiveness. In Donnelly, the employer required that each employee maintain

at least a minimum level of acceptable performance by producing at
a value equal to seventy-five percent of his or her salary.161 The em-

ployer based salary increases on performance, responsibility, and

EEOC v. Sperry Corp., 852 F.2d 503, 511 (10th Cir. 1988) (salary savings not a motivating
factor); Diamantopulos v. Brookside Corp., 683 F. Supp. 322, 328 (D.Conn. 1988) (relocation
costs and applicant's higher salary demands not linked to seniority and age).
153. See Metz, 722 F.2d at 1204; Dace v. ACF Indus., 722 F.2d 374, 377-78 (8th Cir. 1983);
Kaczor v. City of Buffalo, 657 F. Supp. 441, 443-44 (W.D.N.Y. 1987); Gelof v. Papineau, 648
F. Supp. 912, 918 (D.Del. 1986), modified on other grounds, 829 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1987); Franci
v. Avco Corp., 538 F. Supp. 250, 255-56 (D.Conn. 1982); Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, 454 F.
Supp. 715, 723 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), modified on other grounds, 608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979).
154. 454 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), modified on other grounds, 608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir.
1979).
155. Id. at 728.
156. Id.
157. Id.; accord Gelof, 648 F. Supp. at 921, modified on other grounds, 829 F.2d 452 (3d
Cir. 1987).
158. 538 F. Supp. 250 (D.Conn. 1982).
159. Id. at 256.
160. 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 417 (D.N.J. 1974), affd, 521 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1975).
161. Id. at 420.
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seniority. Plaintiff, a high-salaried and once-valued employee, was
discharged when his work badly deteriorated and fell below the seventy-five percent minimum. He challenged the discharge, claiming
that the employer's seventy-five percent ratio discriminated against
older workers because it relied in part on a worker's salary, which in
turn was based in part on seniority.162 Given the correlation between
seniority and age, the employee claimed that the system violated the
Act. The court rejected the argument, emphasizing that all employees
were subject to the minimum requirement, and that the Act did not
require an employer to retain a poor performer who was no longer
able to earn his salary. 16 But the court quickly warned that salary
differences alone may not be used to choose between two equally
competent workers:
It would be unlawful and worse if an employer were to fire
an older worker doing satisfactory work who, because of his
seniority, received a certain salary, because the employer
wished to replace him with someone else would do the work
no better but who, as a younger man with less seniority,
would do the work for less. e
This latter point puts Donnelly in line with the "reasoning" of the
other cases. 16 In terms of disparate treatment analysis, the courts
appear to treat the salary criterion as the functional equivalent of an
overt age classification if salary and seniority are predictably related.
This analysis simultaneously preempts the "reasonable factor other
than age" defense because an overt age classification cannot constitute
a factor other than age.
This "per se" analysis has been incorporated into disparate impact
cases as well. In Geller v. Markham,16 a fifty-five-year-old school
teacher challenged a school district's austerity policy of only hiring
teachers with less than five years' experience. Under the school district's compensation structure, salary progressed in steps in accordance
with each year of experience. To establish a claim of disparate impact,
the plaintiff relied on statistics showing that the facially neutral experience rule predictably operated to the disadvantage of older applicants. 167 Compelled to offer a justification, the employer explained the

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 421-22.
Id.
Id.
See cases cited supra note 153.
635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981).
Id. at 1030.
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experience limit as a cost-saving measure necessitated by budgetary
constraints. 16 The Second Circuit summarily rejected this justification,
169
citing both the absolute anti-cost principle announced in Marshall,
and the administrative guidelines prohibiting age-based cost comparisons.170
The Eighth Circuit mirrored this approach in Leftwich v. HarrisStowe State College, 17 a case that arose out of the transfer of a
college from a city to a state educational system. To control costs,
the new state college decided to reduce the size of the former faculty
and allocate a fixed number of tenured and nontenured positions. The
plaintiff, a tenured professor at the former city college, was not retained on the new faculty and challenged the reservation of nontenured
slots as discriminatory. 1' Once again, given the correlation between
tenure and age, the plaintiff was able to establish a prima facie case
of disparate impact.17 The employer in turn attempted to justify the
limitation on tenure slots as a necessary cost measure. 74 The court
rejected this justification out of hand, stating:
[B]ecause of the close relationship between tenure status
and age, the plain intent and effect of the defendants' practice
was to eliminate older workers who had built up, through
years of satisfactory service, higher salaries than their
younger counterparts. If the existence of such higher salaries
can be used to justify discharging older employees, then the
purpose of the ADEA will be defeated. 7 5
This entire line of authority was recently examined and endorsed
in Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc.,"17 a case involving a high-salaried, longterm employee who was replaced by someone cheaper and younger.

168. Id. at 1030, 1034.
169. 454 F. Supp. at 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), modified on other grounds, 608 F.2d 1369 (2d
Cir. 1979).
170. Geller, 635 F.2d at 1034. Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Geller,
Justice Rehnquist dissented, questioning the applicability of disparate impact liability under the
ADEA, and disputing the Second Circuit's rejection of the school district's cost justification.
Markham v. Geller, 451 U.S. 945, 948 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
171. 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983).

172. Id. at 689-90.
173. Id. at 690-91.
174. Id. at 691.
175. Id. Apart from cost considerations, the college claimed that it was necessary to reserve
nontenured slots in order to promote innovation and bring in new ideas. The court rejected this
justification as an ageist stereotype. Id. at 692.
176. 828 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987).
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The parties in Metz did not dispute that the employer faced economic
difficulty and needed to cut costs to operate; that the plaintiffs higher
salary was a function of annual raises given without regard to the
company's financial condition; and that the employer substituted the
junior employee because of the salary cost differential.a- As a disparate
treatment claim, the plaintiff sought to show that his substitution was
based on age. 178 In response, the employer cited the salary differential
as a legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation. 179 While the district
court agreed with the employer,18 the court of appeals reversed, emphasizing the high correlation between salary and age.181 The appellate
court reasoned that, when a salary system is so tied to tenure and
age, it simply cannot constitute a nondiscriminatory explanation or a
reasonable factor other than age.1 This conclusion largely mirrored
the approach of the earlier cases. Unlike the earlier cases, however,
the Metz court was more reluctant to conclude that the facially neutral
salary criterion was in truth an overt age classification, particularly
in the absence of strong evidence indicating that the criterion was
used as a pretext. To overcome this hurdle, the court inferred an
age-based intent from the foreseeable impact of the neutral criterion.'1
The court also noted that the employer failed to offer the plaintiff the
opportunity to remain at a reduced salary, although the court did not
specifically tie this fact to its disparate treatment analysis.184
In dissent, Judge Easterbrook embraced the use of salary as a
legitimate non-age factor even if linked to seniority.,, In his view,
salary was not just a measure of costs but a component of an employee's productivity. Insofar as the Act permits employers to make assessments of employee performance, Judge Easterbrook maintained that
comparisons based on an employee's productivity per wage dollar were

177. Id. at 1203-04.
178. Id. at 1204.
179. Id. at 1204-05.
180. Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 286, 294 (N.D. Ind. 1986).
181. Metz, 828 F.2d at 1206-08.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1207 n.8.
184. Id. at 1209-10. Theoretically, the employer's decision in Metz to replace the plaintiff
rather than retain him at a lower salary was probative of an intent to dismiss Metz because of
his age. But the overall record belied such an inference and the court cited no specific evidence
of age-based intent. While the availability of a less restrictive alternative would be relevant
without regard to intent under a disparate impact analysis, the Metz court purported to rely
on disparate treatment, not disparate impact. Id.
185. Id. at 1211 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting).
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simply a more complete measure of ability. 86 Cast in these terms, a
salary comparison was a perfectly legitimate, neutral criterion regardless of its correlation to seniority and age unless it was adopted for
an age-based purpose. 8 7 Finally, in response to the majority's extensive reliance on the discriminatory effect of the salary comparison,
Judge Easterbrook would apparently reject altogether the use of disparate impact theory under the ADEA.1es While the United States
Supreme Court has yet to assess the Easterbrook analysis, several

commentators and at least one Supreme Court Justice appear to support it. 18
V.
A.

THE CASE FOR A BALANCED APPROACH
Salary Costs and the Policies of the ADEA

Since the ADEA does not directly address the salary cost dilemma,
approaches of the kind espoused by both the majority and the dissent
in Metz should be assessed in light of the policy objectives of the Act.

One of the Act's central objectives is to outlaw arbitrary age discrimination predicated on unfounded assumptions about the ability of older

workers.

9°

A salary cost comparison is not facially incompatible with

this policy inasmuch as the criterion is objective, ascertainable, and

not based necessarily on group assumptions. However, to the extent
that the salary comparison leads predictably to the displacement of
older workers during periods of economic retrenchment, its use tends

to reinforce the perception that older workers are less productive or
less entitled to their jobs.'19 Moreover, in condemning the use of age-re-

186. Id. at 1213.
187. Id. at 1213-14. Given this focus on motive, Judge Easterbrook would have imposed
no obligation on the employer to explore or adopt less restrictive alternatives, such as offering
the employee the opportunity to remain at a reduced salary. Id. He chided the court majority
for endorsing such an option, arguing that the majority's rationale for prohibiting seniority-related salary comparisons in termination cases would apply equally to wage cuts. Id. He reminds
us, in this regard, that the ADEA outlaws discrimination in all terms and conditions of employment. While Judge Easterbrook is correct about the scope of the ADEA, he ignores the possibility
of treating salary reduction as a "less restrictive alternative" within the framework of a disparate
impact analysis. See infra notes 237-41 and accompanying text.
188. Metz, 828 F.2d at 1220 ('The language, structure, and history of the ADEA have led
thoughtful people to conclude... that disparate impact analysis is inapplicable in ADEA cases.")
(citations omitted).
189. See supra note 19.
190. ADEA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988); see supra note 87 and accompanying text.
191. While harmful perceptions alone do not violate the ADEA, the concern here is that
rationalizing the predictable displacement of older workers can perpetuate unconscious ageist
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lated barriers, Congress articulated a strong preference for performance-related standards in which older workers would be judged on
their true abilities.1- Seniority-salary comparisons arguably frustrate
this objective to the extent that they emphasize the costliness of
longevity rather than the performance-related advantages that may
come from experience and maturity.'9
More importantly, the Act and its legislative history evidence a
protective concern - the concern that older workers are uniquely
harmed by displacement because of the obstacles they face competing
in the labor market late in their careers.1- Studies show that such
displacement can result in prolonged unemployment and premature
withdrawal from the work force.195 This not only can debilitate the

attitudes and reinforce an expectation that older workers are obliged to yield to the young.
This expectation, though inconsistent with the pro-employment objectives of the ADEA, remains
a powerful force in today's society. See M. LEVINE, supra note 90, at 159 ('There is a cultural
expectation that those above normal retirement age have a diminished moral duty to work and
a diminished moral claim on jobs.").
192. S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2213, 2214 [hereinafter 1967 SENATE REPORT] ("It is the purpose of [the bill]
to promote the employment of older workers based on their ability."); 1978 SENATE REPORT,
supra note 87, at 3 ("people should be treated in employment on the basis of their individual
ability to perform a job"); 1986 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 88, at 6 ("growing recognition
.. that employment decisions regarding older persons should be based on individual assessment
of each applicant's or employee's potential or ability").
193. While certain physiological functions decline with age, studies show that older workers
generally are able to compensate for these disadvantages and perform as well as their younger
colleagues. See studies cited in M. LEVINE, supra note 90, at 110-11. Studies also show that,
in comparison with their younger counterparts, older workers tend to provide firms with greater
stability, have lower rates of turnover and absenteeism, and report greater levels of motivation
and satisfaction in their jobs. Id. at 108-09; see also MANDATORY RETIREMENT, supra note
90, at 34; RESEARCH MATERIALS, supra note 25, at 87-88; Knowles, supra note 114, at 17.
194. See ADEA § 2(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(1) (1988) (congressional finding that older
workers are "especially" disadvantaged in their efforts to "regain employment when displaced
from jobs"). The Secretary's Report detailed the following obstacles that impair opportunities
for displaced older workers: (1) negative assumptions about older workers' abilities; (2) concern
about older workers' salary expectations; (3) promotion from within policies which favored
incumbents; (4) the anticipated cost of pension and insurance programs; (5) assumptions about
older workers' projected longevity in the workforce; and (6) the inability of older workers to
satisfy employer testing or educational requirements. RESEARCH MATERIALS, supra note 25,
at 10-14.
195. See RESEARCH MATERIALS, supra note 25, at 98-102; SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra
note 25, at 18-19. Congress specifically cited these findings in explaining the need for the ADEA.
See ADEA § 2(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(3) (1988) (noting that long-term unemployment of older
workers can lead to "deterioration of skill, morale, and employer acceptability" and that 'their
employment problems are grave").
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older worker personally, 1' it deprives the economy of an experienced
source of labor and triggers early dependence on retirement systems
and publicly supported programs.'9 Indeed, it was in direct response
to these concerns that Congress amended the Act in 1978 and 1986
to raise and then eliminate the outer age limit, and to outlaw nearly
all forms of mandatory retirement. 19 These amendments reflected a
desire to address the job security needs of incumbent older workers,
a concern the original Act did not acknowledge.'
Concededly, the abolition of mandatory retirement does not necessarily foreclose the use of salary comparisons to replace workers or
to implement layoffs. The two issues, however, are clearly linked
inasmuch as one of the justifications for mandatory retirement rests

on cost.m Some economists have identified this cost by estimating a
worker's salary curve over the span of a career2m Their thesis is that

196. See MANDATORY RETIREMENT, supra note 90, at 22-31; M. LEVINE, supra note 90,
at 29-32 (documenting the financial and health-related decline often associated with forced retirement).
197. See SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 25, at 18.
198. See 1986 HOUSE REPORT, supr note 88, at 5-7 (citing the need to retain older workers
in the economy, the need to preserve the social security system, and the decline in health that
can result from forced idleness); 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 87, at 4 (citing same
concerns); see also supra note 28 (citing the amendments).
199. The ADEA of 1967 was concerned chiefly with barriers affecting the hiring of unemployed older workers and focused little on protecting the job security of senior incumbents.
See 1967 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 28, at 4 (emphasizing hiring as the primary purpose of
the bill). Consistent with this, statutory protection ceased at age 65. 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1976)
(amended 1978, 1984, and 1986). Also, employers were permitted to compel earlier retirement
under the terms of bona fide pension plans. See United Air Lines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192,
201-02 (1977). By abolishing these forms of mandatory retirement in 1978 and 1986, Congress
expanded the Act to promote not just the hiring but the retention of older workers. See 1986
HousE REPORT, supra note 88, at 7 (amendments "would ensure that those Americans age 70
and over who deserve to continue working and are able to continue performing in a competent
fashion are not denied the basic human right to earn a living") (emphasis added); see also
STAFF OF SENATE SPECIAL COMM.ON AGING, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,THE NEXT STEPS
IN

COMBATING AGE DISCRIMINATION IN

EMPLOYMENT: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO

(Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter NEXT STEPS IN COMBATING AGE DISCRIMINATION] (examining history and shortcomings of the original ADEA and
recommending corrective legislative action aimed at promoting the retention of older workers).
200. See generally L. FRIEDMAN, YOUR TIME WILL COME: THE LAW OF AGE DISCRIMINATION AND EARLY RETIREMENT 95-102 (1984) (linking mandatory retirement with cost savings).
201. See Lazear, Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1261, 1261
(1979); see also Burkhauser & Quinn, The Effect of Pension Plans on the Patternof Life Cycle
Compensation,reprintedin The Removal of the Age Ceilings Cap Under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act: Joint Hearingson H.R. 4154 Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Ed. and Labor and the Subcomm. on Health and Long Term
MANDATORY RETIREMENT POLICY
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workers generally are paid less than the value of their marginal product during the early periods of employment;- this disparity is said
to disappear over time as the worker receives more pay, seniority,
benefits, and privileges.23' Ultimately, the scales are reversed: highsalaried senior workers receive more than the value of their marginal
products, and the firm becomes unwilling to pay these workers' current
wages.2 Economists argue that mandatory retirement addresses this
problem by allowing employees to exit gracefully on a pension. In
effect, the economists describe a kind of Faustian arrangement in
which employees accept advances in salary and retirement benefits
with the understanding that the employer can compel their departure. 2°5 Of course, Metz and the cases preceding it involved cost-based
terminations during periods of economic difficulty, not the routine
application of a mandatory retirement rule. But Judge Easterbrook's
dissent arguably tolerates a similar Faustian structure in that, under
his productivity-per-wage-dollar theory, the acceptance of annual
seniority raises makes older workers predictably vulnerable to discharge during periods of economic adjustment.206
But if the Act is concerned about the untimely displacement of
older workers, it is also sensitive to employers' cost burdens. In Congress's only explicit consideration of age-related cost problems, it provided in section 4(f)(2) that employers may make age distinctions in

Careof House Select Comm. on Aging, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 36-39 (1986) [hereinafter Burkhauser
& Quinn Paper] (relying on Lazear's cost analysis); C. LONG, THE LABOR FORCE UNDER
CHANGING INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT

167-68 (1958) (noting that automatic raises based on

seniority may provide employers with a cost incentive to impose a mandatory retirement age);
Leigh, Why Is There Mandatory Retirement? An Empirical Reexamination, 19 J. HuM. RESOURCES 512 (1984) (expanding Lazear's thesis and justifying it empirically).
202. Lazear, supra note 201, at 1263-66.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1263-66, 1283; see Burkhauser & Quinn Paper, supra note 201, at 82-83.
205. See Burkhauser & Quinn Paper, supra note 201, at 83. Burkhauser and Quinn explain
this "understanding" as follows:
[Ilt may pay both firms and workers to agree to long-term earning streams which
pay workers less than their VMP when young and more than their VMP when
old. This arrangement is superior because turnover and its attendant costs are
decreased, and workers are induced to cheat less and work harder on the job
(Lazear 1979, p. 1266). A necessary condition of such an agreement, however, is
a mechanism for fixing a time after which the worker is no longer entitled to
receive wage earnings greater than VMP. Lazear argues that mandatory retirement
provide[s] this mechanism.
Id.
206. Metz, 828 F.2d at 1213 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) ("If the wage is too high for the
performance, the employer may act.").
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benefit levels to account for the age-related costs of employee benefit
programs. 2°7 While one may attempt to draw some significance from
Congress's failure to address seniority-salary costs as well, this "omission" may be explained by the fact that Congress's focus at the time
of enacting the benefit plan exception was on the problems associated
with the hiring, not the retention, of older workers. 208 Thus, until
Congress speaks directly to the issue of salary costs, the benefit plan
exception remains relevant as an illustration of Congress's concern
about employer cost needs. At the same time, the exception reinforces
the protective policy of the Act by allowing employers to obtain cost
relief by adjusting benefits but not by denying employment.
Other facets of the legislative history also hint at a concern about
employer costs. During testimony in support of the original age bill,
Secretary of Labor Wirtz suggested that employers might take account
of "unavoidable difference[s]" in payroll. 2° As discussed earlier, he

207. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 199 (concerning the "hiring" focus of the original Act). This hiring
purpose was particularly evident in Congress's discussion of the benefit plan exception. See 1967
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 28, at 4 ('This exception serves to emphasize the primary purpose
of the bill - hiring of older workers ....'"); 113 CONG. REC. 31,255 (1967) (colloquy between
Senators Javits and Yarborough citing benefit cost problems that would affect the hiring of
older job applicants). In this setting, Congress never directly explored the cost problems associated with retention and incumbency.
Nevertheless, some commentators have attempted to infer from the benefit plan exception
a congressional intent about the availability of a general cost defense. Some have argued that
in treating the benefit plan issue as an exception, and in granting employers a limited right to
account for costs, Congress believed that cost was otherwise illegitimate as a defense. See Note,
The Cost Defense Under the Age Discriminationin Employment Act, 1982 DuKE L.J. 580,
590-92. Others have drawn the exact opposite inference, arguing that, in providing employers
with a mechanism for offsetting age-related benefit costs, Congress assumed that employers
would otherwise have been able to rely on such costs as a legitimate reason for denying employment. Metz, 828 F.2d at 1219 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting); see also Calille, supra note 19, at
443-45. Both arguments seize on certain statements and phrases used by Senators Javits and
Smathers in discussing the need for the exception. Metz, 828 F.2d at 1219; Calille, supra note
19, at 443-444; Note, supra, at 590-91. In truth, these statements are not determinative and
are incapable of resolving the issue. During the hearings and debates, both senators simply
expressed the concern that, absent a provision allowing for cost relief, employers would be
"discouraged from" or would have a "handy excuse" to avoid hiring older workers. 1967 Senate
Hearings, supra note 99, at 22-30 (Senators Javits and Smathers, respectively); 1967 SENATE
REPORT, supra note 192, at 14 (Sen. Javits). Rather than reflect an assumption about the
validity of a general cost defense, the referenced phrases simply acknowledged the reality that,
lawful or otherwise, benefit plan costs would inhibit the hiring of older workers. Because the
exemption was designed to remove the inhibition (by allowing for the reduction of benefit levels)
Congress did not need to hypothesize about whether reliance on these costs to deny employment
would otherwise have been lawful.
209. 1967 House Hearings, supra note 99, at 14.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

43

Florida Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

also acknowledged the possibility that employers might consider the
investment costs of hiring older workers, at least in industries which
demanded long and expensive training. 21° Finally, a passage in the
House Report to the original Act expressly acknowledged the economic
problems employers face in declining industries, and suggested that
the Act should not "be administered in such a way as to worsen a
achieving a
situation as this, or to prevent [such] an employer from
' '2
reasonable age balance in his employment structure. 1
These pieces of the legislative history, though somewhat ambiguous, suggest the need for a balance between an employer's legitimate
economic needs and the pro-employment objectives of the Act. Both
21
the prevailing and dissenting approaches to the salary cost dilemma 2
are flawed in this respect as each stakes out a one-sided position
polarized from the other.
B.

The Majority Approach

The majority approach acknowledges only the Act's pro-employment interests by establishing a veritable per se rule against salary
comparisons whenever salary correlates with seniority. Doctrinally,
courts usually achieve this result via the disparate treatment theory
by treating the seniority-salary criterion as the functional equivalent
of age. With this age finding, disparate treatment is established as a
matter of law, and the RFOA defense becomes irrelevant.2 13 As noted
above, courts have applied this per se approach even to disparate
impact claims where employers ostensibly were eligible to defeat the
claim based on evidence of an overriding justification. In both Geller
v. Markhaml 14 and Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College,z?5 where

210. Id. at 49. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
211. 1967 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 28, at 7. The Senate report made a similar, but not
identical, observation. 1967 SENATE REPORT, supra note 192, at 7. While the meaning of the
quoted passage is not entirely clear (since the substantive provisions of the Act would appear
to prohibit an employer from acting overtly to "restore age balance"), the passage nevertheless
indicates a congressional awareness of the economic problems that can accompany an aging
workforce.
212. See STAFF OF SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 99TH CONG., 1ST SESS., PERSONNEL PRACTICES FOR AN AGING WORKFORCE: PRIVATE-SECTOR EXAMPLES 3-4 (Comm.
Print 1985) [hereinafter PERSONNEL PRACTICES] (prepared by L. Root and L. Zarrugh)
(acknowledging the tension between the Act's pro-employment objective and legitimate business
needs).
213. See supra notes 152-64 & 176-84 and accompanying text.
214. 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980).
215. 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983).
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plaintiffs challenged neutral rules based on experience and tenure, the
courts of appeal cited the disparate treatment cases to reject justifications based on economic austerity.216
This flexible mixing of theories is flawed. The theory of functional
equivalence is unpersuasive because a salary criterion is not an overt
form of age discrimination, nor is it intrinsically age-based. Absent a
pay scale based in whole or in part on job tenure, a cost-induced layoff
of the most costly workers would appear to constitute a potentially
rational business practice grounded in the employer's concern for
economic efficiency. Assuming the criterion is not used as a pretext,
a problem arises under the law only because neutral salary levels when and if linked to seniority - will correlate with age. To the
extent this correlation can trigger liability, it is because, and only
217
because, of an adverse impact and not overt disparate treatment.
Indeed, in the Title VII setting, the Supreme Court has used "functional equivalence" to explain the underlying basis of disparate impact
liability.218 In this sense, functional equivalence is not established by

adverse impact alone but by showing that the harmful neutral rule,
like age itself, is unjustified. 219 By treating seniority-salary criteria

like age itself simply because of the strong correlation, the ADEA
courts effectively ignore the justification prong.
Geller and Leftwich ignore this prong as well in disparate impact
cases by opposing in principle the use of cost considerations as a
legitimate justification.22 But the anti-cost rule, derived principally
from the disparate treatment context, has never been applied as absolutely in disparate impact cases. The absolute nature of the rule in
disparate treatment cases reflects the courts' traditional reluctance to
allow employers to justify the use of unlawful criteria. 22 By contrast,

216. Leftwich, 702 F.2d at 692; Geller, 635 F.2d at 1034 35; see also Gelof v. Papineau, 648
F. Supp. 912, 921-22 n.48 (D. Del. 1986) (implying that rejection of employer's cost argument
in disparate treatment setting forecloses such justification under disparate impact), nwdified,
829 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1987).
217. Cf. Arnold v. United States Postal Serv., 863 F.2d 994, 999-1000 (D.C. Cir. 1989)

(seniority classification governing employee transfers is not tantamount to overt disparate treatment and is actionable, if at all, under disparate impact theory).
218. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2785 (1988); see also
Fiss, supranote 41, at 296-304 (developing the theory of functional equivalence as the justification

for the imposition of disparate impact liability).
219.

See Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2785; Fiss, supra note 41, at 299 ("There are two steps

necessary to establish functional equivalence.").
220. See Leftwich, 702 F.2d at 692; Geller, 635 F.2d at 1034-35.
221. See City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978);
see also supra text accompanying notes 52-95 (concerning the demanding showing necessary to

justify gender and age BFOQs).
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because the law does not proscribe the use of neutral criteria unless
such use is unjustified, disparate impact theory affords employers
greater latitude in offering justifications, 2 including those based on
economic concerns. Geller best illustrates the unfairness that can arise from an automatic rejection of economic justifications. Recall that the school district
in Geller sought to alleviate budget problems by hiring employees
with less than five years of service.- In effect, the school district
determined that it could not afford to pay for unlimited experience
and would concentrate on filling entry or near-entry positions. The
Geller court's summary rejection of the employer's economic strategy
is problematic because it suggests that employers risk liability unless
they strive to employ the most experienced, and consequently the
most expensive, work force possible. Surely Congress did not intend
the ADEA to function so intrusively.

222. See, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979)
(upholding rule prohibiting the employment of methadone users even in non-safety-sensitive
positions on grounds that it "significantly served" the employer's legitimate goals); Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (upholding the use of a written examination that may have
predicted success in police officer training course but was not necessarily able to predict successful
job performance).
223. Watson, 487 U.S. at 998 (cost or other burdens of less discriminatory selection device
may justify continued use of the challenged practice); accord Clady v. County of Los Angeles,
770 F.2d 1421, 1432 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 705 F.2d 1492,
1493 (9th Cir. 1983) ("head of household" rule, which permitted medical insurance coverage for
an employee's spouse only if the employee was the dominant wage earner, upheld as a valid
cost control measure notwithstanding the gender-based impact), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255
(1984); Spurlock v. United Air Lines, 475 F.2d 216, 219 (10th Cir. 1973) (containment of high
training costs cited as valid factor in airline's refusal to ease standards for entry into its pilot
training program). See generally Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1914: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98 (1974) (arguing that efficiency
interests are relevant in disparate impact analysis).
To be sure, several earlier disparate impact cases (involving neutral practices that severely
perpetuated past racial discrimination) took a somewhat stronger anti-cost position. But even
here, the courts recognized that cost and efficiency were legitimate factors to take into account
and balance against the adverse impact. See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.,
494 F.2d 211, 250 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding that training costs which might result from requiring
employer to abandon its "no-transfer" rule were too insubstantial to outweigh the discriminatory
impact); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 418 (5th Cir. 1971) (upholding
use of a "best qualified" hiring standard), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); Robinson v. Lorillard
Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 n.8 (4th Cir.) (suggesting a balancing approach), cert. dismissed, 404
U.S. 1006 (1971); see also M. ZIMMER, C. SULLIVAN & R. RICHARDS, CASES & MATERIALS
ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

243 (1982) (acknowledging that under the Robinson balanc-

ing approach cost savings must be weighed against the adverse impact).
224. See Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1030 (2d Cir. 1980).
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This is not to say that the school district would have prevailed had
the court considered the merits of its justification, but that under a
true disparate impact analysis, the employer was entitled to that assessment. This would have entailed an inquiry of whether the school
district's experience limit "manifestly" or "significantly" served the
district's alleged austerity problem and whether alternative measures
could address the problem in a less harmful manner.22 5 The most obvious alternative would be to consider the possibility of hiring experienced (but unemployed) teachers at reduced salaries. Because the
employer's claim was simply that it could not afford to pay for experience, this alternative might have satisfied the employer's need for
cost relief without impairing the employment opportunities of senior
applicants. The alternative is "less restrictive" because working, even
226
at a reduced salary, is presumably preferable to unemployment.
C.

The Dissenting View

As the majority approach acknowledges only the pro-employment
objectives of the statute, Judge Easterbrook's approach focuses only
on the employer's interest in economic efficiency. Judge Easterbrook
argues that salary comparisons are inherently legitimate as a basis
for termination or layoff because salary is an inherent component of
an employee's productivity.m By thus incorporating salary into a productivity-per-wage-dollar formula, employees with lower ratios become
vulnerable to displacement because they are labeled "less productive"
and deemed to be less qualified.ma
Like the majority view, this approach is also problematic. First,
the use of "less productive" is seductive but imprecise. When an em-

225. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text (noting the justification standard in
disparate impact cases); infra notes 241-68 and accompanying text (applying this standard to
seniority-salary criteria).

226.

On the other hand, this option may have been unavailable in Geller since state law

may have required the school district to pay its teachers at their experience level.
227. Metz, 828 F.2d at 1212-13 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 1213. Judge Easterbrook explains:
To say that someone is "qualified" to manage the Knox plant is to say that he can
handle the manufacture and sale of concrete well enough that he adds to the value

of the enterprise at least the cost of his salary. If he cannot do this, he is unqualified
for the particular job at the particular time. It is therefore not possible to divorce
the ability to do a job from the wage demanded. If the ADEA allows employers
to make decisions based on performance ... then it also allows employers to make

decisions based on the interaction of performance and wage. If the wage is too
high for the performance, the employer may act.
Id. (emphasis added).
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ployee is labeled "less -productive," it suggests that the employee is,
or has become, less able. The label, then, provides a powerful justification for termination because the Act surely does not protect an older
worker who, by aging, has declined and grown less proficient. But
Judge Easterbrook's formula fails to distinguish between a productivity rating that declines due to an actual diminution in an employee's
productivity- and one that declines simply because the senior worker
receives a higher salary due to an employer's decision to credit seniority and job tenure3n0 In the latter circumstance, when an employer
must make layoff selections from among competent workers, a low
productivity rating for the senior employees can effectively mask
seniority-salary as the true basis of comparison. The same is true if
an employer chooses not to lay off employees but, as in Metz, elects
to replace a senior employee with a cheaper, junior candidate. In both
cases, a senior employee, though arguably more competent, if only
because of the intangibles that come with experience and maturity,21
may appear less productive because of the cumulative effect of automatic seniority raises. Judge Easterbrook's formula thus obscures the
important fact that a low productivity rating may be caused not by
the employee but by that which the employer controls - the wage
scale. Of course, piercing the formula in this way does not itself make
Judge Easterbrook wrong, but it arguably breaks the spell of an
approach that attempts to offer a universally respectable explanation
- lower productivity - for terminating an older rather than a younger
worker.
Still, one might accept Judge Easterbrook's formula if, doctrinally,
it provided safeguards against abuse. It provides only minimal protection, however. In embracing the productivity formula as an inherently
legitimate and neutral criterion, and in resisting the application of
disparate impact liability under the ADEA, Judge Easterbrook would
find the criterion unchallengeable absent a finding of intent to target

229. See, for example, Donnelly v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 12 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 417, 420-22 (D. N.J. 1974), affd mem., 521 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1975), where the
employer imposed a 75% productivity ratio designed to measure whether, on an ongoing basis,
employees were producing at a satisfactory level. The plaintiff was terminated because his
performance significantly deteriorated and fell below the designated percentage. Id. at 420.
230. Metz, 828 F.2d at 1203. This was the circumstance in Metz. Over the years, Metz had
received automatic raises without regard to the firm's economic success. Id. There is no suggestion that Metz's work performance had declined at the time of his termination or that he was
less able than the junior worker who replaced him. Id. at 1209.
231. See supra note 193 (discussing these intangibles).
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older workers.2 But intent is difficult to unearth in the age setting.
Age discrimination generally results from unthinking and unconscious
stereotypes about older workers' abilities and not from the kind of
outright hostility that is more easily detectible in other settings.2
While one might attempt to infer intent from the foreseeable impact
of a seniority-salary criterion, this alone should prove unavailing
since, by definition, there will always exist a plausible economic reason
salary savings - to blunt a claim of age bias.m Thus, to the extent
that an employer holds stereotypes that older workers are less able,
or are no longer worth their salaries, or are less attractive to customers, or will clog promotion lines for younger workers, the risk exists
that a salary criterion that targets older workers can mask these
impermissible considerations.
Assuming the absence of impermissible considerations, the Easterbrook approach would also fail to distinguish between explanations
based on convenience and those based on genuine economic need. An
employer, for example, might be attracted to a seniority-salary criterion not so much because of the salary differentials but because the
criterion is convenient and cheap to administer. 23 Indeed, prior to the
ADEA amendments, employers would cite these very "convenience"
?
factors to justify the maintenance of mandatory retirement policies. 6
Judge Easterbrook's approach would necessarily embrace these same
factors in that, under his analysis, an employer's reliance on administrative convenience would be touted as economically rational and thus
capable of negating a charge of discriminatory intent. The problem is

232.

Metz, 828 F.2d at 1221 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). Thus, Judge Easterbrook explains:

"Wage discrimination is age discrimination only when wage depends directly on age, so that
the use of one is a pretext for the other; high covariance is not sufficient. . . ." Id.
233. See Employment Problems of Older Workers: Hearings on H.R. 10634 Before the
Subcomm. on Labor of House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1965)
[hereinafter 1965 House Hearings] (statement of Secretary Wirtz contrasting age and race
discrimination); M. LEVINE, supranote 90, at 133-35 (discussing psychoanalytic theories explaining the basis of unconscious bias against the elderly); Knowles, supra note 114, at 63-64 (age
discrimination is "subconscious and subtle"; those "who discriminate against older workers are

typically not aware of their behavior").
234.

Cf. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (holding that, in an equal protection

challenge under the fourteenth amendment, discriminatory intent could not be established solely
from the foreseeable adverse effects of the challenged policy).
235. See sources cited supra note 43 and accompanying text (attributing discrimination to

this kind of incentive).
236.

See NEXT STEPS IN COMBATING AGE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 199, at 18 (ad-

ministrative convenience included in list of arguments for mandatory retirement); MANDATORY
RETIREMENT, supra note 90, at 32 (same).
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that the ADEA seems to rank its protective concern about the displacement of older workers significantly higher than any concern for administrative convenience.
Assuming the seniority-salary criterion serves important economic
needs, not just convenience, the Easterbrook approach also fails to
require any meaningful. review of the feasibility of less harmful alternatives.? 7 This is because Judge Easterbrook focuses only on disparate
treatment theory where liability depends on unlawful motive. With
motive as the key, less restrictive alternatives are relevant only in
the rare case where an employer's failure to adopt one reveals a hostile
intent to harm older workers. Assuming no such intent, neither a
court nor an employer bears any obligation to consider less harmful
options.m Yet, when an employer relies on a salary criterion to implement a layoff or to substitute a high-salaried senior worker for a junior
one, alternative means are available, such as reducing the senior employee's salary, which might enable the employer to capture the cost
differential without the necessity of displacement. 9 To the extent this
alternative enhances the older worker's employability, it advances the
protective concern of the Act. An intent-based theory cannot safeguard
the Act's primary objective because an employer who refuses to consider the salary reduction option may successfully rebut an inference
of pretext simply by alleging a concern about the employee's morale.?O
In disparate impact theory, by contrast, a feasible alternative is relevant not only to show pretext but to show that the employer's chosen
means is unnecessary. 4 1

237. See Metz, 828 F.2d at 1214. Judge Easterbrook would hold that employers have no
obligation to consider such options. Id.; see supra note 187.
238. See Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577-78 (1978) (in disparate treatment
case the issue is whether the employer acted out of lawful motives, not whether it adopted the
least restrictive means of accomplishing its objective).
239. For full examination of these alternatives, see infra notes 257-68 and accompanying
text.
240. Such an assumption is hardly irrational. A senior worker might chafe over an employer's
decision to reduce salary. But an economically compelled reduction in force will, of necessity,
hurt someone. In these circumstances, it certainly is not obvious that the senior worker would
fail to recognize the wage cut as a preferable alternative to discharge. See M. LEVINE, supra
note 90, at 59-61, 72 (critiquing studies which assume that wage patterns are too rigid to
readjust).
241. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988). The Supreme
Court has expressly recognized that the existence of a less restrictive alternative can be used
to prove either that the employer's challenged practice is not necessary to achieve its legitimate
goals, or that its practice is a pretext for discrimination. Id.
Unfortunately, the Court also has used language equating proof of a less restrictive alternative
with proof of pretext. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2126 (1989)
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D.

279

A Balanced Approach Based on DisparateImpact

As noted earlier, disparate impact analysis provides a means for
courts to assess the justification for, and necessity of, harmful neutral

criteria.w A criterion is deemed harmful when it operates in a discriminatory (i.e., age-related) manner. A seniority-salary criterion often
will fall under this category to the extent that seniority and job tenure
predictably correlate with age. m At this point, disparate impact

analysis moves to the justification prong and liability is dependent
upon two inquiries: (1) whether the harmful criterion "significantly
serves" the employer's productivity needs and, if so, (2) whether these

needs can be satisfied by less restrictive alternatives.2 "

(quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) and citing Watson, 487 U.S.
at 998 (by demonstrating the existence of a less restrictive alternative, "respondents would
prove that '[petitioners were] using [their] tests merely as a "pretext" for discrimination."')).
This equation of the two concepts is misleading because it might suggest that the sole function
of the less restrictive alternative inquiry is to expose an unlawful motive on the employer's
part. This suggestion is erroneous. First, as the court implicitly acknowledged in Watson, a
motive gloss would run counter to the very nature of disparate impact liability that does not
depend on a finding of subjective intent, but focuses instead on the adequacy of the employer's
business justification under an objective standard. Watson, 489 U.S. at 989-91. Second, while
proof of a feasible, less restrictive alternative may justify an inference that the employer's
chosen practice was a pretext for discrimination, the inference does not necessarily follow. As
noted above in discussing the possibility of a salary reduction option, the employer may have
had a rational but inadequate reason for preferring the challenged practice, or may have chosen
it thoughtlessly without considering its impact. See supra notes 235-41 and accompanying text.
When disparate impact liability is found in these instances, it is not because of any specific
finding of pretext or intent, but because the proof of a less restrictive alternative established
that the harmful practice was simply unnecessary. In these circumstances, were the Court to
invoke its language equating proof of a less restrictive alternative with a finding of pretext, it
would amount to a fiction.
242. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
243. As noted, studies show that such a correlation often exists. See sources cited supra
note 131. On the other hand, not all firms compensate employees based on seniority or provide
automatic pay increases without regard to merit or productivity. See COSTS OF EMPLOYING
OLDER WORKERS, supra note 103, at 9-23 (correlation between higher salary and age does not
exist across the board and depends on specific employment situation). Thus, the mere fact that
an employer terminates an older worker because of that individual's higher salary would not,
itself, establish the age-based effect of the salary criterion. In the absence of such a correlation,
the plaintiff cannot prevail. See, e.g., Holt v. Gamewell Corp., 797 F.2d 36, 38 (1st Cir. 1986)
(higher salary linked to merit and managerial nature of position, not to seniority or job tenure);
Diamantopulos v. Brookside Corp., 683 F. Supp. 322, 329 (D. Conn. 1988) (relocation costs and
higher salary demand not linked to seniority and age).
244. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2125-26 (1989); see also supra
note 147.
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The "Significantly Serve" Requirement

In the context of a seniority-salary criterion, the first inquiry would
test the employer's need to capture the salary differentials of senior
employees. For an employer, such as the one in Metz,?45 claiming a
need to replace a senior employee with a lower salaried junior worker,
the wage differential would represent the sole salary savings gained
from the substitution, and the employer would be required to present
evidence showing a "significant" or "manifest" correlation between
that savings and its economic problems.?6 Justifying the use of a
seniority-salary criterion to implement a reduction in force (rather
than a simple exchange of workers) requires greater precision because
one must distinguish between the salary savings that will result in
any event from eliminating individuals from the payroll, and the added
savings that would result from targeting those with the highest
salaries. Since only the latter savings are relevant to the challenged
criterion, the employer should be required to explain why these savings alone are an important part of the overall layoff program.
This correlation requirement guards against possible abuses. First,
it reduces the ability of the employer to seize on minimal differences
in salary that might figure only modestly in the employer's overall
economic recovery. Though capturing such differentials would be rational economically, the differentials still might represent only an insignificant portion of the overall savings the employer will achieve
7
from the layoffs.-

245.

828 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1987).

246. These standards underscore that an employer in a disparate impact case must show
more than the bare rationality of the challenged practice. Wards Cove Packing, 109 S.Ct. at
2125-26 (standard is between mere rationality and absolute necessity). This standard can be
traced to the Court's earlier decision in New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568
(1979). In Beazer, the Court indicated that the "manifest relationship" test, itself derived from
the language in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), would be satisfied if the
challenged criterion "significantly served" the employer's legitimate goals. Beazer, 440 U.S. at
587 n.31. The Court reaffirmed this interpretation in dicta in Watson, 487 U.S. at 998, and
adopted it explicitly in Wards Cove Packing, 109 S.Ct. at 2125-26. Hence the terms "significant"
and "manifest" correlation may be used interchangeably.
247. Concededly, the line between significant and insignificant savings is not an obvious
one to draw, and would naturally depend on a case by case inquiry. Such an inquiry, despite
its imperfections, is recognized in analogous areas of labor and employment law as a vital tool
for balancing competing interests between employers and employees. See NLRB v. Fleetwood
Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967) (balancing harm to employee rights against legitimacy and
substantiality of employer's business justification); NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 27
(1967) (same). But see infa note 256 and accompanying text (noting that, while the employer's
economic justification must be significant, it need not depend on a showing of absolute necessity
or imminent bankruptcy).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol42/iss2/1

52

Kaminshine: The Cost of Older Workers, Disparate Impact, and the Age Discrimi
AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT

The "significantly serve" requirement also would preclude an employer from justifying a seniority-salary criterion solely on grounds of
convenience and cheapness of administration. This addresses one of
the central concerns of the employment discrimination laws - i.e.
that employers resist the temptation of using forbidden or harmful
criteria as crude but convenient methods of selection.m In the context
of a seniority-salary criterion, the risk is that in a large-scale layoff,
where abilities within the targeted pool may vary, a cost conscious
employer may sacrifice the accuracy of individual performance reviews
and rely on age-related salary comparisons as a more crude but less
costly selection device. 249 The "significantly serve" requirement controls this risk by obligating the employer to present evidence that the
trait measured by the selection criterion - here, salary differences
meaningfully advances the employer's interests.
Finally, while the "significantly serve" requirement focuses principally on the relationship between the challenged criterion and the
employer's economic need, it logically would include some inquiry into
the extent of the economic need itself. Consider in this regard that
an employer who credits seniority and experience but later relies on
seniority-salary differences to replace or lay off senior workers, essentially recants its own compensation system. Facially at least, salary
reflects the value the employer places on the employee's services.
Seniority is often included as a factor in this value system as a way
to credit experience and to promote loyalty to the firm.2 While job
248. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. In cases involving the use of overt age
criteria, the courts safeguard this concern by narrowly interpreting the BFOQ exception. As
interpreted, age itself may not be used as a proxy for a necessary job requirement, regardless
of its ease and cheapness to administer, unless the employer proves that the correlation is
extremely strong and that a nondiscriminatory measure would be highly impractical. See Western
Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 414-15 (1985); see also supra notes 72-75, 93-96 and

accompanying text. The disparate impact doctrine protects this concern in a similar way, even
if the employer enjoys a lighter burden. See supra note 147 (noting that employer assumes a
burden of production not proof). Thus, the "significantly serve" standard suggests that, apart
from pure administrative convenience, the challenged criterion must, at some threshold level,
adequately measure the business objective at issue. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321, 331 (1977) (height and weight requirement, though easy to apply, found insufficiently related
to strength needed for prison guard position); Haskins v. Secretary of HHS, 31 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 256, 262 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (recency factor, precluding consideration of experi-

ence beyond ten years, found insufficiently related to jobs at issue).
249. Cf. Franci v. Avco Corp., 538 F. Supp. 250, 256 (D. Conn. 1982) (broad discretion
granted to department supervisors to implement layoff and reduce payroll tacitly encouraged

the selection of high-salaried senior workers for termination).
250.

See Suzuki supra note 131, at 71, 73; see also Lazear, supra note 201, at 1264, 1267

(contending that a steep wage path that begins low and provides greater rewards for senior
workers may motivate junior workers toward hard work and discourage "shirking").
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tenure alone may not strongly correlate with increased productivity
after a certain point,21 the employer who continues to credit it presumably values some of the intangible benefits that we often associate
with experience and seasoning. 2 Unless the employer intended these
assets to serve as liabilities later in a worker's career, the employer
who uses them negatively against senior employees should at least
offer evidence of changed circumstances that would explain the need
to alter its value system.2 Stated another way, the employer should
be prepared to explain why it no longer is feasible to compensate for
"intangibles" that are only loosely related to productivity. This essentially was the claim put forward by the declining employer in Metz.25
At the same time, an employer showing changed circumstances
should not be required to produce evidence of impending economic
disaster. To stay competitive in today's markets, companies often must
anticipate future problems rather than first respond to them after the
fact. This means that, without having to show an imminent threat
of bankruptcy, the employer should be required to offer evidence of
a significant reassessment of its economic situation.- 6 With such evidence, the court will be better equipped to assess whether capturing
seniority-related salary differentials "significantly serves" the employer's objective.
2. Less Restrictive Alternatives
If a seniority-salary criterion furthers important business needs,
a court still may test the necessity of the criterion by considering

251. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 200, at 94 (suggesting that a factory worker, secretary,
sales clerk, or teacher with thirty years' seniority is not necessarily more productive than the
same person with ten).
252. See supra note 193 (concerning these intangibles).
253. This would control against what one commentator has described as the incentive for
the employer to replace high-salaried senior older workers with younger and lower-paid individuals "whenever a good excuse presents itself." C. LONG, supra note 201, at 168.
254. Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 286, 289 (N.D. Ind. 1986), rev'd, 828 F.2d
1202 (7th Cir. 1987). The plant in Metz had been operating at a substantial loss due to a decline
in sales. Metz's salary, which was largely a function of automatic seniority raises, was nearly
twice that of his replacement. The district court thus found, as the employer had argued, that
"Metz'[s] salary was too high to justify in light of the poor performance of the plant." Id.
255. Skrzycki, The Drive to Downsize, Wash. Post, Aug. 20, 1989, at Hl, col. 2.
256. But see Note, The Cost of Growing Old: Business Necessity and the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 88 YALE L.J. 565. 589 (1979) (suggesting that employer would first have
to show imminent insolvency or recurring operating losses to justify cost-cutting measure). Not
only is such a standard impractical in today's competitive market, it is at odds with the more
flexible justification standard announced by the Supreme Court in Ward Cove Packing. See
supra note 147.
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evidence of less restrictive alternatives. Under settled disparate impact principles, the plaintiff must present this evidence. 7 Further,
the evidence must show not only that a proposed alternative would
be less harmful to the employee, but that it would further the employer's objectives as feasibly and effectively as the challenged criterion. m
"Factors such as the cost or other burdens of proposed alternative
selection devices"' 9 might render the alternative infeasible. Relevant
as well is the Supreme Court's admonition that "[c]ourts are generally
less competent than employers to restructure business practices." 26
These latter considerations necessarily restrict the kinds of options a
court may compel as alternatives to discharge under a seniority-salary
criterion. Thus, while an employer might capture salary costs without
a layoff by offering early retirement incentives to costly senior workers, by instituting a work-sharing arrangement, or by allowing the
work force to contract by attrition, 261 these options may be attacked
2
as either costly, less efficient, or intrusive. 6-

257. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988) (citing Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)).
258. Id. at 998.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 999 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978)).
261. See Note, supra note 256, at 591-92 n.121 (suggesting the feasibility of these and other
options).
262. Attrition alone is not a dependable option if, as is common, the employer seeks to
reduce the workforce within a relatively short period and does not experience significant voluntary turnover. Work sharing, while possibly an option for a short-term problem, can be inefficient
as a way to make permanent or long-term adjustments. See Hall, Employment Fluctuations
and Wage Rigidity, in 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 91, 107-08 (1980)
(suggesting that reducing the work force is more efficient than shortening work hours in response
to a significant economic decline); see also PERSONNEL PRACTICES, supra note 212, at 3-4
(explaining that employers are inhibited from developing part-time work options for older workers because, inter alia, of the "logistical difficulties associated with changes in the [firm's]
organizational structure").
Concededly, early retirement incentives have grown in popularity and many employers have
used them in recent years to avoid forced terminations. See J. HEWITT ASSOCIATES, PLAN
DESIGN AND EXPERIENCE IN EARLY RETIREMENT WINDOWS AND IN OTHER VOLUNTARY
SEPARATION PLANS 1 (1986); S. RHINE, MANAGING OLDER WORKERS: COMPANY POLICIES
AND ATTITUDES 10-11 (1984). However, this option too has drawbacks. First, the incentive
benefits themselves can be costly. See E. MEIR, EARLY RETIREMENT INCENTIVE PROGRAMS:
TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS 7-8 (1986); P. ROBINSON, MANAGEMENT POLICY ON AGING IN
THE WORKFORCE 36-37 (Employment and Retirement Division, Ethel Percy Andrus Gerontology Center, Univ. of Southern California 1983). Second, the employer runs the risk that the
incentive program will be 'too successful" by attracting workers whom the employer would
prefer to retain. See McMorrow, Retirement and Worker Choice: Incentives to Retire and the
Age Discriminationin Employment Act, 29 B.C.L. REV. 347, 367 n.131 (1986); P. ROBINSON,
supra, at 86. Third, incentive programs have provided little insurance against litigation and
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An option based on salary reduction is more feasible. If an employer
proposes replacing a senior worker with a junior one to save on the
difference in salary, allowing the senior worker to cure the differential
by accepting a pay cut would satisfy the employer's objective while
preserving job security. No doubt, critics might complain that the
wage reduction itself is age related and harmful, and that the ADEA
prohibits benefit, as well as job, discrimination. 2- This argument, however, should not foreclose the availability of the option. First, since
the option preserves job security, it is consonant with the Act's dominant concern about the displacement of older workers. 2 - In this sense,
as between lesser compensation and employment, the Act is more
protective of the latter. Section 4(f)(2) is a prime illustration as it
tolerates age-based discrimination in benefit plan levels to reduce the
costliness of older workers and enhance their employability.2 Second,
as a less restrictive alternative, the wage reduction option would not
be forced on the employee but rather would be presented at the
employee's initiative to undercut the necessity for termination.2- Fi-

controversy. To the contrary, they have provoked formidable legal challenges both by older
employees who were targets of the incentive, and by those who were deemed too old and
excluded from eligibility. See, e.g., Paolillo v. Dresser Indus., 827 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1987) (incentive
program challenged as form of constructive termination); Karlen v. City College, 837 F.2d 318
(7th Cir. 1988) (challenge to age..based eligibility restriction); see generally, Kass, Early Retirement Incentives and the Age Discriminationin Employment Act, 4 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 63
(1986); McMorrow, supra.
None of these points are made to deny the potential virtues of these options as humane
alternatives, or to deny that employees, on balance, would prefer them to a layoff. Given their
limitations and cost, however, it is doubtful that a court can cancel a layoff and force an employer
to adopt such programs as a "less restrictive alternative." Consider, in this regard, that the
ADEA plaintiff who challenges the use of a seniority-salary criterion does not generally attack
the legitimacy of the layoff decision but challenges the method of implementation. See supra
notes 122-23 and accompanying text. The options discussed above are significantly more intrusive
because they would do more than provide an alternative method of identifying employees for
termination; they would require the employer to abandon the layoff itself.
263. See Metz, 828 F.2d at 1213 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (noting that a discriminatory
discharge and a reduction in pay are both covered under section 4(a)(1)).
264. See supra notes 194-98 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's concern about
premature displacement).
265. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
266. This factor should remove any argument that the salary reduction option would violate
a rarely used provision of the ADEA, which makes it "unlawful for an employer ... to reduce
the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this chapter." ADEA § 4(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(a)(3) (1988). This provision apparently was intended to prohibit an employer from curing
unlawful wage disparities, which favored younger workers based on age, by reducing wage
rates to the lowest common level. Instead, the employer must raise the wages of the older
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nally, the salary reduction option simply would remove the seniorityrelated salary advantage that had favored the older worker. While
the employee may have had an expectation that the advantage would
continue indefinitely, the Act does not establish contractual seniority
rights.2 Thus, it does not guarantee the maintbnance of salary levels
irrespective of the employer's economic condition.
Salary reduction is also a feasible alternative in a layoff situation,
although it would work less perfectly. Here, as noted above, there
are two areas of salary savings: the savings gained from shrinking
the work force, and the added savings realized by targeting senior
salaries.m Thus, reducing higher salaries arguably will not, by itself,
obviate the need for terminations. But to the extent the senior worker
would prefer a pay cut over termination, the salary reduction option
would allow the older worker to become more cost competitive and
would eliminate the justification for using seniority-salary as a criterion
for layoff. While the older worker would remain vulnerable, he presumably would compete more equally under a substitute layoff criterion
that did not regard job tenure as a negative factor. This arrangement
would advance the employer's interests as well since we should assume
that a struggling employer would prefer to retain competent, experienced personnel were it not for their costly salaries.
3. The Need to Validate the Solution
The chief virtue of using a disparate impact framework for addressing seniority-salary problems is that it allows the judiciary to consider
both the pro-employment and economic concerns of the ADEA. In
this sense, it represents a "balanced" approach. However, this approach is useless if, as many critics contend, disparate impact theory
should not be available in age cases.2 9 Because of the critical effect
this would have on my recommended solution and on the overall scope
of the ADEA, the remainder of the article addresses this broader issue.

workers to equal that of the younger ones. See 29 C.F.R. § 860.75 (1986) (Department of Labor's
original guidelines); see also Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974) (construing

a similar provision of the Equal Pay Act). The salary reduction proposed here is not designed
to cure an illegal wage disparity, and, in the context of a less restrictive alternative, it would
be sought by the employee, not imposed unilaterally by the employer.
267. See, e.g., Tice v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 761 F.2d 1210, 1217 (7th Cir. 1985) (where

employer lawfully eliminated older worker's position, it had no duty to allow that individual to
bump another employee with less seniority: "ADEA was not intended to legislate seniority
rights where none exist in the contract of employment.").
268.
269.

See supra notes 245-47 and accompanying text.
See infra note 273.
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DEFENDING DISPARATE IMPACT UNDER THE
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ADEA

Disparate impact is a Title VII-created theory of liability. 170 Because of the historical link between Title VII and the ADEA and their
textual similarities,-, most courts have held, or assumed without explanation, that disparate impact should apply to discrimination based
on age. 272
While this Title VII connection is an appropriate starting place for
assessing the use of disparate impact under the ADEA, it fails by
itself to address the considerable commentary opposing the incorporation of disparate impact. 3 This commentary in opposition rejects the
Title VII analogy by pointing to ostensible differences in the ADEA's
history and purpose, its statutory language, as well as to differences
in the very nature of age discrimination as compared to discrimination
based on race. The legislative history argument attempts to divine
congressional intent.- It relies principally on a pre-ADEA document,
the 1965 report from the Secretary of Labor to Congress, which
documented the existence of age discrimination and which provided

270. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see also supra notes 142-47 and
accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. As noted earlier, the ADEA grew out of
the Title VII debates and a provision within Title VII directing the Secretary of Labor to
conduct a study of age discrimination in employment and recommend appropriate legislation.
See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 715, 78 Stat. 241, 265; see also supra notes
22-24 and accompanying text. I'he study issued in 1965 and led to the passage of the ADEA
in 1967. See generally SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 25.
272. See, e.g., Holt v. Gamewell Corp., 797 F.2d 36, 37 (1st Cir. 1986); Heward v. Western
Elec., 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 807, 811 (10th Cir. 1984); Monroe v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 736 F.2d 394, 407 (7th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 1394-95 (9th
Cir. 1984); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 690 (8th Cir. 1983); Allison
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 1982); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d
1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980). For one of the few ADEA cases examining the disparate impact
question in detail, see EEOC v. Governor Mifflin School Dist., 623 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
Three circuit courts have assumed arguendo that disparate impact applied under the ADEA
but have expressly declined to resolve the issue. See Arnold v. United States Postal Serv., 863
F.2d 994, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Akins v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 744 F.2d 1133, 1136 (5th
Cir. 1984); Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 120 (3d Cir. 1983).
273. See Blumrosen, supra note 19, at 114-15; see also C. BOLICK, supra note 19, at 8-11;
Schneiderman, The Law of Age Discrimination:DisparateTreatment and DisparateImpact,
in AGE DISCRIMINATION 181 (1982); Stacy, A Case Against Extending the Adverse Impact
Doctrine to the ADEA, 10 EMPL. REL. L.J. 437-55 (1985); Note, supra note 19, at 851-52. But
see Eglit, supra note 38, at 210-17 (maintaining that disparate impact should apply under the
ADEA).
274. See Blumrosen, supra note 19, at 73-93; see also C. BOLICK, supra note 19, at 3-4;
Schneiderman, supra note 273, at 208-09; Stacy supra note 273, at 439-44.
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the impetus for enactment of the ADEA. 5 This report is said to
isolate overt age stereotypes (age ceilings built on unfounded assumptions about older workers) as the sole evil addressed by the statute.
The statutory language argument principally relies on the "reasonable
factor other than age" exception,- a provision not found in Title VII
and that, according to commentators, exempts facialy neutral practices so long as they are not used as pretexts to harm older workers.m
The policy argument, which emphasizes differences between discrimination based on age and that based on race, explains disparate impact
as a necessary tool to root out the pervasive legacy of racism, while
deeming it unnecessary and impractical for addressing the less invidious problem of discrimination based on age.m
These arguments cannot be discounted as simply the views of scholars and practitioners who are ideologically uncomfortable with the
very notion of disparate impact as a theory of liability. Professor
Blumrosen, for example, one of the earliest and most frequently cited
opponents of disparate impact under the ADEA, is equally noted as
a long-time advocate of disparate impact under Title VII. 9 This obviously does not make him correct, but it underscores the need to explore
objectively the differences that he and others see between age and
other forms of prohibited discrimination. I assume this task in the
remaining sections by addressing the arguments made in opposition
and offering a competing rationale in support of disparate impact liability in ADEA cases.
A.

Legislative History and CongressionalIntent
1. The Secretary's Report to Congress

The Secretary's report exposed the existence of age discrimination
as a pervasive problem in the work place. Pursuant to Congress's

SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 25; RESEARCH MATERIALS, Supra,note 25.
276. ADEA § 4(f)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1988).
277. See C. BOLICK, supra note 19, at 9; Schneiderman, supra note 273, at 209-12; Stacy,
supranote 273, at 446-47; Note, supra note 19, at 844-48. Justice Rehnquist expressly endorsed
this argument in dissenting from the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Markham v. Geller,
451 U.S. 945, 945 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For discussion of the Geller case, see supra
notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
275.

278. See Blumrosen, supra note 19, at 102-07; Schneiderman, supra note 273, at 205-08;
Stacy, supra note 273, at 438-39; Note, supra note 19, at 848-54.
279. See Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise:Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept
of Employment Discrimination,71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 105-06 (1972) [hereinafter Strangers in
Paradise].
280. See SECRETARY'S REPORT, supranote 25; RESEARCH MATERIALS, supranote 25.
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directive, the Secretary examined both the causes of this problem and
its consequences. With respect to the latter, the Secretary documented
both the human consequences to older workers themselves and the
economic consequences to industry and society caused by the premature loss of older workers from the workplace.-, The disparate impact
debate focuses on the causal side of the equation and that portion of
the Secretary's report addressing the various factors which "[t]end to
[r]esult in [d]iscrimination in [e]mployment."- The Secretary assessed
three problem areas: (1)the use of fixed overt age ceilings; (2) the
use of neutral standards such as educational level, training, and test
scores, which might operate more strongly against older workers; and
(3) the use of certain institutional arrangements.2
Not surprisingly, the Secretary regarded overt age ceilings as
"[t]he most obvious," and presumably the most odious, form of age
discrimination. His concern stemmed not from opposition to age restrictions per se, but from research showing that age restrictions used
by industry were based on inaccurate, unstudied, and often stereotypical assumptions about the disabilities of older workers as a group.
These assumptions conflicted with documented studies showing that
older employees generally performed comparably to younger workers,
that they often developed traits as they aged which compensated for
any decline in certain functions, and that great variations in individual
ability existed within all age groups.2 The Secretary thus concluded
that fixed age limits in employment were often "arbitrary" in the
sense that they did not accurately measure one's ability to perform
the job. The Secretary contrasted this phenomenon with the kind of
prejudice which characterizes race discrimination and noted that, while
race discrimination is often the result of intolerance and hostility, age
discrimination is more the result of unfair stereotypical assumptions
7
about the capabilities of older workers.?
Following this discussion of overt age restrictions, the Secretary
examined certain "forces of circumstance" that might operate more
strongly against older workers as a group. Here, the Secretary

281. SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 25, at 18-19; RESEARCH MATERIALS, supra note
25, at 95-104.
282. SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 25, at 5-17.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 6.
285. Id. at 6-8.
286. Id. at 7-9, 14; RESEARCH MATERIALS, supranote 25, at 81-89; see also sources cited
supra notes 90 & 193 (other studies with similar findings).
287. SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 25, at 6.
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cautioned that certain job-related factors such as declining health, lack
of up-to-date education or training, or lower test scores might disadvantage older workers in their ability to compete with younger, more
recently educated job applicants.m The Secretary naturally approached this issue more equivocally than he did the overt age limits.
On the one hand, the report expressly noted that a decision not to
employ an older worker where 'there is in fact a relationship between
his age and his ability to perform the job" should not be classified
as "disclnimination." At the same time, the Secretary expressed concern
about placing undue reliance on neutral factors based only on a rough
correlation with aging. Thus using health as an example, the Secretary
cautioned: "This in no sense means that it would be reasonable to
exclude all older workers from consideration for such jobs because as
a group they are more subject to specific health problems associated
In the same spirit, the Secretary noted the
with growing older."
existence of studies showing only a minimal, and sometimes nonexistent, correlation between aging and neutral measures of productivity.29 Indeed, after suggesting that age-based disparities in scores on
employment tests might reflect differences in recent testing experience
rather than differences in intrinsic ability, the Secretary warned:
"[T]hese findings show the injustice of judging workers by the average
''
for the group rather than on the basis of their individual abilities. "
The final portion of the Secretary's report focused on special institutional arrangements that "[i]ndirectly [r]estrict the [e]mployment of
[o]lder [w]orkers. ' ' 2 3 Here the Secretary very specifically addressed
seniority systems, pension and insurance programs, and promotionfrom-within policies.2 The unifying thread in these arrangements is
that, while they were principally designed to benefit older workers
by providing forms of employment protection and retirement security,
they were found to inhibit the hiring of unemployed older workers
who must enter the labor market late in their careers.29 Following
all of these findings, the Secretary recommended multiple corrective
action: (1) legislation to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; (2) adjustments in those institutional arrangements that disad-

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Id.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 11 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 14-15; RESEARCH MATERIALS, supm note 25, at 86-87.
SECRETARY'S REPORT, supm note 25, at 15.
Id. at 15-17, 21-22.
Id. at 15-17.
Id.
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vantage older workers; and (3) special programs and funds to upgrade
the availability of education, training, and job referral opportunities
for older workers.2
Commentators who argue against the use of disparate impact under
the ADEA draw sustenance from the structure of this report. Professor Blumrosen, in particular, forcefully maintains that the report's
distinction between arbitrary age discrimination and practices which
tend to disadvantage older workers parallels a distinction between
present-day disparate treatment and disparate impact theories.2 Since
the Secretary's report recommended the prohibition of arbitrary age
ceilings but proposed other remedies for dealing with harmful neutral
arrangements, Professor Blumrosen concludes that the Secretary did
not support a theory of liability based on adverse effect.- s Professor
Blumrosen then traces this dichotomy to the ADEA itself, noting that
the Act's preliminary statement of findings and purpose refers separately to arbitrary age discrimination and to certain institutional practices which may work to the disadvantage of older workers.2 He
refers as well to statements made during the congressional hearings
and the floor debates focusing on unjust age restrictions as the principle topic of concern.2° Under this thesis, Congress endorsed the
dichotomy as described in the report and thereby intended to prohibit
only overt age discrimination, i.e., discrimination based on "the deliberate disregard of a worker's ability solely because of age."1 This
construction is plausible but not as inevitable as the commentators
would suggest.
2. An Alternative Construction of the Secretary's Report
a. The Meaning of Arbitrary Age Discrimination
Preliminarily, the commentators in opposition infer too much from
the Secretary's preoccupation with overt age restrictions. As the government's first comprehensive effort to study the problem of age discrimination in the work place, 3°2 the Secretary would naturally focus

296. Id. at 21-25.
297. Blumrosen, supra note 19, at 74-79; Schneiderman, supra note 273, at 208-09 (similarly
emphasizing the distinction made in the report); see also Stacy, supra note 273, at 441-42
(adopting Blumrosen's argument).
298. Blumrosen, supra note 19, at 79.
299. Id. at 85-86 (citing what became ADEA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1988)).
300. Id. at 86-91.
301. Id. at 86.
302. Earlier efforts to address this problem at the federal level were minimal. See 2 H.
EGLIT, AGE DISCRIMINATION

16.01, 16-4 n.2 (1989).
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on stereotypes and overt age restrictions as the most glaring age-based
obstacles in the same way Congress was preoccupied with overt racial
policies when it outlawed race discrimination under Title VII. 3 Indeed, one searches in vain in the legislative history to Title VII to

find any specific attention to, or awareness of, the concept of disparate
impact liability.3 Theories about discrimination and disparate impact
would not crystallize for several years and would not become established until the Supreme Court's decision in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.tm in 1971. While this chronology does not render the Secretary's
report irrelevant, it arguably diminishes its capacity to reveal a specific

intent about concepts and definitions that had yet to emerge in this
area of the law.
But even assuming that the report reflects some early understand-

ing of disparate impact liability, its focus on arbitrary age discrimination does not reveal a clear intent to insulate neutral practices from

disparate impact scrutiny. First, the phrase "arbitrary discrimination"
need not be read solely as a euphemism for intentional disparate treatment; it can embrace disparate impact theory as well. In describing

disparate impact liability in Griggs, the United States Supreme Court
condemned the use of "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary bar-

riers"

that operated unfairly on the basis of race. By this phrase

303. See Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Origin of the Adverse
Impact Definition of Employment Discriminationand Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDUS.
REL.L.J. 429, 491-500 (1985) (citing statements made during the Title VII debates that reflect
a preoccupation with intentional discrimination).
304. Advocates of disparate impact under Title VII acknowledge that support for the theory
comes from an assessment of the policy objectives of the statute, not from any specific reference
in the 1964 legislative history. See Helfand & Pemberton, The Continuing Vitality of Title VII
DisparateImpact Analysis, 36 MERCER L. REv. 939, 944 (1985) ("There is very little in that
legislative history ... to show that Congress was aware of adopting anything resembling the
disparate impact principle as the device that would attain [its equal opportunity] objective); see
also Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise, supra note 279, at 73-74 (explaining disparate impact
in terms of policy, and finding its "anchor" in statutory language not legislative history).
305. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise, supra note 279, at 62-74
(tracing evolution of concept of discrimination up to Griggs and referring to disparate impact
as a "new" definition). In Griggs, the Supreme Court principally relied on the equal opportunity
objective of Title VII and concluded that disparate impact liability was an integral part of that
policy. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30. While the Court did not refer explicitly to Title VII's
prohibitory language, the applicable provisions were facially broad enough to embrace such a
theory. Subsequently, the Court confirmed that Griggs rested on an interpretation of Title VII
§ 703(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 2(a)(2) (1985). See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 448 (1982);
see also infra note 347 (examining the applicable statutory language).
306. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
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and others,30 7 the Court underscored that liability arose not from a
racial impact alone, but from the absence of an adequate correlation
between the general screening device and the requirements of the
job. The Secretary's report on age discrimination identified a similar
concern about "arbitrariness" in the use of overt age restrictions built
on generalizations about the capacities of older workers.m The Secretary condemned these age restrictions not just because they targeted
older workers, but because they targeted them unfairly without a true
assessment of ability.3 9 This neatly parallels the concern in Griggs.
At the very least, it allows us to argue that the Secretary's concern
about "arbitrary" age discrimination may have embraced not just the
unjustified use of overt age limits but also the unjustified use of facially
neutral standards that predictably target older employees.
b.

Neutral Job Standards and Institutional Arrangements

Of course, Professor Blumrosen and others depend less on the
intrinsic meaning of arbitrary discrimination than on the structure of
the report and its separate discussion of neutral job standards and of
institutional arrangements that can disadvantage older workers.310 Emphasizing the Secretary's recommendations to ease some of these problems through special programs and adjustments rather than through
specific antidiscrimination laws, Professor Blumrosen would infer an
intent to remove them entirely from the scope of any antidiscrimination law. 3 "1However, the evidence does not compel this conclusion.
(1) Neutral Job Standards
Professor Blumrosen is correct that the report addressed neutral
job standards (education, training, testing, and the like) separately
from overt age ceilings. The Secretary undoubtedly recognized that
these neutral standards might legitimately disadvantage older workers
in competition with younger applicants for scarce jobs. But in making
this assessment, the Secretary seemingly presumed that the standards

307. Id. at 432 ("[challenged] requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question").
308. SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 25, at 7-8.
309. Id.
310. Blumrosen, supra note 19, at 74-79; Schneiderman, supra note 273, at 208-09; Stacy,
supra note 273, at 441-42.
311. Blumrosen, supra note 19, at 77-78; see also Schneiderman, supra note 273, at 209;
Stacy, supra note 273, at 440-41.
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under review were truly job related and designed to measure ability.32

In this sense, the discussion was consistent with disparate impact
theory. And, since job-related standards would be lawful whatever
the age-based impact, the Secretary naturally recognized that relief
could not come solely from an antidiscrimination law but would depend
in part on the establishment of special remedial programs. However,
it does not follow that the Secretary thereby intended to insulate the
use of age-related tests or educational standards which were not predictive of job performance. To the contrary, the Secretary expressly
cautioned about the risks of inaccurate employment tests which harm
older workers, noting that an age-based disparity in scores might
reflect a disparity in test-taking experience favoring younger, recent
graduates, rather than a difference in actual ability.31 3 Further, in a
passage foreshadowing the concerns of disparate impact theory, the
Secretary expressly warned of the potential "unfairness" of inaccurate
screening devices that do not measure actual ability3 14 He explained:
"Any formal employment standard which requires, for example, a high
school diploma will obviously work against the employment of many
older workers - unfairly if, despite his limited schooling, an older
worker's years of experience have given him the relevant equivalent
of a high school education." 15
Although these "words of caution" are not dispositive, they allow
for a distinction between necessary and unnecessary practices, a distinction that would account for the Secretary's proposal for special
programs without having to exclude neutral practices from disparate
impact scrutiny under the antidiscrimination law. This interpretation
would allow one to view the Secretary's recommendations as complementary proposals, designed to work in tandem. It would also avoid
a certain oddity in Professor Blumrosen's assumption that the Secretary intended tax-supported special programs to serve as the sole

312. See SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 25, at 11-15. The Department of Labor apparently operated under this assumption in 1968 when it issued the original interpretive guidelines

to the Act. In illustrating the kinds of factors that would be protected as a "reasonable factor
other than age," the Department specifically referred to job-relatedtests, educational standards,
measures of quantity and quality of production, and similar factors. 29 C.F.R. §§ 860.103, .104(b)
(1986). At the time these guidelines were issued, the Department of Labor was still headed by

Willard Wirtz - the author of the Secretary's report. For further discussion of these guidelines
and their connection to the Secretary's report, see infra notes 363-69 and accompanying text.
313. SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 25, at 14 (performance on aptitude and other
entrance tests can be "affected by recency of education and testing experience").

314. Id. at 3.
315. Id. (emphasis added).
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means of combating the problems of neutral practices. It is one thing
for the Secretary to propose tax-supported assistance for older workers
who need training and cannot meet necessary education or testing
standards;316 it would be quite extraordinary, however, to propose the
use of government-sponsored programs to combat the effect of arbitrary, unnecessary, or illegitimate standards. In the latter circumstance, the obvious remedy is to compel a better standard, not to
excuse the poor one. This would be accomplished within the framework
of an antidiscrimination law that included disparate impact scrutiny,
not through special assistance programs.
(2) Separate Recommendations for Institutional Arrangements
Professor Blumrosen also would infer an intent to exclude disparate
impact from the ADEA based upon the Secretary's separate proposal
to modify, rather than outlaw, "institutional arrangements" that can
317
adversely affect the employment opportunities of older workers.
Here, Professor Blumrosen correctly observes that the Secretary intended the proposal for special adjustments to serve as an exclusive
remedy and to operate in lieu of liability under an antidiscrimination
law.3' 8 However, the Secretary's discussion about institutional arrangements was confined to three special programs: seniority systems, promotion-from-within policies, and retirement and insurance plans.3 9
These arrangements warranted separate consideration. First, they
differed from the neutral job standards discussed earlier as they were
not designed to measure ability but to provide valuable protection and
benefits. Second, rather than harm older workers, these programs
were designed to benefit this constituency and had come to epitomize
progressive employment policy. Thus, the Secretary referred to the
proliferation of pension programs as a "significant contribution toward
enhancing the economic security of [retired] workers"; 320 he referred
to job seniority as a "precious asset" because it fosters employee

316. To provide this assistance, the Secretary contemplated, inter alia, the invigoration of
two federal programs: the United States Employment Service, and the Manpower Development
and Training Act. The purpose of the former was to provide job referral and placement counseling; the purpose of the latter was to provide training opportunities. See id. at 23-24; RESEARCH
MATERIALS, supra note 25, at 135-38.
317. Blumrosen, supra note 19, at 78-80; see also Stacy, supra note 273, at 441 (drawing
the same inference).
318. Blumrosen, supra note 19, at 78-80.
319. SECRETARY'S REPORT. supra note 25, at 15-17, 21-22; see also 1965 House Hearings,
supra note 233, at 21-22 (statement by Secretary Wirtz).
320. RESEARCH MATERIALS, supra note 25, at 21.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol42/iss2/1

66

Kaminshine: The Cost of Older Workers, Disparate Impact, and the Age Discrimi
AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT

security.32 Yet, the Secretary also found that these laudable programs

produced an undesirable side effect - they inhibited the hiring of
older, unemployed job seekers. 22 The Secretary soundly proposed to
ease this latter problem through selective adjustmentsm rather than
to jeopardize the programs themselves under the blanket prohibitions
of an antidiscrimination law. As the Secretary explained: "To the extent that employment security and income maintenance programs are
having a wholly unintended adverse effect on the position of older
workers who are unemployed, these programs must be adjusted."
Perhaps, as Professor Blumrosen maintains, the Secretary meant
this proposal to symbolize a general opposition to disparate impact in
the age setting. The proposal, however, contains little evidence of
opposition beyond the special arrangements under discussion. The special quality of the programs - designed principally to help, not harm,
older workers - makes it understandable that the Secretary would
treat them separately, in a more protective manner. Indeed, if we
are to infer anything from the Secretary's proposal, we might read it
to presuppose the existence of disparate impact liability by viewing
the proposal as an exception to the ordinary reach of the law. The
ADEA, as enacted, supports this view. In section 4(f)(2), Congress
addressed the problem of pension and seniority systems by carving
out a special exception from normal ADEA coverage.m The exception
insulates any such arrangement from scrutiny so long as the arrangement was not adopted as a "subterfuge to evade the purposes of [the
Act.] '' M The Supreme Court has interpreted this phrase to require
proof of a specific discriminatory purpose.
Under this view, the
exception can be read to narrow the kind of liability that would otherwise attach to these programs. For seniority systems in particular,
the Supreme Court's interpretation would foreclose liability based on
adverse impact alone but retain liability based on a showing of agebased intent.m The assumption is that an ADEA without the exception
would not provide this special protection.

321.
322.

Id. at 53.
SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 25, at 2, 21-22; RESEARCH MATERIALS, SUpa

note 25, at 36, 59-61.
323.

SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 25, at 21-22.

324.

Id. at 22.

325.

ADEA § 4(f(2), U.S.C. § 623(f(2) (1988).

326. Id.
327. See Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 109 S. Ct. 2854, 2863 (1989); United
Air Lines v. MeMann, 434 U.S. 192, 203 (1977).

328. For pension plans and insurance programs, the exception actually insulates the use of
overt age-based treatment, in recognition of the fact that age can be a legitimate actuarial factor
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Linking the Report to the Statute

Recognizing that a pre-ADEA report by a federal agency does not
itself reveal the intent of Congress, Professor Blumrosen and others
attempt to link the report to the final legislation.2 This linkage is
generally correct. While the report was never formally included in
the legislative record, it was cited favorably during the committee
hearings and the floor debates and was referenced in the Senate Report
on the bill.- 0 Moreover, the structure of the bill, as ultimately adopted,
reflected the report's recommendation not only for legal prohibitions
but for other remedies as well. Thus section 2(b) states the multiple
purposes of the bill: "[T]o promote employment of older persons based
on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination
in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of
meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment."-'
Section 3 endorses the recommendation for education and research
programs.3 2 The heart of the bill, section 4, sets forth the prohibitions
against age discrimination.3
However, this linkage between the report and the statute does
not advance the inquiry unless Congress understood the report to
preclude liability for disparate impact. Professor Blumrosen and others
point to the bill's statement of purpose and the remarks of several
members of Congress as evidence of this intent. In truth, this evidence is no more conclusive than the report itself. Concededly, the
statement of purpose suggests the need for cooperative efforts, apart

in such programs. See supranotes 96-100 and accompanying text. Seniority systems, by contrast,
generally are facially neutral, but can operate in an age-related manner. The exception operates
to preclude liability based on that impact - even when it operates against older workers absent evidence of a bad intent. See Cook v. Pan Am. World Airways, 647 F. Supp. 816, 820
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (although method employed for integrating seniority rosters had an adverse
effect on older workers, seniority exception precluded liability absent unlawful motive), affd,
817 F.2d 1030 (1987); cf. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 64-65 (1982) (holding
that a similar exception under Title VII exempts seniority systems from liability that would
otherwise attach under disparate impact theory).
329. See Blumrosen, supra note 19, at 85-91; C. BOLICK, supra note 19, at 4; Schneiderman,
supra note 273, at 209; Stacy, supra note 273, at 441-43.
330. See, e.g., 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 99, at 23, 31 (Senators Javits and Randolph); 1967 SENATE REPORT, supra note 71, at 170; 113 CONG. REC. 34,741-2 (1967) (Representatives Perkins, Burke, and Matsonaga).
331. ADEA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988).
332. Id. § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 622 (1988).
333. Id. § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 6?4 (1988).
334. See Blumrosen supra note 19, at 85-91; Schneiderman supra note 273, at 209; Stacy,
supra note 273, at 442-43.
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from legal prohibitions, to combat some of the adverse effects of age
discrimination. But this dual approach does not necessarily establish,
any more than it did in the report, an intent to address adverse effects
exclusively through cooperative efforts.
Individual remarks made during deliberations on the age bill are
similarly inconclusive. As one might expect, several statements focused on the harshest and most common form of discrimination restrictions based on stereotypes and unfounded assumptions about
aging.= But it does not follow from these remarks that Congress
intended to limit the ADEA to this problem alone. Indeed, to confine
the statute to the harshest example of age discrimination would
exclude not only disparate impact liability but certain kinds of overt
age restrictions that Professor Blumrosen presumably would find unlawful. Consider, for example, an overt age limit based not on an
irrational stereotype or unfounded assumption but on an accurate,
albeit overbroad, generalization about the ability of the excluded age
group as a whole.m This form of discrimination literally falls outside
the scope of most of the legislative statements. Yet courts properly
subject such practices to scrutiny under the ADEA because, though
they are less pernicious than unfounded stereotypes, they operate
similarly to disqualify based on group status alone without allowance
for individual variances.337 Insofar as Professor Blumrosen's emphasis
on legislative remarks would exclude this kind of age restriction from
the reach of the Act, his argument, though offered only to show the
exclusion of disparate impact, clearly cuts too broadly.
Moreover, if the answer to the disparate impact question is to
come from snippets of the legislative history, there are snippets that

335. See, e.g., 113 CONG. REc. 31,254 (1967) (problem stems from "pure ignorance" and
'Irrational belief' that workers past a certain age become less able) (Sen. Javits); 113 CONG.
REC. 34,744 (1967) (age discrimination arises out of "old beliefs and myths that have been
proved untrue") (Rep. Pucinski); 113 CONG. REC. 34,746 (1967) ("the stereotype of an inflexible
person, in physical decline, capable of only low productivity, bars the employer from a fair

evaluation") (Rep. Olsen).
336. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (equal
protection challenge to state's age 50 mandatory retirement age for police officers). Applying
the "rational basis" standard for assessing non-suspect classifications under the fourteenth amendment, the Court upheld the age restriction as at least rationally related to the physical demands
of the job. Id. at 314.
337. See, e.g., Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 423 (1985) (rejecting age 60
as a BFOQ for airline flight engineers notwithstanding general correlation between age and
certain increased health risks); cf. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart,
435 U.S. 702, 716-17 (1978) (holding that Title VII ban on gender discrimination applies both
to distinctions based on unfounded stereotypes and to distinctions based on truthful, but overbroad, generalizations).
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are consistent with liability under the Act. In the only specific illustration of the latitude employers would have in using reasonable non-age
factors to select employees, Senator Yarborough approvingly referred
to job-related test requirements.- Significantly, this statement did
not endorse the use of all neutral devices, however unrelated to an
employer's needs, but those that relate to the requirements of the
job. While this cryptic statement hardly constitutes an explicit or
conscious endorsement of a particular theory of liability, it is nevertheless consistent with the basis of disparate impact.
A study on age discrimination contained in the record of the committee hearings before the House is more explicit.33 This study was
commissioned by the California legislature to facilitate its effort to
combat age discrimination in its public agencies. Included in the report
is a discussion of "hidden discrimination," which warns of the harm
caused by a careless use of neutral requirements that operate more
harshly against older workers.3 ° In language strongly reflective of the
concerns of disparate impact theory, the report stated: "Physical or
performance standards in excess of actual job requirements close the
door to many persons who could provide long years of service. '"Notably, the California report was simply included in the legislative
record and not explored in detail. However, the point here is not
seriously to offer the California report or Senator Yarborough's remarks as clear evidence of congressional intent, but to suggest the
folly of searching for "smoking gun" statements to answer the disparate impact question. As noted earlier, employment discrimination law
was still in its infancy in 1967, and the different theories of discrimination had yet to evolve. Indeed, the legislative history of Title VII
shows a Congress equally preoccupied with overt discrimination in its
discussion of that statute, yet this did not foreclose the recognition
of disparate impact liability in Griggs.3 - The reality is that in attending
to the most obvious form of race discrimination, the Title VII Congress
never consciously addressed the subtler problem of disparate impact,
but adopted statutory language which was broad enough to embrace
it. This arguably describes the ADEA experience as well.

338. See 113 CONG. REC. 31,253 (1967); see also supra note 120 (Yarborough statement
quoted in full).
339. 1967 House Hearings, supra note 99, at 161-202.
340. Id. at 192-93.
341. Id. at 192.
342. See supra notes 303-05 and accompanying text.
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C.

Statutory Language and the RFOA Exception

Given the claim by Professor Blumrosen and others that Congress
intended the ADEA to prohibit a narrower brand of discrimination
than that prohibited by Title VII, one might expect to find such a
distinction brightly flagged in the statutory language. Instead, the
ADEA's substantive prohibitions contained in section 4(a) track those
of Title VII nearly verbatim. 4 Similarly, while Professor Blumrosen
trumpets that the ADEA Congress intended to limit the Act to a
singular evil by its references to "arbitrary" discrimination, this modifier appears nowhere in the substantive provisions of the statute.
Rather, the concept of arbitrary discrimination is reflected more diffusely, as in Title VII, by the presence of limited exceptions. 3 4 These
exceptions, particularly the BFOQ provisions allowing employers the
limited right to use age or sex as an indicator of performance, operate
in both statutes to signify that distinctions based on protected traits
are not always illegitimate or arbitrary. 45 Thus, the notion of arbitrary
discrimination is not unique to the ADEA but is implicit in the structure of both statutes.
The similarity in language becomes more significant in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 346 where the
Court effectively interpreted such language to embrace disparate impact as a definition of discrimination under Title VII 47 While Professor
Blumrosen acknowledges this gloss, he maintains that the statutory
words themselves do not compel such an interpretation. m Further,
because Griggs still was unknown in 1967, he argues that:

343. Compare ADEA § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988) with Title VII § 703(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a) (1982). See also supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
344. See Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 775,
776 (W.D. Tenn. 1979) (Act does not impose on employee an additional burden of proving that
the age discrimination was arbitrary).
345. See supra notes 52-93 and accompanying text (discussing age and gender BFOQs).
346. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
347. Id. at 430. In Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 448 (1982), the Supreme Court

confirmed that disparate impact under Griggs rested on a construction of § 703(a)(2) of Title
VII. This provision, which is the equivalent of ADEA § 4(a)(2), makes it unlawful for an employer
"to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1982); see also, Strangers in Paradise,supra

note 279, at 74 (referring to this language as the "anchor" for Title VII disparate impact liability).
348.

Blumrosen, supra note 19, at 94.
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[T]he [ADEA] legislators may be forgiven for using the substantive language of Title VII to express a narrower principle
than that which the [C]ourt later held was applicable under
Title VII. The language of the ADEA, without the gloss of
Griggs, is consistent with the conclusion that Congress
sought only to eliminate specific age barriers.3 9

Professor Blumrosen is correct that the language alone, without the
gloss of Griggs, does not require an interpretation that would include
disparate impact. However, the significance of the language lay not
in the ambiguous words themselves but in Congress's choice to use
Title VII language as the guide for the ADEA. This choice was not
accidental, but reflected Congress's desire to extend Title VII-like
protection to the age setting. Senator Murphy underscored this linkage
when he explained during committee hearings that the age bill would
plug the "loophole" Congress created when it omitted "age" from the
coverage of Title VII. 5 Senator Javits echoed the same theme from

the floor of the Senate when he stated, with a note of vindication,
that the age bill would confirm the views of those legislators who, in
1964, thought that age discrimination was serious enough to include
within the original Title VII. 1 While this conscious reliance on Title
VII may not reflect a specific intent to endorse a theory still to be
announced, it strongly suggests an expectation that language in common would be read in pari materia.The courts, including the Supreme
Court, have consistently used this principle to guide their interpretations of the ADEA.- 2 Moreover, though the ADEA has been amended

349. Id. at 95.
350. 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 99, at 32.
351. 113 CONG. REC. 31,254 (1967). Senator Javits was referring to the unsuccessful efforts
in 1964 to add "age" to the Title VII bill. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. Several
other legislators explicitly referred to the Title VII analogy in expressing their support for the
ADEA. See 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 99, at 29 (Sen. Smathers); 1967 House Hearings,
supra note 99, at 457, 461 (Reps. Kelly and Price); 113 CONG. REC. 34,742 (Rep. Matsunaga).
But cf. 113 CONG. REC. 34,742 (1967) (Rep. Burke). Representative Burke observed that age
discrimination is based on misconceptions about older workers' abilities and not on the same
type of hostility associated with race discrimination. While this might initially suggest an attempt
(by him) to distance the ADEA from Title VII, Representative Burke concluded his remarks
by referring directly to the protection afforded by Title VII and noting that 'it is only just that
we do the same against discrimination based on age." Id. This Title VII analogy was emphasized
again as Congress prepared to amend the ADEA in the 1970s. See H.R. REP. No. 67, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1975) (Report from the House Select Committee on Aging noting that age
should be as protected a classification as race and sex).
352. See, e.g., Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 412 (1985) (interpreting BFOQ
provision of the ADEA narrowly like its Title VII counterpart); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans,
441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) ("Since the ADEA and Title VII share a common purpose, . . . since
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on several recent occasions,3 Congress has never acted to repudiate
a construction based on the Title VII analogy. For these reasons, the
"gloss of Griggs" cannot be discounted so easily.
Still, critics note that the ADEA and Title VII are not identical.
Thus, while Congress could have outlawed age discrimination by
amending Title VII, it chose to enact a separate statute and borrowed
the somewhat different enforcement procedures of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. But Congress apparently chose this route for administrative reasons - to avoid overburdening the EEOC and to place
enforcement in the Department of Labor - not to signal substantive

differences in protection.
A second distinction between the ADEA and Title VII warrants

more attention. Unique to the ADEA is the statutory provision allowing employers to take action based on "reasonable factors other than

age." 15 For many commentators, and apparently for Justice Rehnquist
as well, this facial difference between the statutes evinces an intent

to foreclose liability based on disparate impact. 5 7 Under this view,
the explicit protection for age-neutral factors confines the statute to
a disparate treatment model of discrimination. This analysis, however,
begs the question because we cannot know what constitutes a "factor
other than age" without first agreeing on a definition of age discrimi-

nation.m If, as commentators claim, the Act is meant to prohibit only

the language of [ADEA] § 14(b) is almost in haec verba with [Title VIII § 706(c), and since the
legislative history of § 14(b) indicates that its source was § 706(c), we may properly conclude
that Congress intended that the construction of § 14(b) should follow that of § 706(c)."); Loeb
v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1015 (1st Cir. 1979) (given the similarities in the statutes'
substantive provisions, one would expect to use the same methods and burdens of proof); see
also cases cited supra note 272 (relying on Title VII analogy to support use of disparate impact
analysis under the ADEA). But cf. Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 312-16 (6th Cir.
1975) (recognizing appropriateness of Title VII analogy but cautioning against automatic application).
353. See supra note 28. For a more detailed listing of the ADEA's several amendments,
see H. EGLIT, 2 AGE DISCRIMINATION § 16.01 n.9 (1989).
354. See ADEA § 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988), incorporating by reference Fair Labor
Standards Act §§ 11(b), 15, 16, 17, 29 U.S.C. §§ 211(b), 215, 216, 217 (1988). For discussion of
some of the effects of this provision on ADEA procedures, see supra note 7.
355. See 1967 House Hearings, supra note 99, at 141-43, 413-14; 113 CONG. REC. 31,254
(Sen. Javits). In 1979 administrative responsibility for the ADEA was transferred from the
Department of Labor to the EEOC. See supra note 7.
356. ADEA § 4(f)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 623()(1) (1988); see also supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
357. See supra note 277.
358. See C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER, R. RICHARDS, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 321
(1988).
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intentional age-based treatment, then it follows indeed that "factors
other than age" would include all facially neutral factors, even when
they have an age-based effect, absent a finding of unlawful intent. 9
But if the Act is concerned as well with unjustified discriminatory
effect, the RFOA exception can be read so that a "factor other than
age" would have to pass muster under both disparate treatment and
disparate impact theories. Under this reading, a facially neutral rule
adopted without hostile intent still would fail as a "factor other than
age" if it caused an age-based effect and was not sufficiently job related. This interpretation is consistent with the exception's limitation
to reasonablenon-age factors - a limitation that suggests an objective
standard review. Disparate impact theory supplies this standard by
imposing a requirement of job-relatedness.
Once again, the legislative history provides little guidance for
choosing between these competing constructions. Isolated remarks and
passages in the legislative record merely suggest a general effort by
Congress to reassure employers that the Act would not protect older
workers who lacked the ability to perform the job.3 - Consistent with
this, employers would remain free to make decisions based on factors
that might accompany advancing age, such as declining health or diminished competence. 3 6' This might suggest, as critics contend, a broad
license for an "employer [to] use a ground for decision that is not age,
even if it varies with age."362 But the few examples cited in the legislative record arguably hint at a more limited license based on the use
of job-related measures of ability. This is consistent with disparate
impact theory.
The Department of Labor's original guidelines, issued in 1968 to
interpret the newly passed statute, adopted this latter view.3- The
regulations emphasize that to qualify as a "reasonable factor" the
standard at issue must not only be applied uniformly but also must
be "reasonably necessary for the specific work to be performed" 3 4 or

359. Under such a reading, the apparent limitation of the exception to "reasonable" factors
would serve solely as a euphemism for motive. A facially neutral factor that was so lacking in
reason as to suggest that it was used as a pretext for age would not be protected.
360. See supra note 120.
361. See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1016 (1st Cir. 1979).
362. Metz, 828 F.2d at 1220 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
363. 29 C.F.R. §§ 860.103(f), .104(b) (1986).
364. Id. § 860.103(f)(1)(i) (:986) (referring to physical fitness requirements).
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"shown to have a valid relationship to job requirements. ' ' 36 These
requirements clearly exceed the demands of disparate treatment and
approach the framework of disparate impact. Concededly, interpretive
guidelines that reflect an agency's understanding of the law it administers are influential but not controlling36 But the Department of
Labor's contemporaneous understanding of the newly passed statute
is unusually germane, given its involvement and influence in the legislation. 7 Indeed, the ADEA is said to embody the views of the Depart-

ment as reflected in the Secretary of Labor's pre-Act report to Congress.ca The 1968 regulations presumably reflected these same views
as they were promulgated under the auspices of the same secretary

who authored the report 69 Critics who interpret the report (and thus
the ADEA) to preclude disparate impact fail to account for the contrary
understanding expressed in these regulations.

The critics advance a stronger argument, however, when they
draw upon the Equal Pay Act (EPA) 70 and the construction of a
provision that resembles the RFOA exception. The EPA, enacted as
an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act, prohibits a form of

gender discrimination by outlawing unequal pay for equal work. 37' An
EPA employer may avoid liability under four statutory exceptions,
one of which protects wage disparities based on "any other factor

365. Id. § 860.103(0(2) (1986) (referring to factors based on educational level or that measure
quantity or quality of production). Guidelines on employee testing are even more explicit, stating
that a validated test will be treated as a reasonable factor "when such test is specifically related
to the requirements of the job." Id. § 860.104(b) (1986). These guidelines further explain that
the use of such tests will be carefully scrutinized because of the risk that able, older candidates
may simply suffer from a lack of recent testing experience. Id.
366. See General Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (citing Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
367. The weight accorded an agency's interpretation is generally greater when it was made
contemporaneously with, or shortly following, the enactment of the statute. See Bingler v.
Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 749-50 (1969).
368. See supra notes 330-33 and accompanying text (acknowledging the linkage between
the Secretary's report and the resulting legislation).
369. Willard Wfrtz served as Labor Secretary until the end of the Johnson administration
in January 1969.
370. Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988).
371. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1988). To establish a prima fade case, an EPA employee must
make a fairly particularized showing tailored to the narrow evil identified in the statute. Thus,
a plaintiff must show that (1) an employer pays different wages to employees of the opposite
sex, (2) at the same establishment, (3) 'or equal work on jobs the performance of which requires
equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions."
Id. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974); Hein v. Oregon College of Educ.,
718 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1983).
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'
other than sex. 'a72
The Supreme Court has indicated in dicta that this
defense precludes liability based on disparate impact.3 73 Commentators
argue that the parallel exception in the ADEA should be given a
similar construction.- 7
There are several reasons for resisting this argument, however.
First, the RFOA exception is not as expansive as its EPA counterpart.
While the EPA provision reads as an absolute defense that insulates
any factor other than sex, the ADEA protects only reasonable factors. 75 As noted above, this modification invites scrutiny under an
objective standard and can be read to require an inquiry into the
job-relatedness of the challenged criterion.3 76 Second, there is nothing
in the legislative history of the ADEA pointing to the Equal Pay Act
or to the "any factor other than sex" exception to indicate any conscious
reliance on the substantive standards of that statute. For substantive
standards, Congress chose Title VII as its model.Lastly, incorporation of the Equal Pay Act would do more than
oust disparate impact; it would seriously disrupt the burdens of proof

372. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)iiv) (1988).
373. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170-171 (1981). The Court in
Gunther addressed the "any factor other than sex" defense indirectly. The primary issue concerned the meaning of Title VII's Bennett Amendment - a provision that incorporates aspects
of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 163. See Title VII § 703(h), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(h) (1982). The employer in Gunther argued that because the Bennett Amendment
incorporated the Equal Pay Act in its entirety, a plaintiff could not assert a claim of gender-based
wage discrimination under Title VII if such a claim could not be raised under the narrow "equal
work" requirement of the EPA. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 168. A majority of the Court disagreed,
holding that the Bennett Amendment only incorporated the four affirmative defenses of the
EPA (including the "any factor other than sex" defense) and not the threshold "equal work"
requirement. Id. at 169-70. In its argument to the Court, the employer had criticized such a
construction on the ground that similar defenses already existed within Title VII and that a
limited incorporation would render the Bennett Amendment superfluous. Id. at 169. Compelled
to respond, the Court maintained that incorporating the "any factor other than sex" defense
could have independent significance in litigation involving claims of gender-based wage discrimination. The Court demonstrated this significance by suggesting (albeit unclearly) that the defense
could affect the availability of disparate impact liability. Id. at 170.
374. See Schneiderman, supra note 273, at 210-12; Stacy, supra note 273, at 447; Note,
supra note 19, at 845-46; see also Player, Title VII Impact Analysis Applied to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Is a Transplant Appropriate?, 14 TOL. L. REv. 1261, 1280-83
(1983) (arguing that the "any factor other than sex" defense does not preclude, but significantly
dilutes, the nature of disparate impact liability under the ADEA, so that a court could not
require an employer to adopt a feasible less restrictive alternative).
375. Compare EPA § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1988) with ADEA § 4(f)(1), 29 U.S.C. §
623(f(1) (1988).
376. See supra notes 358-69 and accompanying text.
377. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584-85,(1978).
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in traditional disparate treatment cases. Recall, in this regard, that
ADEA case law generally tracks the Title VII paradigm for proving
instances of intentional discriminations3s Under this paradigm, a plaintiff assumes the relatively light burden of establishing an inference of
unlawful motive through general circumstantial evidence. Since this
evidence generally creates only a modest inference of discrimination,
the employer assumes only a burden of production, not proof, and
simply must articulate a believable, nondiscriminatory explanation for
the adverse action.m This flexible proof scheme accommodates the
fact that the plaintiff generally lacks direct evidence of intent and, in
its generality, the scheme is consistent with the broad scope and range
of wrongs covered by both Title VII and the ADEA.
The proof scheme is appropriately different under the Equal Pay
Act. The plaintiff initially must assume a more exacting burden tailored
to the narrower range of wrongs covered by that statute. ° And, since
a prima facie case showing that women receive lower pay for equal
work creates a fairly strong inference of gender-based discrimination,
it is not surprising that the employer's responsive burden is affected
accordingly. The "any factor other than sex" exception is recognized
as an affirmative defense and the employer must prove, not just assert,
that a bona fide non-sex factor caused the wage disparity. 1 Certainly
one could force this gloss onto the ADEA, reading the RFOA exception
to impose on employers the weightier burden of disproving an inference of age-based intent. But such an interpretation "wouldignore the
ADEA's stronger ties to Title VII. It also would create an odd jurisprudence in which the law in disparate treatment cases would afford
plaintiffs greater protection from discrimination based on age than it
provides for discrimination based on race or gender. Those who would
use the Equal Pay Act to interpret the RFOA exception and limit
the ADEA fail to consider this anomaly.
To be sure, this analysis of the language, like the earlier discussion
of the Secretary's report and the legislative history, allows but does

378. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
379. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 261 (1981); cf. Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1787-89, 1795 (1989) (entire burden of proof shifts to

the employer when the plaintiff presents direct evidence of unlawful motive).
380. See supra note 371; see also Hodgson v. Golden Isles Convalescent Homes, Inc., 468
F.2d 1256, 1258 (5th Cir. 1972) (equality of work between nurse's aides and orderlies could not
be determined on an industry-wide basis); Beall v. Curtis, 603 F. Supp. 1563, 1581 (M.D. Ga.

1985) (equality of job not established between nurse practitioners and physician's assistants in
clinic).
381. See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196 (1974).
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not compel the adoption of disparate impact under the ADEA. But
the purpose here merely is to refute the contention that these sources
are decisive barriers and to suggest that the Title VII connection
creates at least a prima facie basis for applying disparate impact theory
to age cases. Ultimately, the issue must turn on an assessment of
policy - specifically, an assessment of any policy basis for severing
or confirming the Title VII connection. While critics may not endorse
this framework, as they rely principally on their ability to divine
legislative intent, they too resort to policy considerations to bolster
their argument.
D.

Policy Considerations

The policy argument against the inclusion of disparate impact under
the ADEA rests on two related claims: that age discrimination is
different and less invidious than discrimination based on race, and
that the underlying function of disparate impact as developed in race
cases does not apply in the age setting.
1. A Comparison of Age and Race Discrimination
The critics' comparison of race and age discrimination derives from
the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence and its two-tiered
framework for assessing equal protection challenges under the fourteenth amendment. In the leading case, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,s the Court upheld the validity of a state law
requiring state police officers to retire at age fifty. The outcome turned
on the Court's holding that "age" was not a "suspect" classification
warranting the kind of strict scrutiny reserved for racial classifications. 4 Instead, age policies would be tested, and routinely upheld,
under a relaxed "rational basis" standard of review. 38 The Court found
that the Massachusetts age restriction satisfied this standard because
physical capacity ultimately declines with age.8

382. See Blumrosen, supra note 19, at 102-06; Schneiderman, supra note 273, at 204-07;
Stacy, supra note 273, at 438-39; Note, supra note 19, at 848-54; see also Note, The Age
Discriminationin Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARV. L. REV. 380, 382 (1976) [hereinafter
Harvard Note] (while not addressing the issue of disparate impact, the author suggests that
differences between age and race discrimination should affect the interpretation of the ADEA).
383. 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam).
384. Id. at 312-14.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 311, 314-16.
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To justify this deferential review, the Murgia Court cited three
distinctions between race and age: (1) the aged, unlike the victims of
racism, have not experienced a "history of purposeful unequal treatment";8 (2) the aged have not been victimized by "stereotyped characm
teristics not truly indicative of their abilities"; and (3) "old age"
merely defines a stage of life, not a "discrete and insular group in
need of extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."
By way of analogy, commentators cite these distinctions to
justify lesser protection under the ADEA.M
The Murgia Court's analysis, however, should not be applied in
the statutory setting. First, without denying the unique history and
legacy of racism, the problems of age discrimination are surely greater
than the Court's uncritical assessment would suggest. Indeed, although
the Court declared that older workers have not been victimized by
damaging stereotypes not truly indicative of their abilities, 39 ' Congress
enacted the ADEA on the very opposite premise. s 9 Similarly, while
the Court would uphold state-sponsored age policies based on the
barest generalization about aging and ability,39 the ADEA would flatly
condemn such policies absent the rare case in which the targeted age
could be justified as a BFOQ. m This statutory protection is consistent
with the body of data showing that aging is an individual process and
rejecting the canard that older workers are necessarily less able.395
Finally, despite the fact that age itself is transient in the sense that
it changes annually, the Court failed to realize that "old age," that
phase of life in which age is most likely to be used in a stigmatizing
fashion, is surely as immutable as one's race or gender.
387. Id. at 313 (quoting San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
388. Id.
389. Id. at 313-14. The Court subsequently applied the Murgia rationale to uphold the
validity of a federal mandatory retirement policy for white collar foreign service officers generally
engaged in sedentary work. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
390. Schneiderman, supra note 273, at 206-07; Stacy, supra note 273, at 438-39; Harvard
Note, supra note 382, at 383-84; Note, supra note 19, at 852; see also Blumrosen, supra note
19, at 103-04 (not citing Murgia but drawing similar distinctions between race and age discrimination).
391. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313.
392. See ADEA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. 621(b) (1988). The Secretary of Labor's pre-ADEA report
to Congress disclosed that age ceilings based on unfounded stereotypes were pervasive in the
workplace. SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 25, at 7-8.
393. In upholding the mandatory retirement policy in Murgia,the Court was satisfied that:
"Since physical ability generally declines with age, mandatory retirement at age 50 serves to
remove from police service those whose fitness for uniformed work presumptively diminished
with age. This clearly is rationally related to the state's objective." 427 U.S. at 315.
394. See Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
395. See studies cited supra notes 90 & 193.
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Furthermore, even accepting the Murgia Court's causal and somewhat inaccurate assessment of age discrimination, its discussion was
tied specifically to the special concerns the Court must balance in the
constitutional setting under the fourteenth amendment. These concerns stem principally from the Court's traditional reluctance to overturn legislative judgments unless it has reason to regard those judgments as suspect.3 97 In equal protection cases, therefore, the Court
will ordinarily presume the regularity of a legislative enactment unless
the enactment disadvantages a group that has been historically stigmatized and unable to protect itself through the political-legislative
process.3 98 It was in this context that the Murgia Court compared
racism and age discrimination and found that older workers cannot
lay claim to the same legacy of hostile treatment and exclusion from
political institutions. 3 - Its characterization that "old age" defines a
phase of life and not a more discrete class 400 was meant to illustrate
that older workers generally have been able to seek redress through
legislative channels and do not need the extraordinary intervention of
the judiciary. This reasoning does not discount the existence of age
discrimination or deny that in particular settings the elderly may face
systemic obstacles similar to those erected against other groups, 40 1 but
it confirms that recourse lies in the statutory realm. The enactment
of the ADEA illustrates this point. It demonstrates the ability of the
elderly to protect their interests through the political process, and it
reflects the congressional judgment that special protection is necessary, at least in the confines of the workplace.
There are further reasons for resisting the critics' attempt to incorporate into a statute distinctions drawn in the context of the fourteenth

396. See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312-14.
397. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) ('the judiciary may not sit
as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations
made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines").
398. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973). The Court explained
that a suspect class is one "saddled with such disabilities, . . . or relegated to . . . such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process." Id. at 28.; see also United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
53 n.4 (1938).
399. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313-14.
400. See id.
401. Indeed, while emphasizing its limited role under the fourteenth amendment, that Court
wished "not [to] make light of the substantial economic and psychological effects premature and
compulsory retirement can have on an individual," and noted that 'the problems of retirement
have been well documented and are beyond serious dispute." Murgia, 427 U.S. at 316-17 (footnotes omitted).
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amendment. Consider that, under the Court's equal protection hierarchy, gender classifications are deemed less invidious than race and
are denied full "suspect" status;462 yet, it is settled that disparate
403
impact under Title VII applies equally to race and gender cases.
More to the point, in Washington v. Davis,404 the Supreme Court

expressly rejected the call for parallel treatment of employment discrimination claims brought under the fourteenth amendment and under
Title VII. The Court spgcifically held that, because of the greater
deference owed to legislative judgments in constitutional adjudication,
liability under the fourteenth amendment could not be based on disparate impact alone, but would require proof of discriminatory purpose. 40 5
The message here is that the ranking of discrimination in the constitutional context need not have implications in the statutory setting.
Still, the possibility exists that, regardless of the fourteenth amendment, differences between age and race discrimination are sufficiently
sharp to affect the scope of the ADEA. Based on the critics' commentary, these differences coalesce around two related points: that age
discrimination is based on unconscious stereotypes and not malevolence; and that, while race and ability are inherently unrelated, age
and ability are at least at some point inherently linked. 406
The first distinction is questionable on several counts. First, conceding its accuracy, the assertion that age discrimination results from
unconscious stereotyping arguably cuts in favor of, not against, the
application of disparate impact in age cases. While an intent-based
theory might be useful to address discrimination characterized by deliberate hostility, such a theory may prove ineffective in ferreting out
unconscious bias. In this latter setting, it may be more natural to

402. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). While the "mere rationality"
test has been applied more rigorously to gender classifications, and some justices have openly
adopted an intermediate level of scrutiny in such cases, the Court has generally refrained from

treating gender as an inherently suspect classification. Id. at 468-69; see also Califano v. Webster,
430 U.S.
403.
404.
405.
406.

313 (1977).
See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Id. at 239.
Stacy, supra note 273, at 438 (emphasizing correlation between declining ability and

age); Harvard Note, supra note 382, at 383-84 (emphasizing both points); Note, supranote 19,
at 850-53 (emphasizing both points); see also Blumrosen, supra note 19, at 79-80 (emphasizing
differences in historical roots of age discrimination and suggesting that "age," unlike race, is

transient and not immutable). Professor Blumrosen also cites testimony by Secretary WiLrtz to
Congress in which the Secretary observed that age discrimination was caused by unfounded
assumptions rather than outright antagonism. Id. at 80-82 (quoting 1965 House Hearings, supra

note 233, at 26).
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focus on the presence of discriminatory effect. 407 Secondly, the implications the critics draw from the distinction cannot be confined to age
cases. The critics' argument in this regard would jeopardize the availability of disparate impact in gender cases as well because gender
discrimination, like age, is based more on paternalistic stereotypes
than on malevolence. 4°s Finally, this emphasis on the greater animus
associated with racism exaggerates the difference between race and
age discrimination. To be sure, race discrimination is steeped in a
history of unparalleled hatred and bigotry. But race discrimination
today is often based on the same kind of stereotypes and group-based
assumptions about ability that form the basis of age discrimination.
Indeed, many economists assert that race discrimination persists
largely because of the economic incentive for employers to use race
(or some other group status) as a crude proxy for job-related traits. 40
The incentive exists because the proxy is convenient and inexpensive
to administer and because of the perception that the average black
employee comes to the workplace with disabilities in experience, education, and the like. 410 This perception may stem from the prevalence
of racial stereotypes and from the generalization that black employees
still suffer from a legacy of past discrimination and cultural deprivation. 411 Similarly, in the age setting, employers are tempted to utilize
age as a crude but inexpensive proxy for older workers' abilities rather
than undergo the more costly process of making individual assessments.
The critics' second distinction - that ability to perform can decline
with age but that ability and race are inherently unrelated - is accurate412 but requires clarification. Presumably, the critics' point is not

407. Cf. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (holding that
disparate impact analysis can apply to subjective employment criteria under Title VII and
reasoning that disparate treatment analysis could not adequately police the problem of subconscious stereotypes); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-99 (1985) (dicta suggesting that
disparate impact analysis is relevant under federal statute prohibiting discrimination against
the handicapped since such discrimination results from thoughtlessness not animus).
408. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 41, 137 (1974) ("Unlike
other forms of invidious discrirmination, sex discrimination has been characterized more by
paternalistic over-protection than by callous deprivation.").
409. See sources cited supra note 48.
410. See Arrow, supra note 42, at 28-27.
411. Id.; see also Fiss, supra note 41, at 251 (noting the influence of racial stereotypes and
the effects of past discrimination on employer assumptions about the productivity of black
employees).
412. Congress implicitly acknowledged this distinction by excluding race from Title VII's
BFOQ exception. Title VII § 708(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1982).
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to deny the possibility of a statistical correlation between race and
productivity in a particular setting but to emphasize that the correlation is not inherent in race itself. Rather, as noted above, "the source
of any correlation must be found in factors such as past discrimination,
cultural deprivation, history, or the like." 413 Age is different in that
the source of correlation can be physiological, a factor inherent in the
aging process. 414 While the age correlation also may arise from nonphysiological factors, such as a lack of recent testing experience or
the greater costs associated with senior salaries, it generally cannot
be traced to the effects of past discrimination. The question, then, is
whether this difference in the source of correlation should foreclose
the availability of disparate impact in age cases. Commentators who
claim that it should, interpret disparate impact theory narrowly defining it to prohibit unjustified neutral standards that perpetuate
the effects and burdens of past discrimination. 41 5 While this interpretation identifies an important function of disparate impact, it overlooks
developments and commentary emphasizing the theory's broader functions.
2. The Functions of Disparate Impact Theory
Disparate impact as a basis of liability is not self defining. Under
a pure disparate impact model, liability might be imposed whenever
a neutral rule produced a discriminatory effect. Its function would be
to guarantee "equal achievement" for protected groups. At the opposite extreme, disparate impact might function solely as a form of
disparate treatment in which discriminatory effect simply would constitute evidence of an unlawful motive. An intermediate model might
expand the law beyond the constraints of an intent-based system while
resisting liability based on disparate impact alone. The function of
such a model would be to enhance employment opportunities by
eradicating unnecessary barriers that impede the access of protected
groups. In applying this model, one would have to identify the range
of barriers that would be subject to scrutiny. Specifically, one would
have to determine whether to confine the model to barriers that perpetuate past discrimination or to extend the model to any unnecessary
barriers that identify traits linked to race, gender, or age.

413. Harvard Note, supra note 382, at 383.
414. See generally M. LEviNE, supra note 90, at 105-07 (examining data on the etiology
of aging).
415. See Blumrosen, supra note 19, at 103-04; Stacy, supranote 273, at 439; Note, supra
note 19, at 848-52.
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The Supreme Court clearly embraced some form of this equal opportunity, anti-barrier -model in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.416 Subsequent case law confirms that the model is not confined to barriers
that perpetuate past discrimination, a development which by itself
417
undercuts arguments to exclude disparate impact from the ADEA.
But it is important to demonstrate more affirmatively, however, why
disparate impact theory should apply to age discrimination. To do this
we must contrast the equal opportunity model with the other models
that have been rejected. The article will conclude by identifying the
functions of disparate impact under Title VII and demonstrating their
applicability in the age setting.
a. An Equal Achievement Model
Disparate impact might be utilized as a mechanism for ensuring
equal achievement in which the under-representation of minorities and
women in the work force would be addressed by enforcing a group
right to a proportional distribution (or redistribution) of jobs. The
disparate impact model might be structured to enforce this goal either
by predicating liability on adverse effects alone, without regard to
job-relatedness or the necessity of the neutral practice, or by adopting
a nearly insurmountable necessity standard that required near-perfect
validation or essentiality. In either case, the model would induce employers to hire sufficient minorities and women to ensure equal results
and avoid litigation.4 s Evidence that the Title VII Congress was concerned not only with the immorality of race discrimination but with
the consequences to the victims and the national economy might be
49
cited to support such a model. 1
But stronger evidence shows that the Title VII Congress rejected
such an absolute theory of liability. Congress added section 703(j) to

416. 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (endorsing disparate impact theory while cautioning that
"Congress has not commanded that the less qualified be preferred ... simply because of minority

origins.").
417. See cases cited infra notes 445-47.
418. Cf. Fiss, supra note 41, at 256 (referring to "racial hiring" as one form of insurance
against litigation); Vuyanich v. Republic Nat. Bank of Dallas, 505 F. Supp. 224, 262 (D. Tex.
1980) (contending that excessively high standards of proof can lead to an equal achievement
approach "by evidentiary default"), rev'd on other grounds, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1984).
For an early disparate impact case arguably adopting a de facto equal achievement approach,
see Johnson v. Pike Corp. of Am., 332 F. Supp. 490, 495 (D. Cal. 1971) (requiring the employer
to demonstrate an irresistible business demand for the challenged practice and to prove that
no other means existed to achieve its objective).
419. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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the statute to ensure that Title VII would not be interpreted to require
preferential treatment aimed at achieving proportional racial or gender
balance. 420 Further, the Supreme Court's post-Griggs decision in Connecticut v. Teal421 confirms that the disparate impact model does not
turn on equal achievement or proportional representation. 422 Lastly,
whatever arguments can be mustered in favor of preferential treatment for minorities and women, those arguments are less compelling
in the age setting.
b. An Intent Model
At the opposite end, disparate impact might be interpreted solely
as a component of disparate treatment in which a showing of adverse
effect would be probative evidence of intent to target the excluded
group. Confining disparate impact to an intent model, however, creates
several problems. First, the model cannot adequately protect against
evasion. Rarely will a neutral practice prove so irrational as to serve
no plausible business interest or convenience. When such a practice
operates to identify a protected category, it thus becomes difficult, if
not impossible, to expose the "psychological gloss" behind the decision . 23 Did the employer adopt the neutral practice because of its
convenience or because of its effect? This poses proof problems not
only for the plaintiff but for the judiciary. As Professor Fiss once
warned in this context, "[w]hat degree of confidence can be placed on
a court's finding on the motivation issue[?]"
Apart from the problem of evasion, an intent-based model would
not preclude an employer's negligent or unwitting use of harmful neu-

420. Section 703(j) states:
Nothing contained in [Title VII] shall be interpreted to require any employer...
to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account
of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage
of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any
employer . . . in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of
such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State, section,
or other area, or in the available work force in any community, State, section, or
other area.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j)(1982).
421.

422.
preclude
selection
423.
424.

457 U.S. 440 (1982).

Id. at 453-54 (holding that proportional racial balance at the "bottom line" does not
liability based on the disparate impact of a particular component of an employer's
process). For further discussion of Teal, see infranotes 438-41 and accompanying text.
Fiss, supra note 41, at 297.
Id.
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tral standards. Employers conceivably utilize educational standards,
tests, experience requirements, subjective processes, and salary comparisons without a conscious desire to target race, gender, or age.
The problem lies in using such devices uncritically, giving them controlling force on the faith that they are predictive, when they are not,
or in ignoring feasible, less restrictive alternatives.
Compounding
the problem is the risk that employers might tolerate the inaccuracy
of a harmful standard because of the low cost and ease of administering
it.426 If the Title VII and ADEA Congresses were concerned solely
with the immorality of basing decisions on race, gender, or age, the
statutes should be interpreted to ignore these problems. The statutes
would remain fault-based in nature, dedicated to exposing a discriminatory bias. 2 7 However, if, as the evidence suggests, both Congresses
were concerned with the personal and economic consequences of discrimination, 42 the statutes should be interpreted to catch unjustified
innocent devices that operate as harmfully as intentional ones.
One way to address these problems within an intent model would
be to formalize the structure of proof and infer intent whenever a
neutral rule foreseeably operated in a discriminatory fashion and could
not be explained as job related or necessary. 4 - This approach, however, is analytically unsound because it would reduce the intent inquiry
to merely a fiction by limiting the kinds of reasons the employer could
present to negate motive. Moreover, the employer's motive would still
be the primary focus. The more candid course would dispense with
motivation and convert this structure to an objective model that con3
demns the use of, not the reason for, unjustified criteria.4 1
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 31 represents the Supreme Court's distrust of an intent-based model under Title VII. The Court declared:
"Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of em-

425. See infra text accompanying notes 435-47 (discussing the safeguards afforded by the
equal opportunity model).
426. See sources cited supra note 43 (attributing discrimination to this incentive).
427. See generally Friedman, supra note 118, at 47-48 (describing disparate treatment as
a fault-based concept of discrimination concerned solely with the process of decisionmaking, not
with the result).
428. See ADEA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 621(a) (1988); see also supra notes 49, 194-98 and
accompanying text.
429. Indeed, this was the approach essentially employed by the panel majority in Metz,
828 F.2d at 1207 n.8, when it presumed an unlawful intent from the age-based impact of the
employer's seniority-salary criterion. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
430. See Fiss, supra note 41, at 298.
431. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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ployment practices, not simply the motivation. 4 3 2 The Court later
confirmed this distrust in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co.
when it held that disparate impact theory applied not only to objective
barriers such as test or education requirements, but also to subjective
processes that allow supervisors to cloak their conscious and unconscious biases.4 The Watson decision reflected the concern that the
disparate treatment model alone could not police this abuse.
c.

Equal Opportunity and the Anti-Barrier Model

Between the equal achievement and intent models, disparate impact theory would be interpreted to protect equal opportunity. Under
this view, the goal is not to coerce proportional representation but to
eradicate neutral barriers that identify disqualifying traits associated

with a protected group yet are not sufficiently job related or necessary.
The assumption is that the non-job-related barrier obscures what may
be the adequate abilities of protected individuals and denies them the
opportunity to compete on the merits. The model thus furthers an

interest in meritocracy by requiring the elimination of poor barometers
and the substitution of more accurate measures of productivity.4 Since
intent is irrelevant, the anti-barrier model would avoid the problems
of evasion and detection discussed above. At the same time, the model

might adopt a flexible, rather than insurmountable, standard of jobrelatedness and necessity so that it will not operate as a de facto equal
achievement model.
432. Id. at 432 (emphasis in original).
433. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
434. Id. at 989-91.
435. See Caldwell, supranote 49, at 574-83 (arguing that disparate impact theory promotes
opportunity and productive efficiency by eliminating the use of barriers that are not based on
merit); see also Friedman, supranote 118, at 63-82 (arguing that disparate impact is not designed
to guarantee jobs but to promote access).
436. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing, 109 S. Ct. at 2125-26 (expressing concern about the
pressure on employers to adopt quotas to avoid difficult disparate impact litigation, and holding
that the standard of justification fell between mere rationality and absolute necessity); New
York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979) (applying similar standard).
This is not to suggest that any justification standard stricter than the Wards Cove Packing
standard would necessarily lead to quota hiring and preferential treatment. While the Court
seemed to assume that such was the case, it is not immediately apparent that a stricter standard
- that allowed for greater scrutiny but still fell short of absolute necessity - would compel
employers to abandon fair standards and hire by race. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.,
444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.) (adopting a flexible business necessity standard), cert. dismissed,
404 U.S. 1006 (1971). Further, one can argue credibly that, if the Wards Cove Packing standard
lessens the pressure for employers to adopt prophylactic measures, the Court had no need to
go further and reduce the employer's responsive obligation from a burden of proof to a burden
of production. Indeed, in its reaction to the Wards Cove Packing decision, Congress sought
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This describes the model that evolved under Griggs and its progeny. The Griggs Court itself declared: "What is required by Congress
is the removal of artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers to employment .... [Glood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does
not redeem employment, procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to
measuring job capability. '' 4 7 The Court later underscored this anti-barrier rationale in Connecticut v. Teal,- a difficult case involving the
use of an exam that disproportionately excluded blacks from further
consideration for promotion. The case was difficult because the employer had "compensated" for the adverse impact by ensuring the
promotion of a sufficient number of minority candidates who had successfully completed the process." 9 Thus, the employer could show
parity at the "bottom line." The Court rejected the bottom line defense
as unresponsive to the exclusionary effect of the barrier at the competition stage.- 0 Title VII, the Court emphasized, "speaks, not in terms
of jobs and promotions, but in terms of limitations and classifications
that would deprive any individual of employment opportunities."~2 In
these terms, the test acted as a discriminatory barrier by excluding
a greater portion of blacks than whites from the opportunity to compete for promotion. The bottom line adjustment could not address that
harm.
The range of barriers subject to the equal opportunity model remains to be considered. Under one view, the model might be limited
to barriers that perpetuate disadvantages caused by past discrimination. This would confine the disparate impact theory to a kind of
redress model in which victims could obtain indirect redress for past
wrongs." 2 Griggs itself involved such barriers. Duke Power Company

legislation that would have retained a flexible justification standard while restoring to the
employer the full burden of proof on this issue. S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 Cong. Rec.
48045-48 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1990). President Bush vetoed the legislation on October 22, 1990.
Congress subsequently failed to override president Bush's veto. See supra note 147.
437. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 431-32.
438. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
439. Id. at 442-43.
440. Id. at 448-56.
441. Id. at 448 (emphasis in original).
442. See P. Cox, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 7-26 (1989) ("To the extent that reliance
is placed on historical discrimination to establish functional similarity, rather than upon high
correlations between [protected] status and innate characteristics ...[it] invokes a compensatory
rationale for the function of the [disparate] impact model."). As Professor Cox and others aptly
note, this rationale is imperfect. A literal redress model would be available only to those who
establish past victimization and a resulting inability to compete under the challenged practice.
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disadvantaged black applicants by using two requirements, a high
school diploma and a standardized test, that perpetuated historical
discrimination in education and were unnecessary for the blue collar
jobs in question.- 3 The past discrimination factor was helpful because
it enabled the Court to confirm that the adverse impact of these
requirements was indeed traceable to race."" But later decisions confirm that disparate impact can be shown without past discrimination.
Thus, barriers caused by strength and size requirements (which identify physiological traits characteristic of gender)," 5 rules against employing individuals because of drug use (which might operate in a
race-related manner)," 6 or the use of a subjective screening process
for promotions (which may allow white male decisionmakers to act on
their conscious or unconscious biases)," 7 all fall under the disparate
impact model. While these barriers may not identify disadvantages
attributable to past discrimination, they operate similarly to identify
disqualifying traits (inherent or otherwise) that can be linked to a
protected group. Consequently, they are a comparable threat to the
equal opportunity objective.
3. Enumerating the Functions and Applying Them to Age Cases
As suggested above, the overriding function of the disparate impact
model is to eliminate unnecessary obstacles to employment opportunity
that are linked to one's protected status. Eliminating such obstacles
facilitates fairer competition based on a true assessment of ability.
Within this objective, we can identify subsidiary functions, some of
which explain the theory as a handmaiden to the more limited disparate
treatment model. First, disparate impact theory guards against the
casual use of neutral standards that are - based on their impact and
their inability to adequately measure performance - the "functional
equivalents" of overtly discriminatory classifications.448 Second, like

Since it would be practically impossible for the courts to construct these histories, the theory
depends on group status alone as a proxy for victimization. Id. at 7-27; see also Fiss, Groups
and the Equal ProtectionClause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 107, 145 (1976).
443. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427-28.
444. Id. at 432.
445. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 339-40 (1977).
446. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 570 (1979).
447. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2782 (1988).
448. Professor Fiss is generally credited with first developing the concept of "functional
equivalence" to explain disparate impact. Fiss, supra note 41, at 296-304; see also Watson, 108
S. Ct. at 2785 (referring to neutral rules that may be "functionally equivalent to intentional
discrimination!).
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the prohibition of overt classifications, the disparate impact model
eliminates the temptation for employers to select crude screening devices because of their low cost and ease of administration rather than
their accuracy. 4 9 Finally, the model is a necessary alternative to a
pure motive system in which evidence of intent is often too elusive.
These functions are strongly applicable to the age setting. Working
backwards, the subsidiary functions are applicable given the unique
character of age discrimination. As noted earlier, age discrimination
is characterized more by indifference and thoughtless bias than by
overt hostility. 45° This fact alone makes detection of unlawful motive
impractical and enhances the risk of evasion.
Compounding the motive problem is the general availability of
competing economic reasons for choosing an inaccurate or unnecessary
policy. We saw this in the earlier part of the article discussing the
use of salary comparisons. On the one hand, a salary comparison can
correlate so strongly and obviously with age that one may legitimately
fear that an employer who relied on this comparison did so to cater
to impermissible age-related objectives, i.e., a preference for a more
youthful image, or a desire to restore "age balance" or enhance promotion opportunities for younger workers.451 On the other hand, consideration of salary costs during a reduction in force is facially rational.
If the employer used this criterion so exclusively as to overlook an
older worker's greater abilities, the employer might explain further
that he chose it despite its crudeness and impact because it was cheap
and easy to administer.15 2 And, if the employer imposed this criterion
despite a willingness by an older worker to accept a salary cut, the
employer might explain his unwillingness to accept this option by
citing a concern for employee morale.4- Recall again Professor Fiss's
admonition, "what confidence can one place in the judiciary's capacity
'
to identify the true subjective motivation in these circumstances. 45
Disparate impact is meant to lessen the problem by using an objective
standard to examine the need for the harmful policy and the suitability
of less restrictive alternatives.
As for the overriding function of protecting equal opportunity and
safeguarding the rights of older workers to compete on the merits,

449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.

See supra note 43.
See sources cited supra note 233.
See supra text accompanying notes 233-35.
See supra text accompanying notes 235-36.
See supra text accompanying notes 235-40.
Fiss, supra note 41, at 297.
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the ADEA speaks affirmatively about "promot[ing] [the] employment
of older persons based on ability rather than age." 4r This purpose also
is reflected in the provision defining the scope of the protected age
group, as the Act focuses not on age discrimination against anyone at
any age, but only on age discrimination against workers age forty and
over. 4 6 This distinction is critical. Were the Act simply designed to
outlaw arbitrary age distinctions at any age, it would reflect an
abstract concern with the fairness of age criteria in general, and not
a concern with the consequences of discrimination on any one vulnerable group. This abstract concern could be met simply by requiring
employers to purge overt age criteria from the decisionmaking process.
With that limited objective, the statute would be indifferent about
the effects of neutral practices on older workers as long as they were
not used as pretexts for overt age criteria.
But the ADEA Congress was not indifferent about these effects.
The statute defined older workers as a vulnerable group in need of
protection. 457 Congress recognized both the social and economic dimensions of the problem. On a social level, Congress spoke of the human
consequences of denying older workers the opportunity to work while
they remain able.45 In section 2, Congress specifically identified the
special problems older workers face when attempting to overcome
displacement late in their careers. 45 9 It noted as well the Secretary of
Labor's findings that such displacement can trigger prolonged periods
of unemployment that can, in turn, accelerate physical and mental
decline and further impair the older worker's employability. 4 w Congress also addressed this problem in economic terms, noting the harm
to the national economy caused by the premature loss of productive
labor and the increased burden placed on social security and other
461
tax-supported programs.
These concerns help to define the depth of a policy commitment
to promote the employment opportunities of older workers. A disparate impact analysis would safeguard this objective under the ADEA
much as it does under Title VII. Neutral rules which operate to identify

455. ADEA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988).
456. Id. § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1982); see also sources cited supranote 28 (noting the relevant
legislative history).
457. ADEA §§ 2, 12(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, 631(a) (1988). See generally SECRETARY'S
REPORT, supra note 25.
458. See supra notes 194-98 and accompanying text.

459.

ADEA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 621(a) (1988).

460.
461.

See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
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disqualifying traits associated with older age but fail to measure
adequately the capacity to perform the job in question, or that ignore
feasible alternatives, would be vulnerable. As it has in Title VII, this
kind of scrutiny would guard against the risk that a convenient, neutral
standard obscured, instead of measured, the older worker's
capabilities. This risk is considerable in the age setting because of the
interplay of two factors. Older workers often can be distinguished
from their younger counterparts on the basis of differences in formal
education, recent testing experience, perhaps physical endurance, and
as detailed earlier, salary level; yet studies show that older workers
often compensate for any physiological decline and generally match,
if not exceed, younger workers in actual job performance. 4 - Thus, the
risk is real that neutral measures can unfairly identify traits of aging
or longevity in the abstract rather than measure the person for the
job. Disparate impact, as conceived in Griggs, is meant to address
such a problem.'VII.

CONCLUSION

This article recommends a self-described "balanced" approach for
assessing the legitimacy of seniority-salary criteria and employer cost
needs under the ADEA. One danger in such an approach is that it
forfeits some of the advantages of a bright line solution to the problem.
Bright line solutions are generally more predictable and easier to
apply. The judiciary has provided a bright line solution by treating
seniority-salary criteria as the equivalent of overt age-based treatment
and by holding that economic reasons alone cannot justify such discrimination. To reach this result, the courts have drawn liberally on
Title VII anti-cost principles. Critics of this approach offer a bright
line solution by favoring the use of seniority-salary criteria in all instances, unless the criterion can be exposed as a ruse to eliminate
older workers. This article concludes that the ADEA demands the
tempering of both positions based on evidence that Congress was
sensitive to both employee and employer interests. Thus, in its zeal
to protect older workers from the consequences that flow from displacement, Congress was not indifferent about employer cost burdens.

462. See sources cited supra notes 90 & 193. The Secretary's report to Congress carefully
noted this dichotomy. It cited, on the one hand, "[florces of [c]ircumstance" that may correlate
more strongly with older workers, SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 25, at 8-9, 11-14, while
emphasizing, on the other hand, that "the competence and work performance of older workers
are, by any general measure, at least equal to those of younger workers." Id. at 8-9.
463. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436 ("What Congress has commanded is that any tests used must
measure the person for the job and not the person in the abstract.").
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Congress's concern in this area reveals a need for a mechanism
that will balance the needs of older employees and their employers.
Disparate impact theory best serves that function and should be available under the ADEA. Disparate impact theory spares the judiciary
from having to conduct a vain search for intent and allows it to inquire,
under an objective standard, whether the employer's cost-saving measure "significantly serves" the employer's legitimate needs. Assuming
it does, disparate impact theory would further permit the judiciary
to examine the feasibility of salary reduction as a less harmful alternative. To the extent that the application of this theory allows the
older workers to retain their jobs or to compete more equally in seeking
to retain them, it is consistent with the equal opportunity goals of the
statute and of the disparate impact model of discrimination.
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